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California Supreme Court Survey
February 1988-April 1988
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and
judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
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I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
An order to set aside a default judgment requires only
slight evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion: Shamblin v. Brattain.
In Shamblin v. Brattain, 44 Cal. 3d 474, 749 P.2d 339, 243 Cal. Rptr.
902 (1988), the supreme court held that the trial court had not abused
its discretion in setting aside a default judgment, unanimously revers-
ing the court of appeals.
The underlying case involved a real property dispute in which the
defendant and other co-defendants originally prevailed on all matters
except attorney's fees, which were reduced. The plaintiff appealed
and the defendant Brattain cross-appealed to reinstate the higher at-
torney's fees. The cross-appeal was dismissed as Brattain neglected
to provide funds for transcript preparation. Following this dismissal,
Brattain was mistakenly removed from the appellate court clerk's
mailing list, and subsequently did not receive any court documents
pertaining to the trial. The co-defendants continued to receive no-
tices and documents but did not file response briefs. When the date
for filing had passed, the court of appeal, in an unpublished decision,
reversed and remanded the trial court decision. Brattain did not re-
ceive a copy of the opinion. His attorney then filed a withdrawal
from the case, and in so doing, resubmitted Brattain's address to the
court. Notice of the retrial was then reportedly sent to the defend-
ant's address although the wrong zip code had been submitted by the
defendant's attorney. The defendant denied receiving the notice and
did not respond.
Brattain failed to appear at the retrial and a default judgment was
entered against him. The defendant eventually obtained information
regarding the default, hired a new attorney, and moved to have the
default set aside for excusable neglect under section 473 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 473 (West 1979). The
trial court granted the motion.
The court of appeal reversed on the grounds that granting the mo-
tion under such circumstances was an abuse of discretion. The
supreme court, however, reversed the court of appeal and reinstated
the trial court order.
The supreme court emphasized that a factual decision shall not be
reversed without a clear abuse of discretion. See 5 AM. JUR. 2D Ap-
peal & Error § 854 (1962). Furthermore, the court stated that an or-
der setting aside (as opposed to reinstating) a default judgment was
to be accorded great deference, and that only "very slight evidence"
was needed to justify lifting the default. See Weitz v. Yankosky, 63
Cal. 2d 849, 854, 409 P.2d 700, 704, 48 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1966); Elston
v. City of Turlock, 38 Cal. 3d 227, 233, 695 P.2d 713, 716, 211 Cal. Rptr.
416, 419 (1985) (citing Berri v. Rogero, 168 Cal. 736, 740, 145 P. 95, 97
(1914)). The trial court had viewed all the factual evidence and had
made face-to-face determinations of credibility. Thus, although there
was evidence to support either finding, the trial court's decision was
entitled to deference. See 5 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 473
(1973).
The importance of viewing evidence firsthand should not be under-
estimated. A reviewing court may not substitute its interpretations
of the evidence for those of the trial court, unless it is clear that the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. The law requires an abuse




Pursuant to section 667 of the Penal Code, the
defendant's entire prior conviction record may be
examined when a habitual criminal sentencing
enhancement is sought. If the facts of the prior offense
are not contained in the record, the court may not
impose an enhancement unless the statute involved in
the prior offense contains those elements required under
section 667: People v. Guerrero.
In People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d 343, 748 P.2d 1150, 243 Cal. Rptr.
688 (1988), the supreme court held that to enhance sentences under
the habitual criminal provisions of section 667 of the California Penal
Code [hereinafter section 667], "the trier of fact may look to the en-
tire record of the conviction" to determine "the truth of a prior-con-
viction allegation." Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d at 355, 748 P.2d at 1157, 243
Cal. Rptr. at 695; see 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habitual Criminals and Subse-
quent Offenders § 26 (1968) (oral testimony of accused, memoranda
of the court, and various records may be used to establish the truth
of prior conviction). The court's decision expressly overruled the
holding in People v. Alfaro, 42 Cal. 3d 627, 724 P.2d 1154, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1986), which limited the trier of fact's application of sec-
tion 667 to only the offenses contained in the judgment which con-
victed the defendant of the prior offense.
The defendant, Raymond Guerrero, was convicted by a jury for
residential burglary. In the penalty phase of the bifurcated trial, the
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prosecution contended that the enhancement provisions of section
667 should be imposed as the defendant had two prior convictions for
residential burglary. See generally 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 139 (1980)
(punishment for burglary may be enhanced based on prior convic-
tions). After examining the record of the defendant's conviction, the
trial court believed it could not strike any prior, and thus added five
years for each previous offense to the original sentence of six years.
On appeal, Guerrero maintained that under Alfaro, the trial court
erred when it determined the truth of the prior conviction based on
"evidence beyond the judgment of conviction." Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d
at 345, 748 P.2d at 1151, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 689. Agreeing with Guer-
rero, the court of appeal eliminated the enhancements based on the
holding in Alfaro that on examination, the record of conviction was
limited to "'the judgment and matters necessarily adjudicated
therein.'" Id. at 346, 758 P.2d at 1151, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 689. As the
crime of residential burglary at the time of Guerrero's prior convic-
tions did not contain all of the elements required for the "serious fel-
ony" of residential burglary under old section 1192.7(c) of the Penal
Code, the court of appeal reduced the sentence to six years. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West 1985) (amended 1986, current version
at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1988)) (listing serious
felonies applicable under section 667); see also 12A C.J.S. Burglary
§ 57 (1980) (distinction between types of burglary crimes).
The court determined that sections 667 and 1192.7 apply to criminal
conduct and not to "specific criminal offenses." Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d
at 348, 748 P.2d at 1152, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 690 (quoting People v. Jack-
son, 37 Cal. 3d 826, 831-32, 694 P.2d 736, 739, 37 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626
(1985)). The court examined the scope a trier of fact may inquire
into when the defendant has been previously convicted of residential
burglary. To delineate the parameters of this inquiry, the court ex-
amined the rationale of Alfaro, and concluded that the decisions cited
therein did not support the propositions for which they were cited.
The court first examined the holding in In re McVickers, 29 Cal. 2d
264, 176 P.2d 40 (1946), which involved an attempt by the prosecution
to use a Utah conviction of grand larceny to enhance the penalty for
a California conviction for the same crime. The McVickers court
held that the Utah offense could not be used under the California en-
hancement provisions, but looked first to the elements of the offense
in the respective states. The McVickers court noted that grand lar-
ceny in Ohio was established when the value of the stolen property
exceeded $50, whereas, in California, the property value must exceed
$200. See 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3387 (1985) (prosecution
must prove the prior convictions were the type set forth in the en-
hancement statute). After finding the Utah trial court record silent
as to the value of the property, the McVickers court was forced to
view the property value as no more than $50.01. The McVickers
holding was interpreted by the Guerrero court to suggest that "the
court may look to the entire record of the conviction to determine
the substance of the prior foreign conviction; when the record [is si-
lent] . . . the court will presume that the prior conviction was for the
least offense punishable under the foreign law." Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d
at 352, 748 P.2d at 1155, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 693. See generally 22 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3388 (1985) (enhancements based on crimes
in other jurisdictions).
The court then considered the application of the McVickers rule in
In re Seeley, 29 Cal. 2d 294, 176 P.2d 24 (1946) (Oregon conviction of
larceny in a building cannot enhance California penalty under bur-
glary provision when trial record clearly indicates the requisite intent
for burglary was not present), and In Re Finly, 68 Cal. 2d 389, 438
P.2d 381, 66 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1968) (Washington conviction for second
degree burglary cannot enhance California penalty under burglary
provision where elements of the foreign crime do not include all
those required by the California crime). The court rationalized that
an examination of the trial court record pertaining to the prior con-
viction is both desired by the citizenry of California and in the best
interest of the criminal justice system. Under this rationale, the
court rejected the defendant's contentions that the stated rule was in-
equitable and subjected criminal defendants to enhanced sentences
unforeseen at the original proceeding.
By allowing the trier of fact in a subsequent criminal trial to look
beyond the judgment to the entire record of a previous conviction for
purposes of determining whether a sentencing enhancement is appro-
priate, the court has reaffirmed its "hard line" approach to criminal
behavior. This decision is based on a somewhat dated trilogy of cases
and may create questions as to the type of evidence a defendant may
offer in defense. In overruling AUfaro, the court illustrated the faulty
reasoning of the Alfaro decision and added an additional disincentive
to habitual criminals who avoid section 667 enhancements by selec-
tively choosing the offenses they commit. With the espoused rule
now in place, perhaps the sentencing enhancements available under
section 667 will be a sufficient threat to curb the rapidly increasing
crime rate in California. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMES § 1014(e) (Supp. 1985) (discussion of section 667 history and
requirements).
STEVEN L. MILLER
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III. EDUCATION
Section 59300 of the Education Code requires school
districts to contribute a portion of the cost of educating
severely handicapped children, and the districts must be
reimbursed under article XIIIB, section 6 of the
California Constitution: Lucia Mar Unified School District
v. Honig.
In Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig, 44 Cal. 3d 830, 750
P.2d 318, 244 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1988), the California Supreme Court
found that section 59300 of the Education Code [hereinafter section
59300], effective in 1981, was in fact a "new program or higher level
of service" as contemplated by article XIIIB, section 6 of the Califor-
nia Constitution and therefore required state reimbursement.
Section 59300 states:
Notwithstanding any provision of this part to the contrary, the district of resi-
dence of the parent or guardian of any pupil attending a state-operated school
pursuant to this part, excluding day pupils, shall pay the school of attendance
for each pupil an amount equal to 10 percent of the ... excess annual cost of
education of pupils attending a state-operated school pursuant to this part.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 59300 (West Supp. 1988). This provision was en-
acted in response to the repeal of prior provisions requiring contribu-
tions of this type, which left the state to assume full responsibility for
funding deaf, blind, and neurologically handicapped schools.
At issue, however, is whether section 59300 is controlled by the
constitutional provision adopted by initiative in 1979 which states
that "whenever the legislature . . . mandates a new program or
higher level of service on any local government, the state shall pro-
vide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for
the costs. .. ." CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 6 (West Supp. 1988).
The Lucia Mar Unified School District, with other school districts
joining, followed the prescribed procedure for determining entitle-
ment to reimbursement, by filing a "test claim" before the Commis-
sion on State Mandates pursuant to sections 17521, 17551, and 17556
of the Government Code. The districts then petitioned for writ of
mandate and sued for declaratory relief and restitution against the
Commission, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the
Department of Education; all claims were denied by the trial court.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment, finding that the "shift in
funding of an existing program" does not come within the ambit of
the constitutional provision. Lucia Mar, 44 Cal. 3d at 834, 750 P.2d at
321, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
However, the supreme court's analysis differed, finding the Educa-
tion Code does create a new program or increased level of service.
The court began by restating the definition of "program" as: "[O]ne
that carries out the governmental function of providing services to
the public, or laws which, to implement a state policy, impose unique
requirements on local governments and do not apply generally to all
residents and entities in the state." Id. at 835, 750 P.2d at 322, 244
Cal. Rptr. at 680 (citing County of Los Angeles v. State, 43 Cal. 3d 46,
56, 729 P.2d 202, 208, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38, 43 (1987)).
The court found it "unquestionably" clear that section 59300 funds
are used to fund a program: the education of handicapped children,
with requirements on school districts not equally applicable to all
California residents. Although schools for handicapped children are
not "new," the contributions required by section 59300 are, since
prior to the effective date of the statute, school districts were not re-
quired to share these costs.
The court noted that the purpose of the constitutional provision
was to "preclude the state from shifting to local agencies the finan-
cial responsibility for providing public services in view of other re-
strictions on taxing and spending power of the local entities." Id. at
835-36, 750 P.2d at 322, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 680. The state is not allowed
to retain administrative control of a public program and subsequently
shift the costs to local entities simply because the programs are not
technically "new."
Next, the court decided whether the school districts were "man-
dated" to make the contributions called for by section 59300. The
court did not definitively decide the issue but found that the Com-
mission on State Mandates had the duty to decide, pursuant to sec-
tion 17551 of the Government Code, whether a local agency is
entitled to reimbursement under section 6 of article XIIIB of the Cal-
ifornia Constitution.
The court also found that the method of collection of funds appro-
priated by the state is "left to the reasonable discretion of the depart-
ment." Lucia Mar, 44 Cal. 3d at 837, 750 P.2d at 682, 244 Cal. Rptr. at
624. In Lucia Mar, the Department of Education sent invoices to
school district superintendents and when left unpaid, money was de-
ducted from state appropriations to the districts. The collection
methods were found reasonable. Thus, the case was remanded back
to the Commission for determination of whether the funds were state
mandated.
LISA ELANE SLATER
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Iv. DEATH PENALTY
A. A trial court is not required to define for a jury the
meaning of the language contained in section 190.2(a)(1)
of the Penal Code except when there is a possibility that
it will overlap with other special circumstances: People
v. Howard.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Howard,' the California Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction and death penalty sentence for the murder of
Walter Berkey.2 This determination clarified four areas of law.
First, the court held that testimony of an admission to a fellow in-
mate is permissible provided that the state has neither induced nor
directed the informant to obtain the incriminating evidence. 3 Second,
the court held that a trial court is not required to instruct the jury to
utilize a restricted construction of the phrase "for financial gain" un-
less an overlap with other special circumstances arises.4 Third, the
court found that a prosecutor can introduce evidence during the pen-
alty phase of the trial, even though it was not specifically enumer-
ated in his pretrial notice, provided that opposing counsel is given
reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and the evidence is similar
in nature to other evidence presented in the pretrial notice.5 Finally,
the court held that the correct standard to apply in determining
whether the jury has been improperly instructed or informed as to
their responsibilities during the penalty stage is whether the jurors
believed that they could not consider relevant mitigating evidence re-
garding the defendant's background and character in reaching their
determination.6
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, Gary Lee Howard, Sr., met Richard "Tony"
Lemock in May, 1981. At this time, Lemock was having severe
problems with his business competitor, Walter Berkey. Lemock ex-
1. 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1988) (en banc). Chief Justice
Lucas wrote the majority opinion with Justices Mosk, Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson,
and Kaufman concurring. Justice Broussard wrote a separate concurring and dissent-
ing opinion.
2. Id, at 385, 749 P.2d at 281-82, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 844-85.
3. Id. at 402, 749 P.2d at 293, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
4. Id. at 409-10, 749 P.2d at 297-98, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
5. Id. at 424-25, 749 P.2d at 308-09, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
6. Id. at 434, 749 P.2d at 314-15, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
plained to the defendant that he was prepared to pay to have Berkey
"roughed up" and subsequently offered the defendant $1,500 to per-
form this task. On May 30, 1981, the defendant and Berkey went to a
dairy barn together. The evidence showed that Berkey had been shot
at least five times by the same firearm while in the barn. The de-
fendant claimed that a third person committed the murder. How-
ever, there was no evidence to substantiate this contention. In fact,
the defendant had told three people on separate occasions that he did
indeed murder the victim. First, he told his girlfriend, Joy Stevens,
that he killed the victim as a favor to Lemock. Second, he told Wal-
ter Wilson that his confrontation with the victim did not go as
planned, forcing him to act as he did. Finally, he told a fellow in-
mate, David Kent, that he committed the murder. The defendant
then solicited Kent's assistance to kill both Stevens and Wilson.
The jury found that the defendant intentionally murdered the vic-
tim for financial gain, which constitutes a special circumstance as set
forth in section 190.2(a)(1) of the Penal Code,7 authorizing the death
penalty sentence. The defendant was therefore automatically enti-
tled to this appeal under section 1239(b) of the California Penal
Code.8
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority opinion addressed numerous assignments of errors
complained of by the defendant, including: (1) the admissibility of the
defendant's admission to a fellow inmate;9 (2) the trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury as to a restrictive definition of "for financial
gain"; (3) whether certain veniremen were properly excused for
cause; (4) whether the court properly admitted evidence during the
penalty phase that was not contained in the pretrial notice; and (5)
whether the trial court's statements to the jurors during voir dire re-
garding sympathy were misleading.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190. 2 (a)(1) (West Supp. 1988) (intentional murder carried
out for financial gain).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1988) ("When upon any plea a judg-
ment of death is rendered, an appeal is automatically taken by the defendant without
any action by him or his counsel.").
9. The defendant confessed to the police immediately after his arrest that
Lemock offered him $1,500 to "rough up" the victim and that he was in the barn with
the victim at the time of the murder, but an unnamed third party actually was respon-
sible for the murder. Defendant objected to the admissibility of these statements. The
court held that since the statements were made voluntarily and the evidence did not
indicate any coercion by the interrogating officers, the confession was properly admit-
ted into evidence. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 398-99, 749 P.2d at 290-91, 243 Cal. Rptr. at
853-54.
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A. Admission to a Fellow Inmate
At trial, David Kent testified that while he and the defendant were
inmates in the county jail, the defendant admitted that he murdered
the victim and also asked Kent to help him have both Stevens and
Wilson killed. The defendant contended that this testimony was im-
properly admitted because Kent was acting as a government agent
and, therefore, the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel was
violated.' 0 The defendant primarily relied on the United .States
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Henry" as authority for
his position. In Henry, the Court held that testimony of admission to
another inmate was improperly admitted.12 However, the circum-
stances involved were clearly distinguishable from the present case.
Two factors upon which the Henry Court based its decision were: (1)
the informant appeared to be no more than another inmate but was
specifically instructed by the government to be alert for any state-
ments made by the defendant; and (2) the informant received mone-
tary compensation for providing the government with incriminating
evidence. 13 In contrast, Kent was not directed by the state to obtain
incriminating evidence and he did not receive any compensation or
leniency14 for his testimony.
The court also examined cases decided subsequent to Henry that
have addressed the issue of jailhouse admissions. In Kuhlmann v.
Wilson,15 the Supreme Court stated that mere listening by an in-
formant does not constitute a deprivation of a right to counsel.16
Rather, the informant's behavior must be deliberately designed to
elicit incriminating remarks in order to establish a sixth amendment
violation.17 In People v. Whitt,18 the court stated that in determining
10. The sixth amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), the Court held that "The
Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal
charges, the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State." Id. at
176.
11. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
12. Id. at 274-75.
13. Id. at 272-74.
14. Kent, for his own safety, requested a transfer prior to his testifying in the case.
The request was granted. However, the court did not regard this as leniency because
the length of his sentence was not affected. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 401, 749 P.2d at 292-
93, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
15. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
16. Id. at 457.
17. Id. See also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176-77 (where the court held that
the defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated because the government ar-
whether an informant has deliberately elicited an admission from a
defendant, the court must focus primarily on the state's conduct
rather than on the informant's.19 In particular, if the state has in-
duced or specifically directed the informant to obtain such incrimi-
nating evidence, then there has been a sixth amendment violation.2 0
In the present case, the court found that Kent voluntarily informed
the authorities of the defendant's admissions and, therefore, his testi-
mony was properly admitted at trial.21
B. Instructions Defining Financial Gain
Section 190.2(a)(1) of the Penal Code22 provides that a murder
which is intentional and carried out for financial gain constitutes a
special circumstance. 23 The defendant contended that the court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to the judicial definition of
"for financial gain." As authority for his position, the defendant cited
People v. Bigelow.24 In Bigelow, the court found that a restrictive
definition of "for financial gain" was warranted.25 However, that
case involved a murder pursuant to a robbery which also constitutes
a special circumstances under 190.2(a)(17)(i). 2 6 The Bigelow court
adopted a narrow construction of "for financial gain" because of the
distinct possibility that the two special circumstances would over-
lap.27 The present case involved only one special circumstance: in-
tentional murder for financial gain. Therefore, the court found it
was unnecessary to instruct the jury as to a restrictive definition of
"for financial gain."28
The defendant also contended that the special circumstance was
not applicable in this situation because the agreement he entered into
with Lemock provided that he would be compensated for only
"roughing up" the victim, not for killing him. The court found this
argument to be fallacious since it improperly focused only on the
ranged to have conversations between the defendant and the informant recorded while
the defendant was incarcerated).
18. 36 Cal. 3d 724, 685 P.2d 1161, 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1984). See generally 19 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2203 (Supp. 1987).
19. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d at 741, 685 P.2d at 1170, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
20. Id.
21. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 402, 749 P.2d at 293, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
23. Id.
24. 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984).
25. Id. at 751, 691 P.2d at 1006, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(i) (West Supp. 1988) (special circumstance
will attach when a murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in a
robbery).
27. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d at 751, 691 P.2d at 1006, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
28. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 409-10, 749 P.2d at 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62.
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terms of the agreement.2 9 Instead, the court stated that: "[t]he spe-
cial circumstance [enumerated in 190.2(a)(1)] focuses on the defend-
ant's intention at the time the murder was committed."30 Therefore,
since the defendant's actions were done in expectation of receiving fi-
nancial consideration, it was not relevant that the agreement could
have been satisfied even if the murder did not occur.3 1
C Challenges for Cause During Voir Dire
At voir dire, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to ex-
cuse for cause four veniremen who expressed reluctance regarding
their ability to impose the death penalty sentence if warranted. The
defendant contended that the motion was improperly granted. In
Witherspoon v. lllinois32 and Wainwright v. Witt,33 the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of excusing prospective ju-
rors in capital cases. Both cases set forth exacting standards as to
whether exclusion of a venireman for cause is proper. The Wither-
spoon standard permits exclusion for cause only when a venireman
unambiguously states that he will always automatically vote against
the death penalty.3 4 In the more recent Witt decision, the Court re-
examined its statements in Witherspoon and adopted a more liberal
standard: "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.' "35 The Court also stated that it is not nec-
essary to unambiguously prove that the juror is biased against the
death penalty because such a determination cannot be definitely
made during the voir dire process.3 6 Therefore, a court can properly
excuse for cause veniremen in a capital case when there is an indica-
tion that they will not properly consider both prospective penalties.
In the present case, the court found that, based on the responses elic-
ited during voir dire, there was no error in excusing for cause the
challenged veniremen under both the Witherspoon and Witt
29. Id. at 409, 691 P.2d at 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
32. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See generally, Annotation, Comment & Note-Beliefs Re-
garding Capital Punishment as Disqualifying Juror in Capital Case-Post Wither-
spoon Cases, 39 A.L.R. 3D 550 (1971 & Supp. 1988) (discussion of post-Witherspoon
developments in disqualifying jurors in capital cases).
33. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
34. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516 n.9.
35. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424.
36. Id.
standards.37
D. Introduction of Additional Evidence at the Penalty Phase
Section 190.3 of the Penal Code38 states that "no evidence may be
presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evi-
dence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a rea-
sonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial."3 9
After the guilt phase concluded, the prosecutor informed the court
that he intended to present evidence at the penalty phase that was
not expressly contained in the pretrial notice. This evidence directly
pertained to the defendant's egregious and abusive treatment of wo-
men and children.40 The court permitted the prosecutor to present
this additional evidence but only after granting the defendant's re-
quest for a three-and-a-half week continuance. The defendant con-
tended that he was given inadequate and untimely notice of the
evidence in question.
The court focused on three issues in determining whether the addi-
tional evidence was properly admitted: (1) did the prosecutor act in
good faith; (2) did counsel have reasonable opportunity to prepare his
case; and (3) was the defendant unfairly prejudiced. In examining
the issue of good faith, the court noted that the prosecutor did not
learn of the existence of the additional information until after the
guilty verdict was entered.41 Therefore, since the evidence was not
available to the prosecutor at an earlier date, the court concluded
that there was no showing of bad faith.42 On the issue of reasonable
notice, the court held that the three-and-a-half week continuance af-
forded counsel sufficient opportunity to prepare his case.43 Also, the
court noted that if the defendant believed that the continuance was
inadequate, he should have requested additional time.44
In determining whether the defendant was unfairly prejudiced by
the admission of the additional evidence; the court focused on the na-
ture of the evidence. Defense counsel complained that his strategy as
to jury selection and his decision to permit the defendant to testify
might have been different if he had been aware of this evidence prior
to the commencement of the trial. The court rejected this contention
37. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 418, 749 P.2d at 304, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1988).
39. Id. (emphasis added). See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3346
(1985).
40. The evidence in question was offered by defendant's ex-wife and former girl-
friend. Both testified as to the defendant's violent nature and his abusive treatment of
them and their children.
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based on the fact that the general nature of the additional evidence
was similar to other evidence which was contained in the pretrial no-
tice.45 Specifically, the evidence pertained to the defendant's abusive
treatment of women and children. The court believed that from the
information contained in the pretrial notice, the defendant should
have been aware that the prosecution would present evidence of this
egregious behavior.46 Therefore, the court held that since the nature
of the evidence was similar to that contained in the pretrial notice,
the defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by its admission.47
E. Instructions on Mitigating Factors
It is well established that in a capital case the sentencer must be
given the opportunity to consider any relevant mitigating evidence
regarding the defendant's character or background. 48 The defendant
contended that the court's statements during a sequestered voir dire
were improper because the jury was instructed not to consider sym-
pathy during the course of the trial.49 The court conceded that under
an earlier decision, People v. Brown,50 this argument had merit.S1
However, the United States Supreme Court had subsequently re-
versed the Brown decision5 2 In a concurring opinion in Brown, Jus-
tice O'Connor specifically noted that a reviewing court should
examine the jury instructions as a whole and in combination with
statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments to de-
45. Id. at 424, 749 P.2d at 308, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
46. The court specifically mentioned items three, four, and five of the pretrial or-
der, which refer to defendant's violent treatment of a former girlfriend and kidnap-
ping of his children. Id. at 419-20, 749 P.2d at 305, 243 Cal.Rptr. at 868.
47. Id. at 425, 749 P.2d at 308-09, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
48. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), Chief Justice Burger stated that "the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer... not be precluded
from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or rec-
ord and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." Id. at 604 (emphasis in original). See generally Hertz
& Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital De-
fendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 317
(1981); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3345 (1985).
49. The language used by the court was: "These trials always bring out feelings of
some sort or the other in the people who hear the evidence, feelings of sympathy or
passion or prejudice or whatever.... Would you be willing to put such feelings aside
and determine the issues just on the evidence?" Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 432, 749 P.2d at
313, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
50. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985), rev'd sub. nom. Califor-
nia v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987).
51. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 432, 749 P.2d at 313, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
52. California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987).
termine whether the jurors were clearly informed that they could
consider any relevant mitigating factor before rendering a sentence.5 3
If the jurors were misled into believing that they must ignore rele-
vant mitigating evidence during the penalty stage, then the instruc-
tions are improper.5u
Applying these standards, the court found that the jury was not
improperly misled.55 The jury was specifically instructed that the
law does not forbid them from considering pity for the defendant.56
Also, the prosecutor, during his closing argument, informed the jury
that at this stage of the trial they can be influenced by pity in making
their determination.57 Further, the court instructed the jury that
"they could consider matters which 'in fairness and mercy' could be
found extenuating."58 Therefore, the court held that the jurors were
properly instructed that they could consider mitigating circumstances
and pity5 9 in determining the appropriate penalty; thus no error
occurred.6 0
IV. JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Broussard's sole disagreement with the majority opinion
was its treatment of section 190.2(a)(1). He believed that adopting a
dual meaning for the phrase "for financial gain" was undesirable and
imprudent.6 ' He argued that there was no justification for the major-
ity's position that section 190.2(a)(1) should be construed differently
from case to case depending on the charges filed.62 Instead, Justice
Broussard argued that the restrictive construction set forth in
Bigelow should be uniformly applied in every case because he be-
lieved that it properly addressed the problem of overlapping special
circumstances and, at the same time, did not prejudice the
prosecution.63
53. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d at 432, 749 P.2d at 314, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 432-33, 749 P.2d at 314, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
58. Id. at 433, 749 P.2d at 314, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
59. The defendant argued that the words pity and sympathy are not essentially
the same and, therefore, the jury was not informed that it could consider sympathy.
The court summarily dismissed this complaint. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 446, 749 P.2d at 323, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
62. Id. at 447, 749 P.2d at 324, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Broussard J., concurring and
dissenting).
63. Id. at 446, 749 P.2d at 323, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the court addressed a myriad of issues, its interpretation
of sections 190.2(a)(1) and 190.3 of the Penal Code will probably have
the most significant impact on California law. Despite Justice Brous-
sard's insistence, the court is not applying a dual meaning to the
phrase "for financial gain" contained in 190.2(a)(1). The phrase does
not include technical language and is a matter of common under-
standing. Therefore, the general rule is that a court is not required
to instruct a jury as to the definition of "for financial gain." The Big-
elow decision should be interpreted as an exception to the general
rule that will apply only when the section 190.2(a)(1) special circum-
stance overlaps with other special circumstances and could result in
duplicating aggravating factors. The court's decision to permit a pros-
ecutor to present evidence during the penalty phase that is not specif-
ically enumerated in the pretrial notice under limited circumstances,
is consistent with the language contained in section 190.3. The court
recognized that admitting such evidence might possibly unfairly prej-
udice a defendant; therefore, it set forth a three-prong admissibility
standard. First, the prosecutor must have acted in good faith. Sec-
ond, defense counsel must be given reasonable opportunity to pre-
pare the case. Finally, the evidence must be of the same general
nature as other evidence contained in the pretrial notice. This stan-
dard allows a prosecutor to present relevant evidence that is discov-
ered subsequent to the commencement of the trial at the penalty
phase and, at the same time, minimizes the risk of unfair prejudice.
RONALD P. SCHRAMM
B. Independent felonious intent is not an element of felony-
murder special-circumstance. The jury may not be
advised as to the consequences of a nonunanimous
penalty phase verdict: People v. Kimble.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Kimble,' the court affirmed the trial court's judgment
of guilt and the resulting imposition of the death penalty. The court
found the execution of a nighttime search warrant to be proper in
1. 44 Cal. 3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1988). Chief Justice Lucas au-
thored the majority opinion with Justices Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson, and Kaufman
concurring. Justices Mosk and Broussard wrote separately, each concurring and dis-
senting in part.
light of the exigency created by the murder charges. The false state-
ments made by the defendant subsequent to the arrest were properly
admitted for the purpose of showing "consciousness of guilt." 2 The
court also found that the felony-murder special-circumstance jury in-
structions were properly given. Although the allegation of two sepa-
rate multiple-murder special-circumstances was improper, the court
found the error to be harmless. The prosecution's incorrect interpre-
tation of former section 190.3(b) of the Penal Code3 was also held to
be harmless error. Finally, the court ruled that the trial court prop-
erly responded to jury inquiries pertaining to both the application of
section 190.3(b) and the result of a nonunanimous penalty verdict.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
After a jury trial, the defendant, Eric Kimble, was found guilty of
murder, burglary, robbery, and rape. The jury also found sufficient
evidence to support the special-circumstances of robbery felony-mur-
der, rape felony-murder, and multiple murder. The victims' bodies
were found in their home with their hands bound and their mouths
and eyes taped closed. Each death occurred as a result of a single gun
shot and the evidence indicated that the female victim had been
raped. That same evening, the victims' stereo store was burglarized.
Following tips received from a witness, the police obtained a search
warrant for the home of an alleged accomplice to the burglary. Dur-
ing the early morning execution of the warrant, the police found evi-
dence leading to the arrest of the defendant.
In the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecution submitted a tape re-
cording of the false statements made by the defendant subsequent to
the arrest. The prosecution charged the defendant with the multiple
murder special-circumstance for each of the murders committed.
The trial court instructed the jury that a special circumstance could
be found if "the murder was committed 'during the commission' of
the separate felony."4 In the penalty phase, the prosecutor failed to
present evidence, aside from the charged offenses, showing past vio-
lent or forceful criminal behavior by the defendant. During delibera-
tion, the jury submitted a question to the trial court regarding the
application of section 190.3. The court responded by rereading the in-
structions and informing the jury that the penalty determination was
not to be based on "personal choice." 5 The jury also submitted a
question asking how a nonunanimous verdict would affect the pen-
alty. The court responded that such information was not within the
2. Id at 496, 749 P.2d at 812, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(b) (West 1988).
4. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 499, 749 P.2d at 814, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
5. Id& at 507-08, 749 P.2d at 819-20, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
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province of the jury.6
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Guilt Phase
1. The nighttime search warrant was properly executed.
The defendant first argued that the evidence obtained in the search
of his accomplice's residence was improperly admitted due to an ille-
gal "nighttime" search.7 The court rejected this argument as the
warrant facially authorized both day and nighttime execution. Based
on the principle that daytime service is required absent a showing of
"good cause,"8 the defendant next contended that the affidavits sup-
porting the search warrant failed to meet the standard for nighttime
service.9 The court noted that although a nighttime search is signifi-
cantly intrusive, such a search is proper in the presence of exigent
circumstances. 10 Believing the gravity of the offense and the need
for an expedited investigation to constitute the requisite exigency,
the court found the warrant to have been properly executed and the
trial court to have correctly denied the defendant's suppression
motion."
2. The false statements made by the defendant subsequent to
arrest were properly admitted.
The defendant next alleged that the trial court improperly admit-
ted into evidence the tape recording of false statements made by the
defendant during interrogation. Disagreeing with the defendant, the
court observed that although the defendant had not taken the stand,
the evidence was properly admitted for the purpose of showing "con-
sciousness of guilt."12 Based on People v. Colel3 and People v.
6. Id. at 511, 749 P.2d at 822, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
7. Id, at 492-93, 749 P.2d at 809-10, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
8. Id. at 493-94, 749 P.2d at 810, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1529, 1533 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); Solis v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 774, 776-77,
408 P.2d 945, 946, 48 Cal. Rptr. 169, 170 (1966)).
9. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 493, 749 P.2d at 810, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
10. Id. at 494, 749 P.2d at 811, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (quoting United States v. Searp,
586 F.2d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir. 1978)). See generally 20 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law
§ 2530 (1985) (execution of search warrants).
11. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 494-95, 749 P.2d at 811, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57.
12. Id. at 496, 749 P.2d at 812, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 157. See also B. WITKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA EVIDENCE, § 512 (2d ed. 1966).
13. 141 Cal. 88, 89-90, 74 P. 547, 547 (1903) (denial may show intent to steal).
Amaya,14 the court rejected the defendant's contention that inconsis-
tent trial testimony was required prior to the introduction of the
questioned evidence. The court reasoned that like "'flight and con-
cealment,' "15 false statements made to the police may create "'infer-
ences of guilt.' "16 Concluding that the tape recording was offered
only to show that the statements were made, and that the jury would
decide the weight to be given such statements, the court held that the
tape recording was properly admitted. 17
3. The jury was correctly instructed on the application of the
felony-murder special-circumstance.
The trial court instructed the jury that a felony-murder special-cir-
cumstance could be found only if the "murder was committed 'during
the commission' of the separate felony."1 8 The defendant contended
that this instruction was incorrect as it failed to provide the addi-
tional clarification of a special-circumstance developed in People v.
Green 19 and People v. Thompson.20 The court agreed with the de-
fendant that Green limits the "in the commission" requirement to sit-
uations where the murder occurs in furtherance of a separate
crime.21 The court also agreed with the application of the Green test
in Thompson, where the court found no special circumstance to exist
as the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant in-
tended to commit a crime separate from murder.22
Based on decisions subsequent to Green and Thompson, however,
the court rejected the defendant's contention that these cases re-
quired elaboration on the standard special-circumstance instruction.23
Noting that no decision has required such clarification "regardless of
whether the evidence supports such an instruction,"24 the court held
14. 44 Cal. App. 2d 656, 659, 112 P.2d 942, 944 (1941) (misleading false statements
enhance inference of guilt).
15. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 497, 749 P.2d at 812, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 158 (quoting Cole,
141 Cal. at 89-90, 74 P. at 547).
16. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 497, 749 P.2d at 813, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 158 (citing Amaya,
44 Cal. 2d at 659, 112 P.2d at 944). See generally 17 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law
§ 385 (1984) (intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the crime).
17. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 498, 749 P.2d at 813, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
18. Id. at 499, 749 P.2d at 814, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 160. See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D
(REv.) Criminal Law § 3343 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (jury responsibility under special cir-
cumstance charge).
19. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 59-62, 609 P.2d 468, 504-06, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 37-39 (1980).
20. 27 Cal. 3d 303, 321-25, 611 P.2d 883, 892-95, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 298-301 (1980).
21. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 500, 749 P.2d at 815, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 160. See generally
17 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law § 217 (1984) (felony-murder rule).
22. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 500-01, 749 P.2d at 815, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 161. See gener-
ally 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 474 (1968) (homicide within the scope of other crime);
17 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law § 221 (1984) (independent felonious intent).
23. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 501, 749 P.2d at 816, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
24. Id.
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that the given instruction competently described the law to the
jury.25 Recognizing the duty to give an explanatory instruction sua
sponte when the evidence so requires, the court found no such evi-
dence to exist.26
4. The prosecutor's double charging of the multiple murder
special-circumstance was harmless error.
Arguing that the error affected both the guilt and penalty phases
of the trial, the defendant contended that the prosecution incorrectly
attached a multiple murder special-circumstance to both murder
charges. While the court agreed that only one charge of multiple
murder is allowable, it found the error to be harmless as it was not
likely to have affected the jury's decision.27
B. The Penalty Phase
1. The prosecutor's incorrect interpretation of former section
190.3(b) of the Penal Code was harmless error.
The defendant next contended that the trial court improperly de-
nied his motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor's misinterpre-
tation of section 190.3(b). Section 190.3 describes the "aggravating
and mitigating" circumstances which the jury is to consider in its
finding of special circumstances. Subsection (b) includes "the pres-
ence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved
... force or violence."28
In the penalty phase summation, the prosecutor maintained that
the charged murder was sufficient to meet the 190.3(b) requirements.
The bourt found such a suggestion to be improper as section 190.3(b)
is applicable only to violent or forceful criminal activity "other than
25. Id. at 503, 749 P.2d at 817, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 163. See generally 40 AM. JUR. 2D
Homicide § 491 (1968) (instruction need only be understood by jury).
26. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 503, 749 P.2d at 817, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63. See gener-
ally 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 352 (1984) (jury instruction for felony-murder).
27. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 504, 749 P.2d at 817-18, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
28. Id. at 504, 749 P.2d at 818, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3(b) (West 1988)); see also Flanagan, Dark Years on Death Row: Guiding Sen-
tencer Discretion After Zan Barclay and Harris, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689 (1984)
(aggravating circumstances for felony-murder); Comment, Crimes; Death Penalty, 5
PAC. L.J. 321 (1974) (special-circumstance requirement and aggravating circum-
stances). See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, § 1034 (Supp. 1985) (factors
to be considered by jury in penalty phase).
the capital offense" charged.2 9 However, because the prosecutor's
comments were both brief and admissible under section 190.3(a), the
court found the error harmless and insufficient to prejudice the
jury.30
2. The trial court properly responded to the jury's inquiry
regarding the application of section 190.3.
After listening to the jury instructions and deliberating for a short
time, the jury submitted a question to the trial court inquiring
whether there were additional criteria upon which the penalty deter-
mination could be based or whether it was a matter of "personal
choice."31 The court reread the instructions and informed the jurors
that they were to follow the law and not their "personal choice." 32
The defendant contended that this response was misleading and re-
sulted in the jurors' failure to use their own judgment in determining
the proper penalty. The court emphasized that while the reason for
the jury's question may have been unclear, the trial court's response
was proper in light of the prohibition against the arbitrary and capri-
cious imposition of the death penalty.33 Reasoning that the trial
court's reply would simply prevent the jury from ignoring section
190.3, the court held that no "reasonable jury" would have believed
that it was not free to use its "personal choice" in determining the
existence of the aggravating or mitigating factors.3 4
3. The jury properly considered the defendant's sympathy
evidence.
The defendant next argued that the jury was improperly instructed
on the consideration of the defendant's sympathy evidence.3 5 After
examining the record, the court found no evidence that the jury was
misled.36 The court first noted that the jury was properly instructed
in a manner which did not preclude it from considering the sympathy
evidence. The court next observed that while it was possible that the
instructions were misleading, such a possibility was eliminated by the
29. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 505, 749 P.2d at 818, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (citing People v.
Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 105-06, 744 P.2d 1127, 1156-58, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 624-25 (1987)).
30. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 505-06, 749 P.2d at 819, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
31. 1d& at 506, 749 P.2d at 819, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 165 (quoting the trial court record)
(emphasis omitted).
32. Id. at 507-08, 749 P.2d at 820, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66 (quoting California v.
Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 839 (1987) (citations omitted)). See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALI-
FORNIA CRIMES § 947L(c) (Supp. 1985) (sentencing may not be arbitrary or capricious).
33. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 509, 749 P.2d at 821, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
34. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, § 9471-1 (Supp. 1985) (exclu-
sion of mitigating circumstances).
35. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 509, 749 P.2d at 821, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
36. Id, at 510, 749 P.2d at 821, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
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prosecutor's direction that the jury consider mercy in light of the
facts presented. Analogizing the prosecutor's comments to those le-
gitirnized in People v. Allen,37 the court rejected the defendant's
allegation.38
4. The trial court properly responded to the jury's question
regarding a nonunanimous verdict.
The defendant lastly contended that when asked by the jury about
the consequences of a nonunanimous penalty verdict, the trial court
was under a duty to inform the jury that such a result would yield a
life sentence without the possibility of parole. Although People v.
Dixon 39 expressly requires that the court refrain from informing the
jury as to the effect of a nonunanimous verdict, the defendant argued
that such a requirement was not controlling in this case. Relying on
persuasive authority, the defendant maintained that absent the de-
sired explanation, minority jurors might be swayed in the opposite di-
rection for fear that a new trial may result from a split decision.40
The court rejected this argument noting that the defendant's au-
thority was easily distinguished and that a Dixon-type rule is control-
ling in most states.4 ' Reasoning that the instruction requested by the
defendant would provide jurors with the knowledge that they could
exercise a "veto power" over the imposition of the death penalty,42
the court held that such an instruction is a procedural guideline
which is not to be presented to the jury.43 Thus, the court found that
the trial judge properly responded to the jury's inquiry.
IV. THE SEPARATE OPINIONS
A. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Concurring with the affirmation of the defendant's conviction, Jus-
tice Mosk wrote separately to take issue with the majority's holding
that the felony-murder special-circumstance jury instruction was
properly given.44 Based on People v. Green,4 5 Justice Mosk con-
37. 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1276, 729 P.2d 115, 148, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 882-83 (1986).
38. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 510, 749 P.2d at 822, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68.
39. 24 Cal. 3d 43, 53, 592 P.2d 752, 758, 154 Cal. Rptr. 236, 242 (1979).
40. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 511-12, 749 P.2d at 823, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69.
41. Id. at 512-16, 749 P.2d at 823-26, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 169-71.
42. Id at 515-16, 749 P.2d at 825-26, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
43. Id
44. Id at 517, 749 P.2d at 826, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
tended that an "independent felonious purpose" is an element of fel-
ony-murder special-circumstance 46 and that under People v. Garcia,47
a failure to instruct on such an element is automatically reversible.48
Carefully scrutinizing the Garcia line of cases, Justice Mosk noted
three exceptions to the Garcia rule, each of which he found inappli-
cable to the present facts. 49 A fourth exception suggesting that ab-
sent adverse evidence, separate felonious intent may be "established
as a matter of law,"5 0 was not applied as Justice Mosk found insuffi-
cient support for its continued use.5 1 Believing that federal due pro-
cess rights would be violated without the felonious intent
instruction,52 the dissenting justice concluded that the failure to pro-
vide such an instruction was prejudicial error.53
B. Justice Broussard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Concurring with the majority as to the existence of guilt and spe-
cial-circumstances, Justice Broussard disagreed with the imposition
of the death penalty.54 His dissent first noted that the prosecutor's
attempt to use the underlying felonies as aggravating factors under
section 190.3(b) was prejudicial error.55 Justice Broussard believed
that the prosecutor's statement created a "substantial possibility"
that the jury would place undue weight on the underlying crimes as
aggravating circumstances. 56
Justice Broussard also took issue with the majority's opinion that
the trial court properly instructed the jury not to base their penalty
45. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61-62, 609 P.2d 468, 505-06, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 38-39 (1980).
46. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 517, 749 P.2d at 826, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
47. 36 Cal. 3d 539, 554, 684 P.2d 826, 834, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 273 (1984).
48. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d at 517, 749 P.2d at 827, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 172 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
49. 1i at 526, 749 P.2d at 832, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting). The three exceptions set out in Garcia are: (1) the "acquittal exception,"
which avoids the rule when the error involves a special circumstance found inapplica-
ble; (2) the "concession exception," which avoids the rule when the defendant con-
cedes intent; and, (3) the "Sedeno exception" which avoids the rule when the issue is
properly resolved in a correct instruction. Id, at 518, 749 P.2d at 827, 244 Cal. Rptr. at
172-73 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
50. Id, at 518, 749 P.2d at 827, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
51. 1I at 521, 526, 749 P.2d at 829-30, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 174-78 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
52. Id, at 523-26, 749 P.2d at 831-33, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 176-78 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
53. Id at 526, 749 P.2d at 833, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
54. 1d (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
55. Id at 527, 749 P.2d at 833, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
56. Id at 527, 749 P.2d at 833, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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decision on "personal choice."57 Reasoning that the jury's inquiry
was illustrative of its confusions over the factors to be considered in
the penalty decision, Justice Broussard found that the response given
by the trial court served only to remove the subjectivity from the de-
liberation process.58 Based on the belief that "jurors follow the
court's instructions," Justice Broussard concluded that the imposition
of the death penalty was incorrect.59
V. CONCLUSION
People v. Kimble is a message illustrative of the conservative ap-
proach currently practiced by the supreme court in the criminal
arena. Had this decision come before Chief Justice Bird's court, it is
likely that Justice Mosk's dissent would have provided the loophole
necessary to reverse the imposition of the death penalty. Undaunted
by either Justice Mosk's or Justice Broussard's attempt to finesse a
life sentence out of a prototypical felony-murder special-circumstance
offense, the majority clearly recognized that the egregious nature of
the facts was sufficient to overcome the types of harmless error
which previously rendered the death penalty a hollow threat.
STEVEN L. MILLER
C. Unsolicited testimony provided by a cellmate relating to
an offense by a defendant other than the one charged is
admissible. Brief prosecutorial comments regarding
defendant's silence at trial and impact of death on
victim's family constitute harmless error when no
corroborating evidence is introduced: People v. Hovey.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Hovey,' Richard Adams Hovey appealed a first degree
murder conviction and death sentence. The defendant alleged preju-
57. Id. at 529, 749 P.2d at 834-35, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 180 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
58. Id. at 529-30, 749 P.2d at 835, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
59. Id. at 530, 749 P.2d at 835, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 181 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
1. 44 Cal. 3d 543, 749 P.2d 776, 244 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1988). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion with Justices Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson, and Kaufman
concurring. Justice Mosk and Justice Broussard each wrote separate concurrences.
dicial error in both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. The
supreme court rejected all assignments of error.
The court first determined that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain the special circumstance finding2 under People v. Anderson.3
More significantly, the court ruled that the incriminating statements
obtained by Hovey's cellmate were admissible since they were not
forced and did not pertain to the offense with which Hovey was then
charged.4 The court also decided that the prosecution's comments,
including defendant's failure to testify and the impact of the crime on
the victim's family, were improper but constituted harmless error be-
cause they were inconsequential references without corroborating
evidence.5
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 10, 1978, eight-year-old Tina Salazar was found on a
roadside, unconscious and severely injured. The child died from mul-
tiple stab wounds eight days later. Witnesses had seen a car in the
crime vicinity which was later linked to the defendant. One witness
believed he had seen a struggle in the car between a man and child
and later chose the defendant's photograph as looking similar to the
man.
The defendant was arrested on an unrelated charge. During cus-
tody, he made incriminating statements to two cellmates, admitting
the abduction and assault of a "Chicano" girl. One of the cellmates
then reported the conversations to police officers. The cellmate was
instructed to listen to the defendant but not to elicit statements from
him. The defendant was later charged with the kidnapping and mur-
der of Salazar.
The defendant, prior to trial, made a stipulation in which he admit-
ted abducting the victim and performing the act which led to her
2. A death sentence requires a finding of special circumstances. One of these is
that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated (first degree) and was com-
mitted during a kidnapping. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(ii) (West Supp. 1988).
See People v. Hoban, 176 Cal. App, 3d 255, 221 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1985) (evidence showing
that defendant had not decided to kill victim until after abduction supported finding
that murder occurred during course of kidnapping and thus was a special circum-
stance). But see People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 705 P.2d 380, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1985)
(kidnapping was merely incidental to murder when defendant's purpose was to kill
victim and thus did not support special circumstance finding).
3. 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968). The court espoused a
three-part test to establish premeditation and deliberation. Id at 26-27, 447 P.2d at 949,
73 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
4. Hovey was arrested and in custody on unrelated charges at that time.
Although he was a suspect in the Salazar killings, no charges had been brought in rela-
tion to that incident at the time the convictions in question took place. People v. Ho-
vey, 44 Cal. 3d 543, 561, 749 P.2d 776, 785, 244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 130 (1988).
5. 44 Cal. 3d at 580, 749 P.2d at 797, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
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death. This stipulation was made to prevent admissibility during the
guilt phase of a subsequent child kidnapping which had been deemed
relevant on the issue of identity.6 One of the cellmates was unavaila-
ble and his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury.
At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. During the penalty
phase, the subsequent child kidnapping conviction was introduced.
The defendant brought in evidence to attest to his good character.
On rebuttal, the prosecution provided indications of bad character,
including the defendant's reading of child pornography. The prosecu-
tor also briefly mentioned, during closing argument, the defendant's
failure to testify and the impact of death on the victim's family. The
jury chose the death penalty and sentence was so imposed. This ap-
peal was automatic.7
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Special Circumstances Finding
The defendant's first contention was that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish premeditation and thus, the special circumstances
finding was improper. Rejecting this, the court analyzed the evi-
dence under the Anderson test which defendant claimed was unsatis-
fied.8 The court found substantial evidence of planning, motive, and
manner as required under the three-part test.9
B. Cellmate Testimony
The defendant also objected to the reading of the preliminary hear-
ing testimony of cellmate, Donald Lee, as violative of the fifth and
sixth amendments.O The court adopted the analysis of Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, nI which stated that merely listening and reporting state-
ments made by a defendant without eliciting such information does
not violate the fifth and sixth amendments.12 The court determined
6. The trial court had previously ruled as to admissibility of the subsequent of-
fense for a limited purpose. Id. at 566, 749 P.2d at 788, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1988).
8. Id. at 556, 749 P.2d at 781, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
9. Id. at 556-57, 749 P.2d at 781-82, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27. The court explained
that a conviction will be sustained if (1) there is evidence of all three elements; (2)
there is "extremely strong" evidence of planning; or (3) there is evidence of motive
and either planning or manner which "indicates a preconceived design to kill." Id at
556, 749 P.2d at 781, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. Id. at 558-59, 561, 749 P.2d at 783, 785, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 128, 130.
12. Id at 559, 749 P.2d at 783, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 129. See United States v. Henry,
that Lee was not a paid informant and that he had not been in-
structed to question the defendant.'3 Lee had simply been asked to
report on any statements made by the defendant and thus, was a
"passive listener."' 4 In People v. Whitt,15 however, a case which pre-
ceded Kuhlmann, this court held to the contrary: telling the inform-
ant to "listen but don't ask" did not prevent a violation.' 6 However,
the court in Whitt found no violation as the police had not created
sufficient incentive for the cellmate to become a police "agent."' 7
Therefore, although Kuhlmann and this case modifies dicta in Whitt,
that portion was not central to the holding in the instant case.
The court also emphasized that the information pertaining to the
Salazar murder had been received before the defendant had been
charged with that crime.'8 The sixth amendment right to counsel
and the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination had
not yet attached in relation to the Salazar incident.' 9 The court dis-
tinguished Maine v. Moulton, which held that information obtained
on a charged offense while investigating an uncharged offense was
inadmissible.20 The facts were the opposite in Hovey and thus led to
an opposite result.
The defendant's next allegation of error with regard to Lee's testi-
mony was that the prosecution failed to adequately pursue the wit-
ness for in court testimony. The court, however, determined that
regardless of whether an abuse of discretion 2' or an independent re-
view test 22 was used, the trial court's decision should be upheld.
447 U.S. 264 (1980) (deliberately elicited statements found to be violation of sixth
amendment).
13. 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (prisoner had agreement with police to reveal unsolicited
statements). See generally Note, Sixth Amendment-Right to Counsel: Limited Pos-
tindictment Use of Jailhouse Irformants is Permissible, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
743 (1986).
14. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 561-62, 749 P.2d at 784-85, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 130. Contra
People v. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d 724, 685 P.2d 1161, 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1984) (advising in-
formant to listen but not ask questions constitutes a constitutional violation; police cre-
ated a situation likely to elicit incriminating response).
15. 36 Cal. 3d 724, 685 P.2d 1161, 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1984).
16. Id. at 741-42, 685 P.2d at 1171, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
17. Id. at 744-46, 685 P.2d at 1173-74, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
18. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 561, 749 P.2d at 785, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 130. Hovey was ar-
rested and in custody on unrelated charges at that time. No charges with regard to the
present case had been filed.
19. Id. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985) (sixth amendment does
not apply to statements pertaining to other crimes which are not yet charged).
20. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
21. See People v. Enriquez, 19 Cal. 3d 221, 561 P.2d 261, 137 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1977)
(trial court's ruling will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion).
22. See People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 728 P.2d 180, 232 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1986) (in-
dependent review suggested for due diligence but not paramount to holding).
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C. Harmless Errors
The defendant first objected to the trial court's ruling as to rele-
vance of the subsequent child kidnapping. The trial court's determi-
nation led to the defendant's stipulation of identity to prevent the
admission of the prejudicial evidence.23 The court acknowledged that
the abuse of discretion issue, with regard to relevance of the subse-
quent kidnapping to identity, was close.24 However, the court main-
tained that the abundance of other evidence establishing identity
made any possible error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.25
The admission of the subsequent child kidnapping during the pen-
alty stage was also questioned. The court decided that under the 1977
death penalty law,26 there was no limitation on the admissibility of
evidence of prior criminal activity27 and that there was no sound rea-
son for such a limitation.28
The defendant next contended that admission of the victim's pho-
tograph in both the guilt and penalty phases was prejudicial error-
done only to evoke sympathy from the jurors. The court commented
that use of photographs to elicit sympathy should be discouraged.29
However, the court went on to conclude that any error was harmless,
calling the photos "just an ordinary head and shoulders portrait."30
The prosecution also dramatized the effect of the victim's death on
23. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 566, 749 P.2d at 788, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
24. Id. at 568, 749 P.2d at 789, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 135. Evidence of other crimes is
admissible to show identity when there are "common marks which ... support the
strong inference that the current crime bears [defendant's] signature." People v. Al-
cala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 632, 685 P.2d 1126, 1141, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 790 (1984). The defense
correctly pointed out, however, that several of the prosecution's "common marks"
were common to many child molesters and further, that there existed substantial dis-
similarities between the two crimes. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 569, 749 P.2d at 790, 244 Cal.
Rptr. at 135.
25. 44 Cal. 3d at 569, 749 P.2d at 790, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 135. The court further noted
that in order for a defendant to appeal the admissibility of prior conviction testimony,
the defendant must have taken the stand and been impeached. The defendant instead
stipulated on the identity issue, thus his claim may have been waived. See People v.
Collins, 42 Cal. 3d 378, 383-88, 722 P.2d 173, 176-79, 228 Cal. Rptr. 899, 902-05 (1986).
26. Defendant was sentenced under 1977 death penalty law and thus its language
is applicable. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 577, 749 P.2d at 796, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
27. Id. at 577-79, 749 P.2d at 795-96, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 141-42. In fact, the court
stressed that even under 1988 death penalty law, violent crimes were admissible
whether or not they were prior convictions. See also People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144,
201-04, 711 P.2d 480, 513-15, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 217-19 (1985); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 3346 (1985).
28. Hovey at 577-79, 749 P.2d at 795-96, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 141-42.
29. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 576, 749 P.2d at 795, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
30. Id. at 571, 749 P.2d at 791, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 137. The court distinguished cases
with photographs of victims while alive when the photograph was irrelevant to the is-
her parents during the penalty phase.3l The defendant claimed a vio-
lation of Booth v. Maryland.3 2 The court, however, distinguished
Booth where considerable testimony was given on the actual effect on
the parents' lives.33 Here, the court opined that the prosecutor's
statements were "already obvious to any juror,"3 4 and that the effect
mentioned simply compared defendant's treatment of the victim with
her family's loving treatment. The court held this to be harmless er-
ror if Booth applied at all.35
The final alleged violation was under Griffin v. California 36 as the
prosecution, during closing, made indirect remarks on the defend-
ant's failure to testify.37 The court acknowledged that indirect re-
marks could constitute a violation.3 8 However, they stressed that
"brief and mild references ... without any suggestion that an infer-
ence of guilt be drawn" equaled harmless error.3 9 The court ruled
that the remarks made were in this latter class, and thus were harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.40
sues in the case. See, e.g., People v. Hendricks, 43 Cal. 3d 584, 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 66 (1987); People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956).
31. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 577, 749 P.2d at 795, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41. The prosecu-
tor stated such things as "[wiho else is the victim in this case? The parent of that
child." and "[t]hink that the next time you see that child she's in the hospital and she
doesn't talk to you and she never talks to you again." Id. at 577, 749 P.2d at 795, 244
Cal. Rptr. at 140.
32. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987) (testimony of impact from death disallowed).
33. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 577, 749 P.2d at 795, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comments on defendant's failure to testify constitute a vio-
lation of privilege against self-incrimination). See generally J. LAWLESS,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 9.16 (1985) (discussing prosecutorial remarks on de-
fendant's failure to testify and silence).
37. While commenting on testimony stating defendant used a knife, the prosecutor
said, "[h]e's never told you anything different." 44 Cal. 3d at 572, 749 P.2d at 792, 244
Cal. Rptr. at 137. And referring to the stipulation, the prosecutor said "he's never said
anything to you about why, why he did these things." Id. But see United States v.
Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1980) (statement that defendant "has been
very quiet" sufficient to infer guilt and constitute a violation); State v. Macomber, 18
Or. App. 163, 168, 524 P.2d 574, 576 (1974) ("Ask the defendant to explain these things"
equals inference of guilt). See generally B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
§ 10.3(a) (1987) (discussing violation of defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination).
38. Hoveyj, 44 Cal. 3d at 572, 749 P.2d at 792, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 137. See also United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508 n.6 (1983) (test is whether it is "manifestly in-
tended" or would "naturally and necessarily" be understood by jury to be comment on
failure to testify); People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 304, 618 P.2d 149, 169, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 603, 623 (1980).
39. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 572, 749 P.2d at 792, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 137. See also Jack-
son, 28 Cal. 3d at 305, 618 P.2d at 169, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 623; People v. Vargas, 9 Cal. 3d
470, 478-81, 509 P.2d 959, 964-66, 108 Cal. Rptr. 15, 20-22 (1973). See generally B.
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 10.3(a) (1987).
40. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 705, at n.30 (1981).
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IV. THE SEPARATE OPINIONS
Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurrence. He wished to deline-
ate the point at which a series of harmless errors becomes prejudi-
cial. Although he agreed with the majority's determination of each
contention being harmless, he felt their collective effect needed to be
addressed.41
Particularly troublesome to Justice Mosk was the potential Booth
violation from commenting on the effect of death on the victim's
family. However, the fact that no evidence was offered to corrobo-
rate the statements supported a finding of no violation.42
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, there were errors in this case. In fact, at least three errors
were conceded by the court. Justice Mosk's concern, then, is well
taken. By individually rationalizing each error as harmless, the court
neglected to look at the whole picture, and neglected to determine
whether, cumulatively, these errors were harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt.43
However, in this particular case, absent errors, the evidence proba-
bly would have supported a conviction. A judgment should not be re-
versed when there exists substantial evidence of guilt." In the
instant case, such evidence renders the errors merely technical in na-
ture and they should probably not be allowed to overturn the
conviction.
LESLIE GLADSTONE
41. Hovey, 44 Cal. 3d at 586, 749 P.2d at 801, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
42. Id. at 587, 749 P.2d at 802, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Mosk, J., concurring).
43. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (analysis of harmless error
doctrine).
44. B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Reversible Error § 753 (1963).
See also Annotation, 24 A.L.R. 3D 1104-08 (1969) (examples of cases where error held
prejudicial and harmless).
D. A trial court has broad discretion in denying a severance
motion; if the evidence from the separate charges is cross
admissible then the trial judge did not abuse this
discretion: People v. Ruiz.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Ruiz,' the California Supreme Court affirmed both the
conviction and the death penalty sentence imposed upon the defend-
ant for the murder of his two former wives and his stepson.2 The
court addressed numerous contentions raised by the defendant per-
taining to both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the trial.
Most significantly, the court held that a trial court has broad discre-
tion in determining whether separate murder counts should be sev-
ered3 and such a determination can only be reversed if the defendant
can establish that clear and substantial prejudice resulted from de-
nial of a severance motion.4 The court also determined that if the ev-
idence presented at the trial of each of the joined charges would be
cross admissible at separate trials, then the requisite prejudice cannot
be inferred.5 The court refused to follow authority from other juris-
dictions and reaffirmed its previous holding that sequestration of the
jury in a capital case is not required,6 but is within the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge.7 Finally, the court held that a trial court is
not required to affirmatively instruct a jury that an anti-sympathy in-
struction given during the guilt phase is not applicable in determin-
ing the appropriate sentence in the penalty phase.8
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1972, the defendant, Alejandro Gilbert Ruiz, married his third
wife, Tanya. The two had a seemingly unhappy marriage9 and then,
in August 1975, Tanya mysteriously disappeared. Not only did she
disappear from her residence, but she also ceased communication
with her friends, relatives, and doctors. Mrs. Ruiz's failure to contact
her physician, Dr. Shields, after her disappearance was especially sig-
nificant because she needed professional treatment for cerebral palsy
1. 44 Cal. 3d 589, 749 P.2d 854, 244 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1988). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion with Justices Mosk, Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson and Kauf-
man concurring. Justice Broussard authored a concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. Id. at 599, 749 P.2d at 857, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
3. Id. at 607, 749 P.2d at 862, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
4. Id. at 605, 749 P.2d at 860, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
5. Id. at 605, 749 P.2d at 860-61, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
6. Id. at 616-17, 749 P.2d at 868, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
7. Id. at 616, 749 P.2d at 868, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
8. Id. at 623-24, 749 P.2d at 872-73, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
9. Although there is some contradictory evidence, the victim's mother claims her
daughter told her that she was scared of the defendant, especially his "terrible tem-
per." Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 600, 749 P.2d at 857, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
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and epilepsy. Furthermore, had Mrs. Ruiz contacted another medical
doctor, her physician would have been notified.O
Other circumstantial evidence indicated that the victim was most
probably dead. At the time of her disappearance the victim was re-
ceiving Medi-Cal and Social Security benefits. After she disappeared,
no request was made to continue these payments.' Tanya was a
Mormon and after her disappearance, she failed to contact any other
Mormon ward to continue practicing her faith.12 Finally, many of
the victim's personal belongings remained at her residence after she
disappeared.' 3
There was significant circumstantial evidence to indicate that the
defendant murdered the victim. The defendant told the victim's
friends and relatives, as well as the police, conflicting and unsubstan-
tiated stories relating to the victim's disappearance.14 On numerous
occasions the victim had told her mother and stepfather that she was
afraid of the defendant and that he had a terrible temper.' 5 Finally,
the defendant failed to legally divorce the victim prior to his mar-
riage to his fourth wife.' 6
However, the defendant was not charged with the murder of Tanya
Ruiz until 1979, when the police located the bodies of Pauline Ruiz
and Tony Mitchell who had also mysteriously disappeared. Pauline
Ruiz was the defendant's fifth wife, and Tony Mitchell was her son
from a previous marriage. In October 1978, the two disappeared. 17
Pauline also told her friends that she feared the defendant and ex-
pressed her belief that the defendant wanted to kill her.'8
The bodies of the two victims were located in a shallow grave near
the defendant's home. An autopsy revealed that both victims were
shot at close range by a Marlin rifle. The police discovered a Marlin
10. The victim wore a medi-alert bracelet which identified her ailments and the
name of her treating physician. Dr. Shields testified that if she did relocate, her new
physician would contact him and request all relevant medical data pertaining to the
victim. Id at 601, 749 P.2d at 858, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
11. Id
12. According to the victim's pastor, if she had contacted any other Mormon ward
he would have been notified. Id
13. Id
14. Id. at 600-01, 749 P.2d at 858, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 203-04.
15. Id. at 600, 749 P.2d at 857-58, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 203. This testimony was later
held to be improperly admitted into evidence. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying
text.
16. Id. at 601, 749 P.2d at 858, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The court found this to be
significant because he had divorced his previous two wives. Id.
17. Id. at 602, 749 P.2d at 859, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05.
18. Id. at 602, 749 P.2d at 859, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
rifle in the defendant's home during their investigation.19 Further-
more, a microscopic comparison of the rope used to bind Tony's body
and the rope found in the defendant's house revealed that the two
ropes may have originated from the same skein.20
The defendant was subsequently charged with the murders of
Tanya Ruiz, Pauline Ruiz, and Tony Mitchell. At trial, the jury
found the defendant guilty of first degree murder as to Pauline and
Tony and guilty of second degree murder as to Tanya. The jury
found that the murders of Pauline and Tony involved special circum-
stances because they were accompanied by another first or second de-
gree murder2 l and they imposed the death penalty sentence upon the
defendant.22 The defendant was therefore automatically entitled to
his appeal under section 1239(b) of the Penal Code.23
III. MAJORITY OPINION
The majority addressed several of the defendant's contentions in-
cluding (1) whether the defendant's severance motion was improp-
erly denied; (2) whether the admission of evidence of the victims'
fear of the defendant constituted prejudicial error; (3) whether there
was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of the murder of
Tanya Ruiz; (4) whether the trial judge improperly denied the de-
fendant's motion to sequester the jury; and (5) whether it was erro-
neous for the trial judge not to affirmatively instruct the jury that a
prior antisympathy instruction was not applicable in the penalty
phase.
A. Denial of Severance Motion
Section 954 of the Penal Code24 provides that: "An accusatory
pleading may charge ... two or more different offenses of the same
class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, and if two or more
accusatory pleadings are filed in such cases in the same court, the
court may order them to be consolidated."25 The defendant con-
tended that although the court had a statutory right to invoke the
aforementioned joinder provision, it should have granted his motion
to sever the Tanya Ruiz murder count from the other counts to avoid
undue prejudice. The defendant expressly argued that permitting all
19. 1& at 603, 749 P.2d at 859-60, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
20. 1& at 603, 749 P.2d at 860, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
21. Id, at 604, 749 P.2d at 860, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
22. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 604, 749 P.2d at 860, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1988). This statute provides that
"upon ... a judgment of death .. . an appeal is automatically taken by the defendant
without any action taken by him or his counsel." Id,
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985).
25. Id
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counts to be joined created a spillover effect, whereby evidentiary
weaknesses in the Tanya Ruiz case were fortified by evidence from
the other two murders.
The court first noted that the trial judge has very broad discretion
in determining whether to sever a case. 26 The court, relying on case
precedents, held that a defendant must prove that clear or substan-
tial prejudice resulted from the trial judge's refusal to grant a sever-
ance motion in order to establish abuse of discretion.27 The court
unequivocally held that an assertion of prejudice by a defendant is in-
sufficient to meet the burden of proof required to establish abuse of
discretion.28
In its determination of whether substantial prejudice resulted from
joinder of all three murder counts in the present case, the court pri-
marily addressed the issue of cross'admissibility of the evidence. The
rule of law followed by the court 'indicated that prejudice cannot be
inferred where evidence relating to each of the joined charges would
have been admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, if the de-
fendant was tried separately for each charge.29 The court held that
because of the similarities between the two sets of murder charges,
the evidence produced at trial, especially pertaining to the issue of
the identity of the murderer, was cross admissible.30
The court next held that the lack of direct evidence to even charge
the defendant with Tanya's murder, until the discovery of the bodies
from the second set of murders, was an important reason to permit
joinder in this case.3 1 The court noted that the defendant's murder
26. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 606, 749 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
27. Id See People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 170-73, 711 P.2d 480, 491-94, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 184, 195-97 (1984) (where the defendant could not establish clear or substantial
prejudice, the court held the trial court was correct in denying a motion to sever); Wil-
lians v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 452, 683 P.2d 699, 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707
(1984) (where the court stated that substantial prejudice may warrant severance).
28. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 605, 749 P.2d at 860-61, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
29. Id, at 605, 479 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (quoting Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at
171-72, 711 P.2d at 493, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196); see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966).
It is important to note that although the court, in the present case, focused upon the
issue of cross admissibility to determine whether substantial prejudice resulted from
denial of the severance motion, the court stated that even if the evidence had not been
cross admissible, the trial judge might still not have abused his discretion in denying
the severance motion. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 606, 749 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
30. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 605-06, 749 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07. The court
indicated that the fact that both Tanya and Pauline were the defendant's former wives
and they both disappeared under suspicious circumstances was relevant in determining
the cross admissibility issue. I& at 605-06, 749 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
31. Id at 606, 749 P.2d at 861, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
of Pauline and Tony was extremely relevant in determining whether
he was responsible for Tanya's death.3 2 At trial, the jury found the
defendant guilty of second degree murder for Tanya's death, whereas
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder for the other two
murders. From this, the court adduced that the jury could differenti-
ate between the two sets of murders and the improper spillover ef-
fect which the defendant complained did not exist.33 Therefore, the
court held that substantial prejudice did not accrue from the joinder
of the two sets of murder counts and the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in denying the defendant's severance motion.34
B. Admissibility of Evidence of the Victim's Fear of the Defendant
During the course of the trial, the trial judge admitted into evi-
dence testimony from the victims' friends and relatives concerning
statements made by the victims in which they expressed their fear of
the defendant. The trial judge ruled that based on the holding in
People v. Merkouris,35 these out-of-court statements made by the vic-
tims were admissible for the limited purposes of establishing the de-
clarants' state of mind and establishing motive for the murders.36
However, section 1250(b) of the Evidence Code,37 which was enacted
subsequent to the Merkouris decision, expressly prohibits the admis-
sibility of such testimony.38 The comments to section 1250(b) specifi-
cally state that "[t]he doctrine of the Merkouris case is repudiated in
section 1250(b) because that doctrine undermines the hearsay rule
itself."39
The court acknowledged that under section 1250(b) and the cases
that have followed, out-of-court statements indicating fear of an ac-
cused are generally not admissible.40 Therefore, the court held that
the trial court was incorrect in relying on Merkouris, and erred in ad-
32. Id,
33. Id. at 607, 749 P.2d at 862, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 207. The court, however, noted that
"[i]f the evidence were indeed cross-admissible, as we have concluded, then any spill-
over effect would have been entirely proper." I&
34. Id. at 607, 749 P.2d at 862, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
35. 52 Cal. 2d 672, 344 P.2d 1 (1959).
36. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 749 P.2d at 862, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
37. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(b) (West 1966).
38. Id.
39. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(b) comment, Assembly Comm. on Judiciary (West
1966).
40. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 608, 749 P.2d at 862-63, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 208. The court rec-
ognized that only when there is a dispute as to whether the victim's conduct was in
conformity with the fear expressed in out-of-court statements, would such statements
be admissible. However, this exception did not apply to the present case. Id. at 608,
749 P.2d at 863, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09. See People v. Armendariz, 37 Cal. 3d 573, 586,
693 P.2d 243, 251, 209 Cal. Rptr. 664, 672 (1984) (victim's out-of-court statements of fear
of an accused when victim's conduct in conformity with that fear is in dispute is admis-
sible); People v. Arcega, 32 Cal. 3d 504, 526-27, 651 P.2d 338, 350, 186 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106
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mitting the testimony into evidence.41 The court also held that, be-
cause the evidence was admitted for only very limited purposes and
that it was reasonably probable that the jury's verdict would not have
been different if the evidence was found inadmissible at trial, the er-
ror was harmless.42
C. Sufficiency of Evidence to Establish Tanya's Murder
The defendant contended that the evidence offered by the prosecu-
tion was insufficient to both 'establish the corpus delicti and support
his conviction for the murder of Tanya Ruiz. California law provides
that the corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evi-
dence.43 The court concluded that the evidence presented by the
prosecution, which included her abrupt disappearance, her total ces-
sation of all communication, her failure to seek resumption of Medi-
Cal and Social Security payments, and the fact that her body was
never found, created a reasonable inference that her death could
have been caused by a criminal agency.44 The court therefore held
that the corpus delicti was sufficiently established.45
The court next addressed the issue of sufficiency of evidence to
support the defendant's murder conviction. The standard of review
in capital cases is whether, from the evidence presented, any reason-
able trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.46 The evidence presented must be substantial,
credible, and of solid value in order to affirm a conviction for mur-
der.47 Although the court acknowledged that a close question existed
as to whether the evidence proffered on this issue was substantial, it
did determine that, from the evidence presented, it was reasonable
(1982) (statement of declarant's then-existing mental state is admissible if the declar-
ant's state of mind is at issue or is relevant to prove acts or conduct of the declarant).
41. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 609, 749 P.2d at 863, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
42. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 749 P.2d at 863-64, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 209-10.
43. Id at 610, 749 P.2d at 864, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d
604, 624-25, 685 P.2d 1126, 1136, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 775, 784 (1984) (circumstantial evi-
dence is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti).
44. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 749 P.2d at 863, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See People v.
Towler, 31 Cal. 3d 105, 117, 641 P.2d 1253, 1256, 181 Cal. Rptr. 391, 396 (1982) (introduc-
tion of evidence creating reasonable inference that death could have been caused by
criminal agency satisfies corpus delicti rule).
45. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 749 P.2d at 864, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
46. Id. at 611, 749 P.2d at 864-65, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See People v. Towler, 31
Cal. 3d 105, 117-18, 641 P.2d 1253, 1257, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 391, 397 (1982). Sufficient evi-
dence has been presented if "a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id (citation omitted).
47. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 611, 749 P.2d at 864-65, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
for the jury to reach a guilty verdict against the defendant for the
murder of Tanya Ruiz.48
D. Motion to Sequester the Jury
The defendant contended that the court improperly denied his mo-
tion to sequester the jury. The defendant believed that certain news
articles pertaining to his case and other capital cases might adversely
affect the jury. Relying on statutory authority49 and three lower
court decisions,5 0 the court held that the determination of whether a
jury must be sequestered is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.5 1 The court rejected the defendant's argument that sequestra-
tion should be required in every capital case.5 2 The court reasoned
that a mandatory sequestration rule would violate the express lan-
guage of section 1121 of the Penal Code.53
The court noted that the trial court took extreme precautions to
ensure that the jury would not be prejudiced by outside sources or
influences. In particular, the trial court admonished the jury not to
read any newspaper articles pertaining to the present case and it per-
mitted the defense counsel to take the jury on voir dire prior to the
penalty phase to determine if the jurors were affected by outside
sources. The court followed the rule that denial of a motion to se-
quester is proper unless the defendant demonstrates that the trier of
fact was actually prejudiced by outside sources or pretrial publicity.5 4
The court held that the defendant failed to meet this burden.55
48. The evidence that the court found to be most probative on this issue included
the victim's mysterious disappearance, the fact that the defendant failed to divorce the
victim before he remarried and the cross-admissible evidence pertaining to the other
two murders. Id. at 611, 749 P.2d at 865, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 210-11.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1121 (West 1985).
50. People v. Manson, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1, 27, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275, 288 (1977) (seques-
tration of a jury rests on the sound discretion of trial court); People v. Murphy, 35 Cal.
App. 3d 905, 933, 111 Cal. Rptr. 295, 312 (1974) (whether a jury will be sequestered or
permitted to separate with proper admonishment within sound discretion of trial
court); People v. Chaim, 22 Cal. App. 3d 493, 497, 99 Cal. Rptr. 472, 475 (1972). (trial
court has discretion to separate or sequester jurors without need of cause).
51. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 616, 749 P.2d at 868, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
52. Id. at 616-17, 749 P.2d at 868, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 214. The court, however, ac-
knowledged that in other states, sequestration in capital cases was mandatory. See,
e.g., People v. Jones, 711 P.2d 1270, 1279 (Colo. 1986) (where a state statute requires
sequestration in capital cases); Lowery v. State, 434 N.E.2d 868, 869-70 (Ind. 1982)
(where the court interpreted a state statute to require sequestration in capital cases).
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1121 (West 1985). The jurors sworn to try an action may,
in the discretion of the court, be permitted to separate or be kept in charge of a proper
officer." Id. (emphasis added). Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 616, 749 P,2d at 868, 244 Cal. Rptr. at
214.
54. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 616, 749 P.2d at 868, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
55. Id.
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E. Instructions on Mitigating Factors
The defendant contended that the jury was inadequately instructed
as to the propriety of certain mitigating factors that could be consid-
ered in determining the defendant's sentence. In particular, the de-
fendant argued that the court's modification of former section 190.3
subdivision (j) of the Penal Code56 was inadequate to cure the patent
flaws in the section. The trial judge instructed the jury that they
were not limited to the statutory list of aggravating or mitigating fac-
tors contained in section 190.3. Furthermore, the trial judge in-
structed the jury that they may consider any circumstance which
mitigates the gravity of the crime. Nevertheless, the defendant still
argued that the court inadequately instructed the jury as to the broad
scope of its sentencing discretion.
The court first noted that, in determining whether the jury was ad-
equately informed of its responsibility to consider all mitigating fac-
tors presented during the case, it must review the record in its
entirety.57 The court concluded that the trial judge's instructions,
the prosecutor's statements, and the defense counsel's statement suf-
ficiently explained and clarified for the jury that they could consider
all relevant mitigating factors, including the defendant's background
and character in determining the appropriate penalty.58 The court
concluded that the jury was adequately instructed.59
In a related argument, the defendant contended that the trial court
was required to affirmatively instruct the jury that sympathy was a
proper consideration in determining the defendant's sentence. The
defendant argued that because the jury was instructed not to con-
sider sympathy or passion in determining guilt during this phase,
there was potential for confusion and the jury could have believed
that sympathy was an improper consideration in the penalty phase.
Case precedence holds that a trial court's failure to instruct a jury
not to consider sympathy at the penalty phase may be grounds for re-
versal.60 The court found that the record clearly indicated no im-
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988) (formerly CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(j)).
57. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 623, 749 P.2d at 872, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 218; see California v.
Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 842 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); People v. Ghent, 43 Cal.
3d 739, 777-78, 739 P.2d 1250, 1275-76, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 107-08 (1987).
58. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 623-24, 749 P.2d at 873, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
59. Id. at 624, 749 P.2d at 873, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
60. See, e.g., People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 875-80, 671 P.2d 813, 823-27, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 319-23 (1983) (court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury
that it could not be influenced by sympathy in determining the appropriate penalty).
proper carryover of the guilt phase instruction in question. 61
The court relied on two recent cases, People v. Rodriguez62 and
People v. Miranda,6 3 which held that an antisympathy instruction
given during the guilt phase did not mislead the jury into applying
the same instruction during the penalty phase.64 The Ruiz court
carefully reviewed the record and determined that there was testi-
mony by the defendant's friends and relatives, as well as arguments
made by the defense counsel to the jury, which were of a sympathetic
nature.65 The court concluded that the trial court's failure to affirm-
atively instruct the jury that sympathy was a proper consideration
during the penalty phase was not erroneous.66
IV. JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Broussard concurred with the majority as to its affirmation
of the first degree murder conviction of the defendant for the
murders of Pauline Ruiz and Tony Mitchell.67 However, Justice
Broussard vigorously disagreed with the majority's holding that the
defendant's motion to sever the Tanya Ruiz murder count was prop-
erly denied.6 8 He believed that if the evidence pertaining to the
murders of Pauline Ruiz and Tony Mitchell were properly excluded,
then the evidence would be insufficient to sustain the conviction
against the defendant for the murder of Tanya Ruiz.69 Justice Brous-
sard concluded that the cumulative effect of the foregoing errors was
substantial. Therefore, the death penalty sentence imposed, by the
jury, should be reversed.70
Justice Broussard's principal argument was that the majority ig-
nored both statutory and case law in holding that the evidence
presented, pertaining to the murders of Pauline Ruiz and Tony
Mitchell, was cross admissible.71 Section 1101(a) of the Evidence
61. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 624-25, 749 P.2d at 873, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
62. 42 Cal. 3d 730, 785, 726 P.2d 113, 148-49, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 702-03 (1986).
"[Tihe potential for confusion [from a no-sympathy instruction during the guilt phase],
while it exists theoretically, is more attenuated." Id.
63. 44 Cal. 3d 57, 102, 744 P.2d 1127, 1155, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 622 (1987) (the jury
was not misled into applying antisympathy guilt phase instruction at the penalty
phase).
64. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 624, 749 P.2d at 873, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
65. Id at 625, 749 P.2d at 873, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
66. Id
67. Id at 625-26, 749 P.2d at 874, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
68. Id at 626, 749 P.2d at 874, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
69. Id (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
70. Id at 634, 749 P.2d at 879, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
71. Id. at 626, 749 P.2d at 874, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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Code72 provides that "evidence of a person's character... is inadmis-
sible when offered to prove his conduct on a specific occasion." 73
Furthermore, case precedence precludes the "admissibility of evi-
dence of other crimes ... [if] it is offered to prove criminal disposi-
tion or propensity on the part of the accused to commit the crime
charged." 74 Justice Broussard determined that although evidence of
other crimes might be relevant, it is highly prejudicial at the time,
therefore a court should exercise extreme caution in determining
whether such evidentiary concerns should be resolved in favor of the
defendant.75
Justice Broussard expressly disagreed with the majority's finding
that sufficient similarities existed between the Tanya Ruiz murder
charge and the other two murder charges to permit cross admissibil-
ity at separate trials76 He contended that under the standards set
forth in People v. Rivera,77 People v. Haston,78 and People v. Alcala,79
the similarity requirement pertaining to cross admissibility of evi-
dence was not established.80 Justice Broussard concluded that the
prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence of shared character-
istics or common marks necessary to raise the requisite inference
that the two sets of murders were committed by the same perpetra-
72. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1966).
73. Id.
74. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 626, 749 P.2d at 674, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 244, 444 P.2d 91, 98,
70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 426 (1968)).
75. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 626-27, 749 P.2d at 875, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
76. Id. at 627-28, 749 P.2d at 875, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
77. 41 Cal. 3d 388, 392, 710 P.2d 362, 364-65, 221 Cal. Rptr. 562, 564, (1985). "[In
order for evidence of a prior crime to have a tendency to prove the defendant's identity
as the perpetrator of the charged offense, the two acts must have enough shared char-
acteristics to raise a strong inference that they were committed by the same person."
Id. (emphasis added).
78. 69 Cal. 2d 233, 444 P.2d 91, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1968). In Haston, the court held
that "the general test of admissibility of evidence in a criminal case is whether it tends
logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference, to establish any fact material for the
People or to overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the defense." Id. at
244, 444 P.2d at 98, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
79. 36 Cal. 3d 604, 632, 685 P.2d 1126, 1141, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 790, (1984) "rWhere
the prosecution seeks to fix responsibility for a particular crime on defendant by show-
ing a consistent modus operandi, there must be common marks which, considered sin-
gly or in combination, support the strong inference that the current crime bears his
signature." Id.
80. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 627-28, 749 P.2d at 875-76, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22 (Brous-
sard, J., concurring and dissenting).
tor.8 1 Furthermore, he believed that the majority's contention that
the evidence was cross admissible to establish that Tanya died from a
criminal agent was fallacious.8 2 He argued that in this instance the
term "criminal agency" was merely a euphemism for "criminal dispo-
sition" and such evidence would be excluded under section 1101(a) of
the Evidence Code.83
Justice Broussard next contended that under the standard set forth
in Williams v. Superior Court,84 the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the defendant's motion for severance.8 5 He based this
contention primarily on the fact that the evidence should not have
been found cross admissible, the case against the defendant for the
murder of Tanya Ruiz was weak, and the evidence pertaining to the
other two murders altered the outcome of the first murder charge.8 6
Justice Broussard believed that the evidence exclusively pertaining
to the Tanya Ruiz murder was insufficient to affirm the conviction.8 7
He concluded that there was a reasonable possibility that the afore-
mentioned errors made by the trial court were substantial. There-
fore, the death penalty sentence, imposed by the jury, should be
reversed.8 8
V. CONCLUSION
People v. Ruiz will have a significant effect on California. Since
the court held that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in de-
nying the defendant's severance motion, it properly reaffirmed previ-
ous decisions which held that a trial court has very broad discretion
in determining whether a severance motion should be denied. The
court also held that cross-admissibility of evidence is the most salient
inquiry in determining whether severance should be denied.
Although the court did not hold that cross-admissibility is a "bright-
line" test per se, it did find that, if the evidence had been cross-ad-
missible, the requisite prejudice necessary to establish abuse of dis-
cretion could not be inferred. Finally, the court properly held that
81. Id (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
82. Id. at 629, 749 P.2d at 876, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 222 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
83. Id. at 629-30, 749 P.2d at 876-77, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 222. See supra notes 71-75
and accompanying text.
84. 36 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 683 P.2d 699, 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707 (1984) (where the
trial court abused its discretion in denying a severance motion).
85. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 630-31, 749 P.2d at 877, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
86. Id. at 630-31, 749 P.2d at 877, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
87. Id. at 633, 749 P.2d at 879, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 224 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
88. Id. at 634, 749 P.2d at 879, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
[Vol. 16: 117, 1988] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the two sets of murders were sufficiently similar to satisfy the cross-
admissibility requirement. The court's decisions in this case were ra-
tional and illustrate its solid commitment to affirming death penalty
sentences where the trial court used its sound discretion.
RONALD P. SCHRAMM
E. A "claim-of-right" defense is unavailable when the claim
involves an illegal activity; intent to kill before finding
special circumstances is not required when the defendant
is alleged to be the actual killer: People v. Hendricks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Hendricks,1 the California Supreme Court upheld the
imposition of the death penalty after the jury found all alleged spe-
cial circumstances to be true.2 The court dismissed all alleged errors
as harmless, 3 and reaffirmed the requirement that contemporaneous
objection must occur before an alleged error can be asserted on ap-
peal.4 Additionally, the court reaffirmed the wide latitude that trial
courts have in determining the admissibility of evidence pursuant to
section 352 of the Evidence Code.5
In the guilt phase, the court held harmless the admission into evi-
dence of the victim's checkbooks which the defendant previously ad-
mitted taking.6 Furthermore, the court indicated that the evidence of
past uncharged homicides may be used to impeach a psychologist ex-
1. 44 Cal. 3d 635, 749 P.2d 836, 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1988), reh'g denied, modified,
44 Cal. 3d 1254a, 749 P.2d 836, 244 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1988). Chief Justice Lucas wrote the
majority opinion, in which Justices Panelli, Arguelles, Kaufman, and Eagleson con-
curred. Justice Mosk concurred in the affirmation of the defendant's guilt, but dis-
sented as to the affirmation of the death penalty. Justice Broussard concurred with
Justice Mosk.
2. For a general overview of death penalty procedure, see generally Kopeny, Cap-
ital Punishment-Who Should Choose?, 12 W. ST. U.L. REV. 383 (1985); 47 C.J.S.
Homicide §§ 433-435 (1944 & Supp. 1988); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3340-3347
(1985 & Supp. 1988).
3. For a general overview of reversible error see B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE, §§ 435-442 (1963 & Supp. 1985).
4. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 648, 749 P.2d at 842-43, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 188. See, e.g.,
People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983) (contemporane-
ous objection at trial necessary for appellate review). Contra People v. Frank, 38 Cal.
3d 711, 729 n.3, 700 P.2d 415, 424 n.3, 214 Cal. Rptr. 801, 810 n.3 (1985) (plurality
opinion).
5. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 643-44, 749 P.2d at 840, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 185; CAL.
EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
6. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 642, 749 P.2d at 838, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
pert witness when a mental defense is raised.7 Additionally, the
court upheld the trial court's rejection of various proposed jury in-
structions. The court also indicated that a mistrial is not appropriate
when error results from the defendant's own voluntary acts.8 Fi-
nally, the court held that intent to kill is not a necessary instruction
before a finding of special circumstance when the defendant is the al-
leged killer.9
The court, in the penalty phase, reaffirmed the constitutionality of
excusing veniremen for cause for stating that they would automati-
cally vote against the imposition of the death penalty.O Photographs
of victims are admissible when relevant and not unduly shocking or
gruesome." Evidence of other crimes need not be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt before admission1 2 Objections to alleged errors
must be contemporaneous with the alleged error in order to properly
raise the alleged error on appeal.' 3 Allegations of the defendant's fu-
ture dangerousness, when briefly raised in closing argument, are
harmless.14 Finally, section 190.3 of the Penal Code15 is constitu-
tional and the prosecutor complied with its requirements by stating
that the final determination of the penalty was in the jury's hands.16
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
The defendant was a homosexual prostitute. After having sexual
encounters with his customers, he would return to the customers'
residences to kill and rob them. The defendant was charged with the
murders of James Parmer and Charleston Haynes. After a sexual
encounter with Parmer, the defendant returned to Parmer's resi-
dence, shot him at point-blank range six times, and then took numer-
ous items from Parmer's apartment, including his checkbook. The
last three shots occurred when Parmer was unconscious on the floor.
Similarly, after a sexual encounter with Haynes, the defendant went
to Haynes' hotel room and shot him five times. The last three shots
occurred while Haynes was lying on the bed. The defendant then
took some of Haynes' belongings, including a checkbook.
During the guilt phase, the jury found the defendant guilty of all
but one count and found all but one special circumstance to be true.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 642-43, 749 P.2d at 838, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85.
9. Id. at 644, 749 P.2d at 840-41, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86.
10. Id. at 644-45, 749 P.2d at 840-41, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
11. Id. at 645-46, 749 P.2d at 841, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
12. Id. at 648, 749 P.2d at 842, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
13. Id. at 649, 749 P.2d at 842-43, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
14. Id. at 649, 749 P.2d at 843, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
15. Id. at 650, 749 P.2d at 843, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 189; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West 1988).
16. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 652-53, 749 P.2d at 845-46, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
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In the penalty phase, the defendant offered the testimony of a psy-
chologist in order to establish the defense of "homosexual rage."'17
The prosecution then introduced evidence of three previous murders
allegedly committed by the defendant. A prosecution psychiatrist tes-
tified that based on the previously alleged murders, the defendant
could form the intent to steal and kill, premeditate, deliberate, and
harbor malice. The jury returned a penalty of death and appeal was
automatically perfected under section 1239(b) of the Penal Code.18
III. GUILT PHASE
A. Admission of Checkbooks
As to the first allegation of error, the failure to exclude the -vic-
tims' checkbooks as fruits from an illegal arrest was harmless in light
of the defendant's subsequent confession to taking the checkbooks.19
B. Impeachment with Past Uncharged Homicides
Where a defense psychologist testifies on the defendant's state of
mind during the killings, such testimony is a mental defense. There-
fore, introduction of evidence by the prosecutor of past uncharged
homicides, to impeach the expert, is admissible. Furthermore, expert
witnesses can be extensively cross examined; thus, what is allowable
for impeachment purposes is within the trial court's discretion.2 0
When testimony is probative and not unduly prejudicial, it may be
used by the prosecutor to impeach.
C. Proposed Jury Instructions
The court upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's three
proposed jury instructions. The defendant proposed an instruction
which would acknowledge a "claim-of-right" defense. This defense
negates intent where a person taking property has a good faith belief
that he owned the property. 21 However, there is no claim-of-right de-
fense where the right claimed is based on an illegal activity such as
17. Homosexual rage is the irresistible impulse to kill which arises out of the fear
that one is a homosexual. 44 Cal. 3d at 641, 749 P.2d at 838, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1988).
19. 44 Cal. 3d at 641-43, 749 P.2d at 838, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
20. Id. at 642, 749 P.2d at 838, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
21. For this proposition the defendant relied on People v. Butler, 65 Cal. 2d 569,
421 P.2d 703, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1967). The proposition of defense counsel was for modi-
fication of California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) No. 9.10 (4th ed. 1979)
[hereinafter CALJIC], the general instruction regarding the definition of robbery.
prostitution.22
The defendant next proposed an additional instruction regarding
the intent to steal. However, the trial court refused the instruction
based on the conclusion that the instruction would confuse the jury.23
The court upheld the refusal, as the proposed instruction merely re-
stated other instructions already given on intent to steal.24
The third and final proposed instruction involved involuntary man-
slaughter. The court indicated that there is no duty to give an in-
struction when there is no "substantial evidence in support" of the
instruction.25 The trial court's refusal to give the proposed instruc-
tion was upheld based on the evidence that the defendant shot his
victims at point-blank range when one was unconscious and the other
lying prone on a bed. The defendant's evidence in opposition, his
tape-recorded statements denying intent, were insubstantial in
character.26
D. Mistrial Allegation and Improper Photographs
The defendant moved for a mistrial after he confessed in court to
committing six murders. The court stated that the defendant's vol-
untary acts did not provide grounds for a mistrial.27 Additionally, the
defendant alleged that the trial court abused its discretion in admit-
ting photographs of the two victims. Relying on section 352 of the
Evidence Code,28 the court indicated that the photographs were rele-
vant to the issue of malice and were not shocking. Thus, there was
no abuse of discretion. 29
E. Intent to Kill Instructions
The defendant alleged that intent to kill instructions must be given
to the jury prior to the special circumstance findings of felony-mur-
22. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 642, 749 P.2d at 838, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
23. The proposed instruction stated: "If you have a reasonable doubt whether the
defendant formed an intent to steal from Mr. Parmer and/or Mr. Haynes before they
were shot, then you are instructed that Mr. Parmer and/or Mr. Haynes were not killed
in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, the crime of robbery." 44 Cal. 3d at
642-43, 749 P.2d at 839, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 185. The defendant felt that although there
might have been a "cosmetic" problem, the proposed instruction was proper as framed.
Id. at 643, 749 P.2d at 839, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
24. The court gave CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 9.10 on intent to steal.
25. 44 Cal. 3d at 643, 749 P.2d at 839, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 185. For this proposition the
court cited People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 603 P.2d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979).
26. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 643, 749 P.2d at 839, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 185. The court
indicated that such statements were self-serving and thus implied that their veracity
was suspect. Id.
27. Id. at 643, 749 P.2d at 839, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
28. Section 352 gives the trial court broad discretion in determining whether the
probative value of proffered evidence outweighs its prejudicial value. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 352 (West 1966).
29. Id. at 644, 749 P.2d at 840, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
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der robbery, felony-murder burglary, or multiple murder. However,
the court held that no such instruction need be given.30 Under the
auspices of People v. Anderson,31 an intent to kill instruction is neces-
sary only when the defendant could be found to be an accomplice,
rather than the actual murderer. An intent to kill instruction is not
required where the defendant is the alleged actual killer.
IV. PENALTY PHASE
A. Excuse of Veniremen for Cause
The defendant alleged error in excusing veniremen for cause who
would automatically vote against the death penalty. The court stated
that under the United States Supreme Court opinion of Wainwright
v. Witt,32 it is proper to exclude veniremen for cause when they indi-
cate that they would automatically vote not to impose the death
penalty.33
B. Evidence of Other Crimes and Admissibility of Photographs
Regarding the prosecutor's offer of evidence of other crimes, the
court indicated that there was no denial of due process.3 4 However,
the defendant contended that the admission of certain photographs
depicting the condition of various victims' bodies violated section 352
of the Evidence Code by being too prejudicial, too gruesome, and cu-
mulative. The court indicated, and the defendant conceded, that the
photographs were relevant to the determination of the penalty. The
court concluded that the photographs were not so shocking or grue-
some as to be unduly prejudicial under section 352. Alternatively,
the court reasoned that even if the trial court erred in admitting the
photographs, the error was not prejudicial since the penalty phase
30. Id. at 644, 749 P.2d at 840, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
31. 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
32. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). The standard set forth in Wainright allowed excuse for
cause where a veniremen's beliefs would "prevent or substantially impair the perform-
ance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Id. at
424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). For a general overview of the
jury selection process in California, see B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
§§ 393-423 (1963 & Supp. 1985).
33. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 645, 749 P.2d at 841, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
34. Evidence was offered by the prosecution, in the penalty phase, that the de-
fendant had murdered Harry Carter, James Butchers, and Virginia Hernandez prior to
the murders charged in the present case. 44 Cal. 3d at 640, 749 P.2d at 838, 244 Cal.
Rptr. at 183.
outcome would still have been the same.3 5
C. Confessions of the Defendant During the Penalty Phase
During the penalty phase, the defendant confessed to killing an in-
dividual while robbing a small market in San Francisco. The prose-
cutor asked the state's psychiatrist if the San Francisco killing was
probative as to whether the defendant could plan, use a gun, and
commit a crime. The psychiatrist stated that the prior killing did
show the defendant's capability of planning a crime, committing it,
and using a gun in the process. The defendant alleged that the psy-
chiatrist's testimony was based on an improper foundation since evi-
dence of other crimes must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
before being admitted into evidence. The court rejected this argu-
ment and added that defense counsel did not contemporaneously ob-
ject to the defendant's confession,3 6 thereby waiving the right to
contest the admissibility on appeal.
D. Future Dangerousness
The defendant further alleged that the prosecutor violated People
v. Murtishaw by commenting in closing argument on the defendant's
future dangerousness.37 The court, in distinguishing Murtishaw, in-
dicated that the prosecutor's comment did not constitute an expert
prediction; rather, such comment was merely argument. The court
refused to equate the prosecutor's brief comment with the Mur-
tishaw comments which comprised a major part of that prosecution's
penalty phase presentation.3 8 Furthermore, defense counsel failed to
contemporaneously object which would have cured the error. Thus,
the defendant was deemed to have waived the error on appeal.3 9
E. Section 190.3 of the Penal Code
The defendant's penultimate argument raises the constitutionality
of the sentencing formula under section 190.3 of the Penal Code.40
The defendant argued that the jury did not have the constitutionally
required sentencing discretion when applying section 190.3.41 The
35. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
36. 44 Cal. 3d at 646, 749 P.2d at 841, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 187; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352
(West 1966).
37. 44 Cal. 3d at 648, 749 P.2d at 842-43, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 188; see supra note 4; B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 293h (Supp. 1985).
38. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 649, 749 P.2d at 843, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (citing Peo-
ple v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981)) (expert predic-
tions as to future dangerousness of the defendant generally inadmissible at trial).
39. Id. at 650, 749 P.2d at 843, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
40. Id. at 649-50, 749 P.2d at 843, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). The constitutionality of section 190.2
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court rejected the claim of unconstitutionality and indicated that the
application of section 190.3 would be determined on a case by case
basis.
Additionally, the defendant contended that the prosecutor's com-
ments misled the jury into a rote weighing of the mitigating and ag-
gravating factors without placing personal values on the factors as
required by People v. Allen.42 The court agreed that a mechanical
weighing of the factors is unsatisfactory and that jurors must know
that they can assign their own weight to the factors to decide
whether "death is the appropriate penalty under all the circum-
stances." 43 However, the court found that both the prosecution and
defense counsel informed the jury in this case as to its discretion in
determining the appropriate penalty. For example, the prosecution
remarked that the jury must "follow the law" and otherwise indi-
cated that the jury could attach its own weight to the factors.44 Addi-
tionally, defense counsel made similar statements regarding the
jurors' ability to personally weigh the factors to determine the appro-
priate penalty.
F. Ultimate Responsibility for Appropriateness of Death Penalty
Finally, the defendant argued that the prosecutor's closing argu-
ment violated Caldwell v. Mississippi.45 The court, however, held
that the prosecutor did not violate Caldwell as he never told the jury
that the sentencing was not ultimately in the hands of the jurors.46
V. JUSTICE MOSK CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
Justice Mosk wrote separately and was joined by Justice Brous-
sard. Both concurred in the findings in the guilt phase but dissented
was upheld in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) and People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d
730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986).
42. 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
202 (1987).
43. Hendricks, 44 Cal. 3d at 651, 749 P.2d at 844, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
44. The prosecutor stated that the law requires "you [to] weigh the aggravating
and mitigating factors." Id. at 652, 749 P.2d at 845, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (emphasis in
original).
45. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
46. The court relied on the prosecutor's opening remarks where he stated that the
jury is "going to have one of the most important decisions that [they] will probably
have to make in the course of [their] lifetime because [they] are going to decide based
on the evidence and the law whether a human being shall suffer life imprisonment or
shall suffer death." 44 Cal. 3d at 655, 749 P.2d at 847, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (emphasis in
original).
on the affirmance of the death penalty. Justice Mosk strongly stated
that the majority was willing to find errors harmless so long as they
were correct "in some respect." 47 He focused on the application of
section 190.3 and found a violation of the mandates of People v.
Brown 48 and Caldwell v. Mississippi.49 Although indicating that the
court's instructions to the jury were misleading, his chief ire was re-
served for the prosecutor's closing arguments, which he felt misled
the jury as to what the weighing process entailed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Mosk's opinion raises sound objections to the court's analy-
ses of penalty phase errors. The majority opinion is indicative of the
court's trend to give tremendous latitude to the findings of the jury.
The court seems to attach the same weight to errors alleged in both
the guilt and penalty phases. By doing so, the court disregards the
fact that penalty phase errors are more adverse in a death penalty
case and therefore should be given closer scrutiny, regardless of
whether contemporaneous objections are made or not.50
ERNEST F. BATENGA
F. Reversible error does not exist despite contentions that the
state's key witness testified under the influence of drugs,
that evidence linking the defendant to the victim was
hearsay, and that the jury considered one inseparable
action as two aggravating circumstances: People v.
Melton.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Melton,' the court upheld the jury's imposition of the
death penalty after affirming the finding of first degree murder dur-
ing the commission of a burglary and robbery.2 The court addressed
twenty-one contentions of error and declared all meritless or
harmless.
Several of the court's many guilt phase holdings were especially
47. Id. at 656, 749 P.2d at 847-48, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 196 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
48. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 538-544, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985), rev'd sub non
California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987).
49. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
50. See People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711, 729 n.3, 700 P.2d 415, 424 n.3, 214 Cal. Rptr.
801, 810 n.3 (1985) (plurality opinion).
1. 44 Cal. 3d 713, 750 P.2d 741, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1988). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Eagleson, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli,
Arguelles and Kaufman concurring. A separate dissenting and concurring opinion was
filed by Justice Broussard,
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West 1988).
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relevant: first, the court did not find error in the trial court's refusal
to order a bodily intrusion of a key witness whom the defendant sus-
pected had testified under the influence of drugs; second, the court
affirmed the admission of admittedly gruesome and potentially preju-
dicial photographs of the victim as well as incriminating evidence
which admittedly may have been hearsay; third, the court declared
certain testimony irrelevant yet harmless despite its potentially dam-
aging effects; fourth, the court held that a violation of the attorney
work product privilege did not occur; and fifth, the court reaffirmed
its decision to overrule the instructional guidelines set forth in Carlos
v. Superior Court.3
As to error raised in the penalty phase, the court held: juror mis-
conduct did not occur when jurors innocently and coincidentally
watched a television program about the death penalty; the defendant
was not denied the right to present mitigating factors of his youth
although certain records had been destroyed; graphic evidence of the
defendant's past crimes was admissible although the defendant stipu-
lated to the convictions; instructional confusion did not result
although the jury may have remembered and applied inapplicable
guilt phase admonitions during the penalty phase; the jury was prop-
erly instructed as to the method of assigning weights to aggravating
and mitigating circumstances; and the jury properly counted a rob-
bery and burglary arising out of a single act as two aggravating
circumstances.
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
The defendant was convicted of murdering a seventy-seven year
old homosexual male with a finding of special circumstances.4
Although the defendant's fingerprints were not found at the murder
scene, an entry in the victim's calendar showed that the defendant
was to meet the victim to see if the two might be sexually compati-
ble. Boyd, the state's primary witness and ex-lover of the defendant,
was granted immunity and testified against the defendant. The de-
fendant admitted to entering the victim's house, finding the victim's
corpse and taking the victim's car. The defendant was arrested three
days after the victim's body was found. Six-and-a-half years after the
murder, this appeal was heard and the death penalty affirmed.
3. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1988).
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Guilt Phase
Among many other contentions of guilt phase error, the defendant
asserted: 1) denial of the right to confront witnesses; 2) improper ad-
mission of hearsay evidence; 3) use of prejudicial photographs; 4) vio-
lation of the attorney work product privilege; and 5) instructional
error.
1. Refusal to submit witness to physical examination
The court held that despite the recognized right to confrontation of
witnesses,5 a defendant has no right to force a bodily intrusion upon
a witness absent probable cause that the witness' in court testimony
is affected by drugs.6 The defendant asserted that Boyd's sluggish re-
sponses, tired eyelids and sunglasses indicated the influence of drugs
while on the witness stand.7 Thus, the defendant stated that the wit-
ness should have been drug tested for impeachment purposes.8 The
court held that the trial court's "external examination for signs of
drug use," which resulted in a negative finding, sufficiently dispelled
any probable cause of drug use by the witness;9 therefore, a blood or
urine test would have been an unreasonable search and seizure.1 0
2. Admission of hearsay
The court held that a notebook and calendar containing entries in
the victim's handwriting, although hearsay, were "admissible to show
the victim's state of mind," that is, the decedent's intention to meet
with the defendant.ll The court found that any possible error was
harmless in light of the additional evidence linking the defendant to
the victim.12
3. Prejudicial photographs
The court found that the probative value of numerous pictures de-
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 294, 578 P.2d 123, 127-28, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880-
81 (1978) (probable cause necessary for bodily intrusions).
7. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 736, 750 P.2d at 753, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
8. People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 137, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 283 (1976) (wit-
ness may be impeached by a showing of drug influence); see 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE, § 1914 (1986).
9. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 738, 750 P.2d at 754, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
10. IdA. at 738 n.7, 750 P.2d at 754 n.7, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.7; see U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (all persons protected
against "unwarranted" bodily intrusions by the government); 68 Am. JUR. 2D Searches
& Seizures §§ 29, 105 (1973); 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2227-2230 (1984).
11. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 739-40, 750 P.2d at 755, 244 Cal. Rptr. 8 at 881; see CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1250 (West 1966); 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, § 755 (1986).
12. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 740, 750 P.2d at 755, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
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picting the victim after death was not outweighed by their prejudicial
effect.13 The pictures were clearly "relevant insofar as they sug-
gested a willful and deliberate killing."14 The court further rejected
the defendant's contention that the trial court failed to make an ade-
quate record of its deliberations on this issue.15 Additionally, the
court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.16
4. Testimony elicited from defense investigator
During the prosecution's cross examination, a defense investigator
testified that Boyd told the investigator that the defendant was not
responsible for the murder. The investigator stated that he did not
inform the police about this statement, implying that the investigator
did not believe Boyd's story. The court denied the claim that the
cross examination of the defendant's investigator violated the attor-
ney work product privilege.17 The defendant was deemed to have
waived any work product privilege by allowing his own investigator
to testify.'8
However, the court agreed that the investigator's lay testimony of
Boyd's credibility was "irrelevant and incompetent."1 9 The evidence
did not establish that the investigator was an expert witness nor an
individual familiar with Boyd's "reputation for veracity. '20 Never-
theless, the technically inadmissible testimony was deemed "minimal
in context" and thus harmless.2 '
13. Id. at 741, 750 P.2d at 756, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 882; see CAL. EVID. CODE § 352
(West 1966).
14. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 741, 750 P.2d at 756, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
15. Id. at 740, 250 P.2d at 755, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 882; see People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d
1, 24-27, 609 P.2d 468, 481-83, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 14-16 (1980) (discussing the need for ade-
quate records of judicial deliberations).
16. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 741, 750 P.2d at 756, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 882; see People v.
Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 171, 599 P.2d 587, 604, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 297-98 (1979) (admis-
sion of photographs primarily at discretion of the trial court).
17. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 743, 750 P.2d at 757, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 883. See generally 31
CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence § 442 (1976).
18. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 743, 750 P.2d at 757, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 883. See generally 31
CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence § 442 (1976).
19. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 743-44, 750 P.2d at 757, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 884; see CAL.
EVID. CODE § 800 (West 1966); 31 AM. JUR. 2D Ex'pert & Opinion Evidence §§ 14, 15
(1967 & Supp. 1988); 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, §§ 447-449 (1986).
20. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 744, 750 P.2d at 758, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 884; see CAL. EVID.
CODE § 786 (West 1966); 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, §§ 484-488 (1986).
21. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 744-45, 750 P.2d at 758, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 884; see Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966).
5. Instructional error
The defendant asserted that the trial court erred by not instructing
the jury, in accordance with Carlos v. Superior Court,22 that a felony-
murder special circumstance requires an intent to kill.23 The court
noted that since Carlos had been overruled,24 a jury need only find
that the defendant "personally killed [the victim] in the course of a
robbery and burglary."25 "Intent to kill need be charged and proved
for a felony-murder special circumstance only when the defendant
was an aider and abettor to the homicide." 26 Because the defendant
was the sole perpetrator, the instruction was correct.27
B. Penalty Phase
The defendant asserted, inter alia: 1) denial of the right to conduct
voir dire of jurors on a question material to the case; 2) violation of
the constitutional right to preserve favorable evidence; 3) improper
admission of graphic testimony of the defendant's past crimes; 4) ap-
plication of guilt phase instructions by the jury during the penalty
phase; 5) inadequate jury instructions as to the weighing of aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances; and 6) improper counting of aggra-
vating circumstances.
1. Denial of voir dire
The court rejected the assertion that the defense counsel should
have had the opportunity to question the jury about a television show
called "The Executioner's Song" during voir dire.28 Despite the de-
fendant's concern that the show glamorized an execution and mini-
mized the gravity of the death penalty, the court found no evidence
of any jury misconduct.29 There is no misconduct in merely watching
"a popular television program that happens to discuss the subject
matter of the trial in a general way."30
22. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
23. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 746-47, 750 P.2d at 760, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
24. Id. at 747, 750 P.2d at 760, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 886; see People v. Anderson, 43 Cal.
3d 1104, 1138-48, 742 P.2d 1306, 1325-31, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 604-11 (1987) (overruling
Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79).
25. Melton, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 747, 750 P.2d at 760, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 886; see Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3201 (1987).
26. Melton, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 747, 750 P.2d at 760, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 749, 750 P.2d at 761-62, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
29. Id. at 749, 750 P.2d at 761, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 887. See generally 47 Am. JUR. 2D
Jury §§ 195-212 (1969).
30. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 749, 750 P.2d at 761, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (quoting El-
sworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 37 Cal. 3d 540, 557, 691 P.2d 630, 640-41, 208 Cal. Rptr.
874, 885 (1984)); Comment, Due Process for Whom-Newspaper or Defendant?, 4
STAN. L. REV. 101 (1951) (newspaper coverage causing unfair trials).
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2. Lost records
The court refused to dismiss the death penalty although records
which may have shown mitigating circumstances of the defendant's
youth were destroyed by the California Youth Authority (CYA).31
"The constitutional duty to preserve favorable evidence... is not vio-
lated when the authorities have no reasonable bases to believe that
the material destroyed will have bearing on a criminal defense." 32
Since the records were destroyed long before the offense, there was
no error.33 Additionally, CYA was statutorily authorized to destroy
such records.34 Furthermore, the court noted the availability of
other evidence which sufficiently portrayed the life of a CYA ward.35
3. Details of past violent crimes
The court found it proper to admit evidence of the defendant's past
violent crimes despite the defendant's offer to stipulate to the convic-
tions.36 "There is no unfairness in allowing the People to show the
circumstances of the violent 'criminal activity.'"37 Similarly, the
court allowed evidence of prior convictions which resulted from "bar-
gained pleas." 3 s The court held that a "bargained conviction or dis-
missal is not an 'acquittal'" and thus is admissible at the penalty
phase.3 9 Finally, the admission of circumstances leading up to prior
crimes is proper since they tend to expose a "particularly vicious and
callous assault."40
4. Carryover effect of guilt phase instruction
Despite a guilt phase instruction to ignore sympathy in arriving at
the verdict,4 1 the court felt the carryover effect of this instruction as
31. Melton, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 750, 750 P.2d at 762, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
32. Id.; see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984).
33. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 751, 750 P.2d at 763, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
34. Id. at 751-52, 750 P.2d at 763, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 889; see CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 1763 (West 1984).
35. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 752-53, 750 P.2d at 764, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
36. Id. at 754, 750 P.2d at 764-65, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
37. Id. at 754, 750 P.2d at 765, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 891; see People v. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d
1168, 1203, 743 P.2d 301, 323, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 688-89 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West Supp. 1988); Comment, Capital Punishment-Who Should Choose?, 12 W. ST.
U.L. REV. 383 (1985).
38. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 755, 750 P.2d at 765, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
39. Id. at 755, 750 P.2d at 765, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
40. Id. at 757, 750 P.2d at 767, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
41. Id. at 758, 750 P.2d at 768, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 894; see California Jury Instruc-
tions, Criminal (CALJIC), No. 1.00 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter CALJIC].
to penalty deliberations was harmless.42 Although such an instruc-
tion at the penalty phase compounded with an instruction to consider
all mitigating factors4 3 might create ambiguity, the court reasoned
that when all instructions were taken as a whole, the jury was sub-
stantially informed of its duty to weigh all mitigating factors.44
Therefore, the guilt phase admonition had no effect on the penalty
phase deliberations. 45
5. Weight of aggravating and mitigating factors
The court held that an instruction requiring the jury to "impose
the death penalty if it finds that aggravating circumstances 'out-
weigh' mitigating ones" 46 did not confuse the jury as to their sentenc-
ing responsibilities. 47 Due to the additional admonitions that
aggravating factors require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that
one mitigating factor may outweigh all aggravating ones, the jury was
clearly advised that it was to decide based on "relative weight, not
relative numbers."48
6. Indivisible action worth double aggravation
Finally, the court determined that section 190.3(a) of the Penal
Code49 must prevail over section 654 of the Penal Code5O because sec-
tion 190.3 operates as a specific statute and an exception to the gen-
eral rule of section 654. While section 654 prohibits the imposition of
more than one sentence for crimes occurring from "indivisible" ac-
tions,51 section 190.3(a) permits all special circumstances to be indi-
vidually considered as aggravating circumstances.5 2 The court
rejected any contrary suggestions implied from the plurality opinion
42. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 760, 750 P.2d at 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 895; see People v.
Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 785, 726 P.2d 113, 149, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 703 (1986).
43. See CALJIC No. 8.84.1(k).
44. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 760, 750 P.2d at 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 895; see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1988); 59 CAL. JUR. 3D Trial § 103 (1980).
45. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 760, 750 P.2d at 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
46. Id. at 761, 750 P.2d at 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 895; see CALJIC No. 8.84.2.
47. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 761, 750 P.2d at 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 896; see CALJIC No.
8.84.2.
48. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 761, 750 P.2d at 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 896; see People v.
Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 544, 709 P.2d 440, 458, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 655 (1985); 59 CAL. JUR.
3D Trial § 103 (1980).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1988); see Survey, Review of Selected
1977 California Legislation, 9 PAC. L.J. 439 (1978).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988); see, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36,
65, 679 P.2d 433, 451, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 800 (1984).
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654; see People v. Beamon, 8 Cal. 3d 625, 637-39, 504 P.2d
905, 913-15, 105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 689-91 (1973); Comment, Double Jeopardy v. Double
Punishment, 2 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 86 (1965).
52. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 765, 750 P.2d at 772, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
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in People v. Harris.53
IV. JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Broussard opined that the majority wrongly applied section
190.3.54 He stated that the majority strayed from precedent by al-
lowing the jury to consider both the robbery and the burglary as sep-
arate aggravating factors. According to supreme court policy55 and
the dictates of section 190.3, when two individual crimes arise from
the same factual occurrence, both should be considered together as
only one aggravating factor.56 Nevertheless, Justice Broussard ap-
proved the defendant's death sentence.
V. CONCLUSION
As Justice Broussard stated, a robbery and a burglary occurring
from the same uninterrupted conduct cannot not give rise to two sep-
arate punishments under section 654.57 It thus follows that the two
should not be considered as a double aggravating circumstance. As
Justice Broussard noted, "the use of such factors 'artificially inflates
the particular circumstances of the crime'...."58
Because of the particular facts in this sexually deviant murder,
counting one indivisible action as two aggravating circumstances
probably was harmless. However, the precedent set by this decision
will affect more than sexually related murders. The majority ratio-
nalizes its decision by stating that the more specific provisions of sec-
tion 190.3 prevail over section 654.59 However, it is section 654 which
addresses the violation of two statutes by the same conduct, not sec-
tion 190.3.60 Thus, it appears that the court's reasoning on this final
53. Id. at 766, 750 P.2d at 773, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 899; see People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d
36, 64-65, 679 P.2d 433, 450-51, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 800-01 (1984).
54. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 773, 750 P.2d at 777-78, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (Broussard,
J., concurring).
55. Id. at 773, 750 P.2d at 777, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04 (Broussard, J., concurring);
see People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 410, 749 P.2d 279, 298, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 861
(1988); People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 504-06, 749 P.2d 803, 817-19, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148,
163-64 (1988).
56. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 774, 750 P.2d at 778, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (Broussard, J.,
concurring).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988); see infra note 60.
58. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 772, 750 P.2d at 777, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (quoting People
v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 62, 63, 679 P.2d 433, 449, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 798 (1984)).
59. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d at 768, 750 P.2d at 774, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
60. Section 654 states:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
issue was affected by the facts of this case, resulting in the court ra-
tionalizing away a valid contention of error.
MICHELLE R. ANDERSON
G. The court dismissed contentions that prior criminal
conduct was improperly admitted, and that diminished
capacity obviated the specific intent to commit first
degree murder with special circumstances: People v.
Williams.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Williams,1 the California Supreme Court affirmed
three counts of the defendant's first degree murder conviction and
death penalty sentence with special circumstances. 2 The court held
that although the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury as to the
legal definition of insanity, the error was harmless.3 The court also
determined that the record was devoid of the evidence necessary to
establish inadequate representation by counsel.4 Finally, the court
held that the trial court's refusal to exclude evidence of the defend-
ant's prior criminal acts constituted only harmless error 5 and thus
did not warrant reversal of the conviction.6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 1978, the defendant and Robert Tyson stole a .22
Beretta pistol from their employer. The two then robbed a couple in
Modesto. Some of the goods stolen from the Modesto couple were
then sold at a yard sale at Tyson's home. Two of the defendant's
murder victims came to this sale and openly displayed a large
amount of currency. On October 8, the defendant and Tyson went to
the victims' home. The men from the yard sale were robbed and
provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in
no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction
and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission
under any other.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988).
1. 44 Cal. 3d 883, 751 P.2d 395, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1988). Justice Eagleson wrote
the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas, along with Justices Panelli and Arguel-
les concurring. Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Kaufman authored separate concurring
opinions.
2. Id. at 897, 751 P.2d at 403, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 344. The special circumstances
were affirmed. However, the court modified the lower court's judgments to reflect
that the defendant should have been convicted only of a single multiple-murder special
circumstance instead of multiple special circumstances. Id.
3. Id. at 931-32, 751 P.2d at 427, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
4. Id. at 922, 751 P.2d at 420, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
5. Id. at 914, 751 P.2d at 415, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
6. Id
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killed, and a third victim, a female, was taken from the home, raped,
and murdered in a field.
Tyson voluntarily surrendered to the police and directed them to
the location of the rape victim's body. In November, Williams was
arrested in Arizona and subsequently confessed to the crimes. His
primary defense at trial was diminished capacity. However, an ex-
pert witness testified that despite the defendant's incessant craving of
drugs and alcohol, Williams did not lack the capacity to formulate
the specific intent necessary to commit the crimes for which he was
indicted.7 The jury found the defendant guilty of three counts of
murder.8 They also found that the offenses were committed pursu-
ant to a robbery which constitutes special circumstances under sec-
tion 190.2 of the Penal Code 9 and thus affixed a penalty of death.10
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Refusal to Exclude Prior Criminal Acts and History
The defendant argued that inclusion of prior criminal acts for
which he was not formally charged as inherently prejudicial to his
defense and in violation of section 1101(b) of the Evidence Code."
7. The defendant argued that his tremendous appetite for hard drugs and liquor
diminished his capacity to form the specific intent required to commit first degree
murder. An example of defendant's hunger for drugs and alcohol was described by the
court:
[C]ommencing with the robbery at the Modesto Park ... he had used mor-
phine and Valium in the morning, smoked marijuana, and consumed diet pills.
On Friday, October 6, he had again used heroin, morphine, and Valium. He
had also smoked marijuana, and had drunk two to three 6-packs of beer as
well as two or three glasses of tequila. In the evening he had LSD.... On the
way to [the victims' home] he ate four ... Valium tablets, consumed another
eight cans of beer, and at the [victims'] home drank a glass of whiskey. Later
that evening, on the way to [the rape site], he drank two cans of beer.
Id. at 902, 751 P.2d at 406-07, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48.
8. Id. at 896, 751 P.2d at 403, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988).
10. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 896, 751 P.2d at 403, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
11. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West Supp. 1988); Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 904, 751
P.2d at 408, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 347. According to the court, three factors must be present
in order to admit this highly prejudicial evidence: "(1) the materiality of the fact
sought to be proved or disproved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or
disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the ex-
clusion of relevant evidence. Id. at 905, 751 P.2d at 408-09, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 350. See
CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 351, 352 (West 1966); see also Mendez, California's New Law on
Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychologi-
cal Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984); Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior
Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 297 (1982).
Additionally, because the crimes in question occurred prior to June 8, 1982, the "Vic-
Although the court found that such prior acts were erroneously ad-
mitted,12 the error was not prejudicial' 3 as other evidence sufficiently
established the defendant's guilt.14
B. The Admission of Lay-Opinion Testimony
The defendant argued that the opinions of a detective and a correc-
tional officer regarding the defendant's sobriety and lack of drug in-
fluence were inadmissible because they were not experts on these
issues. In California, lay opinion testimony as to alcohol-induced in-
toxication and sobriety is admissible where the opinion is
"[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness."' 5 However, the
issue of admissibility of lay opinion in regard to drug intoxication was
one of first impression for the court.
The court agreed with several appellate court decisions holding
such testimony admissible where a proper foundation is first estab-
lished.16 However, the agreement stands only as dictum as the court
reasoned that the witnesses never stated an "opinion," but merely
testified to their observation that the defendant was not under the in-
fluence of narcotics, nor "strung out" on narcotics.17
C The Adequacy of Representation by Counsel
The defendant argued that his trial counsel did not provide consti-
tutionally adequate representation. The court found that the defend-
ant's counsel properly investigated the diminished capacity defense,' 8
properly objected to or attempted to suppress an illegally obtained
confession,1 9 and did not improperly or inadequately attempt to sup-
press the testimony of Tyson and his wife. 20 Furthermore, the court
noted that any claim by the defendant that his trial counsel improp-
erly allowed prior criminal acts to be admitted into evidence was not
tim's Bill of Rights" section of the California Constitution did not apply. CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 28(d) (1983) (inclusion of all relevant evidence in criminal proceedings).
12. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 909-10, 751 P.2d at 411-12, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53.
13. Id. at 909-10, 751 P.2d at 412, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
14. Id. at 912, 751 P.2d at 413, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
15. Id. at 914, 751 P.2d at 415, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 800(a) (West 1966)). See Letwin, Objections to Non-Expert Opinion Testimony, 15
UCLA L. REV. 134 (1967).
16. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 45, 751 P.2d at 415-16, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 345. See gener-
ally Annotation, Competency of Non-Expert Witness to Testify in Criminal Case,
Based on Personal Observation, as to Whether Person was Under the Influence of
Drugs, 21 A.L.R. 4th 905 (1983).
17. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 915, 751 P.2d at 416, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58. The wit-
nesses testified that Williams did not exhibit the symptoms of being "strung out";
those symptoms would have included nausea, shaking or trembling, and sweating
excessively.
18. Id. at 917, 751 P.2d at 417, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
19. Id. at 917-18, 751 P.2d at 417-18, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
20. Id. at 918-19, 751 P.2d at 418-19, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 359-61.
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a sign of inadequate representation because the defendant had previ-
ously confessed to these crimes.21 Therefore, the court determined
that the record clearly established that the defendant received ade-
quate legal representation as required by the sixth amendment.22
D. Special Circumstance Murder Issue
The defendant had been charged with six special circumstances,
three of which were based on section 190.2(c)(5)-that a defendant
"has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of
murder... "23 The defendant argued that because he had not been
convicted of any murder offense at the time of the preliminary pre-
trial hearing, the charge of six special circumstances was erroneous. 24
The court noted that to uphold allegations of special circumstances, a
magistrate is only required to make a pretrial determination that
probable cause exists to believe that the defendant "may be" con-
victed of murder, not that the defendant "has been" convicted.25
Since the defendant did not make a pretrial motion to set the infor-
mation aside, any error was deemed waived.26
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF INSANITY
The defendant properly contended that the trial court incorrectly
stated the M'Naughten definition of insanity while instructing the
jury during the sanity phase.27 Case law has established that the
standard set forth by the American Law Institute is the correct defi-
nition of insanity in California. 28 Although the court acknowledged
21. Id. at 922, 751 P.2d at 420, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
22. Id. at 923-34, 751 P.2d at 421, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63; see U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(5) (West 1988).
24. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 751 P.2d at 420-21, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
25. Id. at 925, 751 P.2d at 422-23, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
26. Id
27. The trial court's instructions stated:
A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.... A person whose
brain has become diseased or damaged by the use of intoxicating liquor, drugs
or narcotics so as to render him incapable of knowing or understanding that
his act was wrong, is legally insane.
Id. at 930, 751 P.2d at 426, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
28. Id. at 931, 751 P.2d at 426-27, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 368. The proper jury instruction
would have been: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
that the trial court erred in stating the M'Naughten standard, the er-
ror was not prejudicial because the appointed experts and the direct
evidence clearly established that Williams was not insane at the time
the murders were committed.29
V. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that the multiple murder
special circumstance conviction and the death penalty sentence
should be affirmed.30 However, he contended that the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury that an independent felonious purpose
must be established to convict the defendant of the felony-murder
special circumstance constituted prejudicial error.31 Nevertheless,
Justice Mosk concluded that the multiple-murder special circum-
stance was sufficient to affirm the death penalty verdict against the
defendant.32
Justice Kaufman filed a concurring opinion in which he stated,
"[T]here is no reasonable possibility that absent these errors and de-
fects the jury would have reached determinations more favorable to
the defendant." 33 Therefore, Justice Kaufman determined that the
majority correctly affirmed the defendant's conviction and death pen-
alty sentence.3 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Automatic review of death penalty cases has overburdened the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court.35 The result is a robotic disposition of all
contentions of error. A separate court of appeals may be necessary to
eliminate meritless contentions, so that review by the California
Supreme Court of such cases would be more clearly focused and obvi-
ate the necessity for needlessly expansive review.36
PETER BENNETT LANGBORD
ments of law." Id. at 931, 751 P.2d at 427, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 368; see People v. Drew, 22
Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 63 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Modern Status of Test of Ctimi-
nal Responsibility-State Cases, 9 A.L.R. 4th 526 (1981).
29. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d at 932-33, 751 P.2d at 427-28, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
30. Id. at 973, 751 P.2d at 456, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (Mosk, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 973, 751 P.2d at 456, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98 (Mosk, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 973-74, 751 P.2d at 456, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 398 (Mosk, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 974, 751 P.2d at 456, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 398 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
34. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 1988).
36. "[I]t is time to eliminate direct appeals to the high court and route capital
cases through the appeal courts, where issues can be narrowed and sharpened. ...
[T]he court would be spared some of the busywork that consumes its time... " Un-
shackle the High Court, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1988, Part II, at 6, col. 1 (emphasis added).
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H. Open candor regarding cruelty of the crime and initial
reluctance in being appointed counsel does not constitute
ineffective representation. Although the heinous-murder
special-circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, a
finding of torture-murder special-circumstance alleviates
the vagueness error: People v. Wade.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Wade,1 the California Supreme Court upheld the de-
fendant's conviction for first degree murder of his ten-year-old
stepchild and affirmed the death penalty sentence.2 Notwithstanding
the numerous arguments raised by the defendant, the court held that
the trial court did not err and, even if it did, any error was harmless.
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
In 1981, the defendant, Melvin Wade, lived with his wife, Irabell
Strong, and four of her five children. The children were Penny,
Joyce (the victim), Alexis, and Syetta.3 Although the family relation-
ships were initially friendly, Wade gradually began to mistreat the
children.4
On the morning of the murder, twenty-four-year-old Wade beat
Joyce for neglecting her personal hygiene.5 He later forced her into
an army duffel bag where she remained confined for four hours.6
Joyce pleaded with Wade, but his beatings continued past nightfall. 7
The defendant tried to hang her from a nail on the wall and repeat-
edly kicked her when she fell to the floor.8
The police first arrived at 3:35 a.m., but left after Wade convinced
them that the disturbance was merely an argument. 9 When the po-
1. 44 Cal. 3d 975, 750 P.2d 794, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1988). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Mosk, Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson, and
Kaufman concurred. Justice Broussard wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
2. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 981, 750 P.2d at 796, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 907; see CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 190-190.6 (West 1988).
3. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 981, 750 P.2d at 796, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
4. Id. This physical abuse included fist and paddle beatings, making the children
take cold showers, and forcing Joyce and Alexis to drink their own urine. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 982, 750 P.2d at 797, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
7. Id. The defendant drank a full bottle of wine during the beating and shouted
that he was "Michael the Archangel" and was going to kill Joyce since she was the
devil. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id The police stayed for fifteen minutes. Id.
lice arrived a second time with the paramedics, Joyce was dead.10
Wade surrendered to the authorities, saying, "Here I am. I'm the one
you want. I guess I hit her too hard. I guess I hit her too hard.""
Several psychiatrists were engaged by both the prosecution and the
defense to evaluate Wade's mental state and the viability of an in-
sanity defense. 12 The psychiatrists' investigations revealed that the
defendant had been molested by his mother's boyfriend at a very
young age.13 The doctors found multiple personas within Wade's
psyche in addition to his own "mild-mannered, polite, soft-spoken
and cooperative" personality.14 One personality, "Othello," was de-
scribed as "boisterous, arrogant, vulgar and violent; [disliking] Melvin
intensely."15 "Joe," another personality, was a "devil in training,
waiting around for a body to occupy." "Joe," described as "weak,
friendly, soft-spoken, mischievous and devilish," was the personality
who ultimately submitted to the authorities.16 "Michael the Archan-
gel," was "angelic, weak and mild" and challenged Othello's influ-
ence over Wade. 17  The psychiatrists, making individual
determinations, concluded that Wade either had a multiple personal-
ity or suffered from "possession syndrome." Additionally, some con-
cluded that Wade was legally insane and a pathological liar.'8 Other
witnesses testified that the defendant had a tendency to become vio-
lent, citing incidents of child abuse.19
Wade testified at the penalty phase of the trial that: he could not
remember Joyce's death;20 he did not recall inflicting any physical
punishment on the children; and had no recollection of events lead-
ing up to the murder.21
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Guilt Phase
The defense asserted that five reversible errors occurred during
10. Id. at 983, 750 P.2d at 797, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
11. Id. Wade was arrested and in his statement to the police, admitted to most of
his violent actions. Id.
12. Id at 983-85, 750 P.2d at 797, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
13. Id. at 983, 750 P.2d at 798, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 909. Wade had previously under-
gone psychological counseling and attempted suicide on three occasions. Id
14. Id. at 984, 750 P.2d at 798, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
15. Id. Othello, who was supposedly born in Greece and was known as the "Son of
Fire" or "Son of Satan," was the devil's assassin, employed by the council of twelve
archdemons to kill Irabell. Id.
16. Id Joe, according to the court, "fouled up his part of the assignment." Id
17. Id. The doctors learned that Michael is strongest on Sundays but could not
prevent Joyce's death because it occurred on Saturday, Othello's strongest day. I&i
18. Id. at 984-85, 750 P.2d at 798-99, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
19. Id. at 985-86, 750 P.2d at 799, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
20. Id. at 986, 750 P.2d at 799, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
21. 1I
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the guilt phase of the proceedings: 1) denial of Wade's constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel; 2) improper admission of re-
buttal evidence which demonstrated prior history of non-charged
child abuse; 3) insufficient evidence of torture; 4) the unconstitu-
tional vagueness of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel special circum-
stance; and 5) the unconstitutionally vague and overbroad torture-
murder special-circumstance.
1. Denial of effective assistance of counsel
The court initially noted that Wade was entitled to a "proper argu-
ment on the applicable law in his favor."22 Nevertheless, his attor-
ney's candor concerning the inhumane nature of the crime, did not
necessarily mean that Wade received ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.23 The court stated that "in light of the overwhelming evidence of
his client's guilt, trial counsel had little choice but to candidly ac-
knowledge guilt, concede the heinous nature of the offense, and con-
centrate instead on convincing the jury of the legitimacy of the
defendant's mental defenses."24 Defense counsel's open acknowl-
edgement of the cruel crime, his decision to focus on the question of
sanity, and his decision to plead for innocence rather than a lesser
sentence did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.25 Fol-
lowing People v. Jackson,26 the court reasoned that complete candor
with a jury constitutes an appropriate trial strategy and does not fall
under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel.27
2. Improper admission of rebuttal evidence
The court held that the trial court properly admitted evidence of
Wade's prior, uncharged acts of child abuse concerning his twin
22. Id. at 989, 750 P.2d 801, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
23. Id. at 988, 750 P.2d 801, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
24. Id. (citing People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 292-93, 618 P.2d 149, 161, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 603, 615 (1980)); see also People v. Ratliff, 41 Cal. 3d 675, 697, 715 P.2d 665, 678,
224 Cal. Rptr. 705, 717-18 (1986) (defense counsel's admission that defendant commit-
ted burglary not the equivalent of guilty plea).
25. See generally Comment, A Coherent Approach to the Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1516 (1983); Note, Maxwell v. Superior Court: Buy-
ing Counsel of Choice or Ineffective Assistance?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1348 (1983); Com-
ment, Standards to Guarantee Effective Assistance of Counsel, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
108 (1987). See also 21A Am. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 984-987 (1981); 19 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law §§ 2167-2178 (1954).
26. 28 Cal. 3d 264, 292-93, 618 P.2d 149, 161, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 615 (1980).
27. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 988-89, 750 P.2d at 801, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
sons. 28 Proper admission of circumstantial evidence concerning non-
charged crimes is subject to three factors: "1) the materiality of the
fact sought to be proved or disproved; 2) the tendency of the un-
charged crime to prove or disprove the material fact; and 3) the exist-
ence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant
evidence." 29 This test, in effect, applies the probative value versus
prejudicial effect test of section 352 of the Evidence Code.30 The
court continued that "[t]o be relevant, an uncharged offense must
tend logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to prove the is-
sue(s) on which it is offered."31 This evidence was deemed relevant
since the prosecution had to prove "specific intent to kill as well as
premeditation and deliberation." 32
The court found that the evidence of prior acts of child abuse was
probative both as to whether Wade had the requisite intent to com-
mit the crime, and under which personality he acted at the time of
the crime. 33 The evidence was relevant because it tended to prove
that Melvin Wade, not a different personality, killed Joyce since
Wade had committed prior acts of child abuse.34 The court rejected
the defendant's contention that the child abuse evidence was cumula-
tive. Lay testimony and expert testimony are manifestly different.35
The court upheld the trial court's determination that the probative
value of the proferred evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.3 6
28. Id. at 989-93, 750 P.2d at 801-04, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 912-15.
29. Id. at 990, 750 P.2d at 802, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (quoting People v. Thompson,
27 Cal. 3d 303, 315, 611 P.2d 883, 888, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 294 (1980) (emphasis in origi-
nal)). For restrictions in the use of rebuttal evidence, see 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE, §§ 1732-1734 (3d ed. 1986). As for evidence concerning prior acts, see 1 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, §§ 391-393 (3d ed. 1986). See generally Annotation,
Court's rights in imposing sentence, to hear evidence of, or to consider, other offenses
committed by defendant, 96 A.L.R. 2d 768 (1964).
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966). See also People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 24-
26, 609 P.2d 468, 481-82, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 14-15 (1980) (court must explicitly determine
that the risk of undue prejudice does not outweigh the probative value of the
evidence).
31. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 990, 750 P.2d at 802, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (citing People v.
Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 631, 685 P.2d 1126, 1141, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 790 (1984)). The
court also stated "that if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably
harbors the same intent in each instance." Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 990, 750 P.2d at 802, 244
Cal. Rptr. at 913 (quoting People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 319, 611 P.2d 883, 891,
165 Cal. Rptr. 219, 297 (1980)).
32. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 990, 750 P.2d at 807, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 913; see also Califor-
nia Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC), No. 8.20 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter
CALJIC] (deliberate and premeditated murder); 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES
§§ 298-302 (2d ed. 1963 & Supp. 1985); Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules Requir-
ing Malice "Aforethought " "Deliberation," or "Premeditation, "as Elements of Murder
in the First Degree, 18 A.L.R. 961 (1932).
33. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 991, 750 P.2d at 802-03, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14.
34. Id. at 991, 750 P.2d at 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
35. Id. at 992, 750 P.2d at 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
36. Id. at 992, 750 P.2d at 803-04, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15; see also CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 352 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988); People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 24-26, 609 P.2d 468, 480-
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Such lower court rulings are overturned only for abuse of
discretion. 37
3. Insufficient evidence of torture
The court also rejected Wade's claim that insufficient evidence was
introduced to support a finding of torture. First, the court indicated
that since this objection was first raised in a supplemental brief fol-
lowing a petition for rehearing, it was waived.38 Second, the court
noted that even if the objection was timely raised, there was suffi-
cient evidence to sustain a finding of intent to torture.39
4. Constitutionality of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel special-
circumstance
The court held that the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" special-cir-
cumstance finding by the jury had to be set aside40 as it was unconsti-
tutionally vague in light of People v. Superior Court (Engert).4 1
Nevertheless, the court found this error harmless since the defend-
ant was properly convicted under the torture-murder special-
circumstance.42
83, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 14-16 (1980) (where trial court failed to determine whether risk of
undue prejudice concerning incriminating testimony substantially outweighed proba-
tive value of evidence).
37. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 992, 750 P.2d at 803-04, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15. See, e.g.,
People v. Northrop, 132 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 1042, 182 Cal. Rptr. 147, 205 (1982) (trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding incriminating statements as hearsay in
second-degree murder case); People v. Wein, 69 Cal. App. 3d 79, 90, 137 Cal. Rptr. 814,
820 (1977) (trial court properly admitted evidence of prior offenses demonstrating the
defendant's methodology and behavior pattern in perpetrating crimes). See also CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 13; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 352-354 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988).
38. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 992, 750 P.2d at 804, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 914; see 9 B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, § 684 (3d ed. 1985). See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 137
Cal. App. 3d 778, 782, 187 Cal. Rptr. 324, 326 (1982) (appellate court need not consider
contentions made for the first time on petition for rehearing).
39. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 993, 750 P.2d at 804, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 915; see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189 (West 1988); 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 307-309 (2d ed. 1963 &
Supp. 1985); CALJIC, No. 8.24 (murder by torture); but see People v. Steger, 16 Cal. 3d
539, 549, 546 P.2d 665, 671, 128 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1976) (beating stepchild as act of
discipline did not constitute murder by torture).
40. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 993, 750 P.2d at 804, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 915; see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (West 1988).
41. 31 Cal. 3d 797, 806, 647 P.2d 76, 81, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (1982).
42. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 998, 750 P.2d at 807, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19 (citing People
v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1276-80, 799 P.2d 115, 148-52, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 882-86 (1986).
5. Constitutionality of the torture-murder special-circumstance
The court determined that, despite the absence of explicit instruc-
tions, the jurors understood that they must believe that Wade in-
tended to torture Joyce to find him guilty of torture-murder.
Neither counsel told the jury that intent to torture was unnecessary;
and moreover, the prosecutor stated that the torture-murder special-
circumstance required an intent to "cause cruel pain."43 Since in-
structions were given on torture-murder, it was unlikely that the
jury did not comprehend its required elements.44
B. The Penalty Phase
The defense raised objections to seven potential errors that oc-
curred during the penalty phase of the proceedings: 1) improper us-
age of "no sympathy" instruction; 2) ineffective assistance of counsel
during closing arguments; 3) invalid findings of special circumstances;
4) improper instruction to "disregard consequences" of the verdict; 5)
failure to delete extraneous mitigating factors from the standard pen-
alty phase instructions; 6) improper usage of incorrect sentencing in-
structions; and 7) the unconstitutionality of the 1978 death penalty
law.
1. Improper usage of "no sympathy" instructions
Admitting that "no sympathy" jury instructions are not favored,
the court observed that the use of such instructions "require [the ap-
pellate court] to review the record in each case to determine whether
the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and read in conjunction with
the jury arguments, adequately informed the jury of its responsibility
to consider all of the mitigating evidence."45 Having done so, the
court rejected the defendant's assertion that the jurors failed to com-
prehend that sympathy may still be considered when determining
the appropriate penalty.46 The court determined that the jury was
not misled by the instruction since both prosecution and defense
counsel argued its impact.47
43. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 994-95, 750 P.2d at 805, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
44. Id at 994-95, 750 P.2d at 805, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
45. Id. at 996, 750 P.2d at 806, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 917 (citing California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 546 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See e.g., People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d
739, 777, 739 P.2d 1250, 1275, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 107 (1987).
46. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 997, 750 P.2d at 807, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 918; see also CALJIC
No. 1.00 (The jury instruction reads: "As jurors, you may not be influenced by pity for
a defendant or by prejudice against him.... You must not be swayed by mere senti-
ment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling.")
(emphasis added).
47. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 996-97, 750 P.2d at 806-07, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 917-18.
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2. Ineffective assistance of counsel during closing arguments
Referring to the previous discussion of Wade's guilt phase objec-
tions, the court summarily dismissed his contention that he was de-
nied effective assistance of counsel. While the majority did not quote
the defense counsel's alleged advocacy of the defendant's death dur-
ing his closing argument, 48 it nevertheless concluded that any state-
ment constituted a reasonable tactical decision, and was not
"tantamount to advocating his client's death."49
3. Invalid findings of special-circumstance
The court, having previously determined the "heinous" murder
special-circumstance unconstitutional and the torture-murder special-
circumstance valid, summarily rejected Wade's contentions that the
"heinous" finding prejudicially affected the jury's verdict.5 0 Further,
the court stated any error was harmless.5 1
4. Instruction to "disregard consequences" of the verdict
The court briefly noted that although the usage of a "disregard
consequences" instruction had been found improper at the penalty
phase, this instruction is proper if the jury understood the "grave
consequences of its penalty decision."52 Such a finding supports a
conclusion that the instruction was harmless.53 Finally, the court in-
48. Counsel stated:
I just want to conclude with, considering that the disorder, the emotional dis-
turbance that the evidence has suggested to you by way of the physicians in
this case and the psychologists, I don't think that Melvin Wade, Melvin Mef-
fery Wade, can actually, can be said to lose this case. As has been expressed
to me by Melvin on many occasions, he can't live with that beast from within
any longer and if in your wisdom you think the appropriate punishment is
death, you may be also giving an escape once again by analogy the gift of life
to Melvin Meffery Wade to be free from this horror that he and only he
knows so well.
Id at 1004, 750 P.2d at 812, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 998, 750 P.2d at 807, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
50. Id; cf. People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1281-82, 729 P.2d 115, 152-53, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 849, 886-87 (1986) (improperly allowing a jury to consider eleven special circum-
stances instead of three was not "substantial error" requiring reversal of death penalty
given prosecution's overwhelming evidence and slight emphasis placed on those special
circumstances).
51. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 998, 750 P.2d at 807, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
52. Id at 998, 750 P.2d at 808, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 919; see also People v. Miranda, 44
Cal. 3d 57, 102 n.21, 744 P.2d 1127, 1155 n.21, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 622 n.21 (1987) ("disre-
gard consequences" instruction was proper where jury also told that the determination
of defendant's life or death depended upon its decision); CALJIC No. 1.00.
53. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 998, 750 P.2d at 808, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
terpreted the jury instruction not as a "disregard consequences" in-
struction but as a "just" verdict instruction.m
5. Extraneous mitigating factors in the standard penalty phase
instructions
Following People v. Ghent,5 5 the court rejected the defendant's as-
sertion that the failure to delete extraneous mitigating factors from
the standard penalty phase instructions was prejudicial error.56
6. Improper usage of incorrect sentencing instruction
The court found that the jury instructions did not mislead the jury
because the jury knew it had the appropriate authority to decide the
sentence.5 7 The court noted the rejection of this argument in earlier
cases,58 and the record failed to demonstrate that the jury was im-
properly misled.59
7. Constitutionality of the 1978 death penalty law
Recognizing that all previous attacks on the constitutionality of the
1978 death penalty law have been rejected, 6o the court dismissed this
contention with little discussion. 61 According to the majority, death
was not a "disproportionate penalty 'for the parent who disciplines
his child to death.' "62 The court affirmed the death penalty because
this case was not akin to a situation where a "parent overreacts in
heat of anger toward a child" since Wade had "ample time to reflect
upon the nature of his acts."63
IV. JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Broussard wrote a lengthy dissent calling for complete re-
versal based on the denial of Wade's constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.64 Justice Broussard emphasized four areas
54. Id,
55. 43 Cal. 3d 739, 776-77, 739 P.2d 1250, 1274-75, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 106-07 (1987).
56. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 998-99, 750 P.2d at 808, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 918; see also
CAL.JIC No. 8.84.1 (penalty trial factors for consideration).
57. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 999, 750 P.2d at 808, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
58. IcL (citing People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 1276-80, 729 P.2d 115, 148-52, 232
Cal. Rptr. 849, 882-86 (1986)); People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 834 (1985); see also CAIJIC No. 8.84.2 (penalty trial concluding instruction).
59. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 999, 750 P.2d at 808, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
60. Id at 999, 750 P.2d at 809, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 919 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 42
Cal. 3d 730, 717-79, 726 P.2d 113, 143-44, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 697-98 (1986); see also CAL.
CON ST. art. I, § 27 (death penalty deemed not cruel nor unusual punishment).
61. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 999, 750 P.2d at 808, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
62. I&
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1000-05, 750 P.2d at 809-12, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 920-23 (Broussard, J., dis-
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where the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.
First, Wade's counsel failed to "zealously" represent him and, in-
stead, argued against him. 65
Second, the defendant's counsel failed to raise several arguments at
the guilt phase closing argument.66 Wade's counsel merely "waxed
eloquently about the horrendous details of the crime, emphasized the
tragic results, and repeatedly alluded to his appointed status"6 7 in-
stead of arguing that the defendant did not possess the requisite
intent.
Third, counsel's complete silence at the sanity phase also denied
Wade effective assistance of counsel.6 8 Counsel failed to argue the is-
sue of insanity, improperly reasoning that any arguments were fruit-
less since guilt had been previously determined.6 9
Finally, counsel's closing argument at the penalty phase had the ef-
fect of advocating Wade's death. According to Broussard, the defense
counsel's statement that a death penalty may give a "gift of life to
Melvin to be free from this horror,"70 was improper.
In summary, Justice Broussard's dissent notes that rather than ad-
equately defending Wade, his counsel "argued against him at the
guilt phase of the trial, stood mum at the sanity phase, and, at the
penalty phase, virtually commended him to the gas chamber."7 1 Ad-
ditionally, Justice Broussard felt that Wade's counsel was a sort of
"second prosecutor . . . offering the jurors an excuse for executing
the defendant .... ,,72
senting). His dissent parallels that of former Chief Justice Bird before the rehearing
was granted. Id. at n.1.
65. Id. at 1000-02, 750 P.2d at 809-11, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21 (Broussard, J., dis-
senting); see, e.g., People v. McKenzie, 34 Cal. 3d 616, 631, 668 P.2d 769, 778-79, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 462, 472 (1983); People v. Diggs, 177 Cal. App. 3d 958, 970, 223 Cal. Rptr. 361, 368
(1986); People v. Cropner, 89 Cal. App. 3d 716, 720, 152 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (1979); see
also U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
66. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 1002-03, 750 P.2d at 811, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22 (Brous-
sard, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1003, 750 P.2d at 811, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
68. Id. at 1003-04, 750 P.2d at 811-12, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23 (Broussard, J., dis-
senting); see also U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
69. Wade, 44 Cal. 3d at 1003-04, 750 P.2d at 811-12, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23 (Brous-
sard, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1004, 750 P.2d at 812, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1000, 750 P.2d at 809, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 920 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1004, 750 P.2d at 812, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
V. CONCLUSION
Although Wade offers no radical departure from California crimi-
nal law, it alarmingly signals that the conservative judicial trend in
California is now fully entrenched. The court hints that the death
penalty convictions will not be overturned on technical grounds if
plausible harmless error arguments can be made. Additionally, the




I. Exclusion of evidence of a defendant's character offered
for the mitigation of a death penalty is federal
constitutional error: People v. Lucero.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Lucero,' the court affirmed the judgment of guilt, and
the case was remanded for a hearing of the penalty stage since miti-
gating evidence had been improperly excluded.
The court found Skipper v. South Carolina2 controlling. The
United States Supreme Court, in Skipper, held that there was an ab-
solute right in a capital trial to produce all relevant evidence for the
mitigation of punishment.3 Following this precedent, the Lucero
court held that evidence of the defendant's likelihood of adjustment
to prison life and the testimony diagnosing post-traumatic stress syn-
drome were improperly and prejudicially excluded.4
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 12, 1980, two young girls, ages seven and ten, were discov-
ered missing. They had been on their way to the park. While passing
defendant Phillip Louis Lucero's house, his goose cackled and he ap-
proached the girls saying the goose would not hurt them. The de-
fendant was seen approaching the girls in front of his yard. After the
1. 44 Cal. 3d 1006, 750 P.2d 1342, 245 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1988). Justice Broussard de-
livered the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli, Arguelles,
Eagleson, and Kaufman concurring. Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion advocating
the use of the statutory power of sections 1181(7) and 1260 of the Penal Code. CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1181(7) (West 1985), 1260 (West 1982). See infra notes 35-45 and ac-
companying text.
2. 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (testimony of two jailers and one "regular visitor" sought to
be admitted to attest to petitioner's good adjustment to jail life).
3. 1& at 4. The Skipper court indicated that this principal was embodied in two
of its prior opinions: Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978). 476 U.S. at 4.
4. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1025, 750 P.2d at 1353, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 1956.
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girls had been reported missing, a police command post was set up at
the park across the street from the defendant's house and helicopters
were employed in the search for the girls.
The police at the command post observed a fire in the defendant's
house. A search was commenced which revealed human blood stains,
pieces of broken glass, gasoline residue, and one of the victim's tennis
shoes. The bodies of the two girls were found in a nearby dumpster
among broken glass. A search of the defendant's car, as well as the
defendant, revealed additional blood stains found to match one of the
victims.
Lucero was a Vietnam veteran with a troublesome childhood his-
tory. In the penalty phase, Dr. Edward Conolley testified for the de-
fense concerning the defendant's serious psychological problems
stemming from his experiences in childhood and Vietnam. According
to Dr. Conolley, the defendant's post-traumatic stress syndrome was
clearly evident. This included recurrent flashbacks, inability to ad-
just to life outside of the combat zone, survivor guilt and avoidance of
Vietnam discussions. The doctor concluded that the defendant was
"quite psychologically impaired"5 on the date of the homicides.
The doctor also felt that the events on the day of the murders
caused a Vietnam flashback resulting in the defendant's explosive be-
havior. Specifically, the cackling goose triggered memories of the an-
imals of Vietnam, where their agitation often signaled the approach
of enemies. Additionally, the helicopters employed in the search for
the girls, coupled with the use of loudspeakers, also triggered the al-
leged flashback.
Lucero was convicted of two counts of first degree murder with a
special circumstance finding, one count of arson, and was subse-
quently sentenced to death. The defendant claimed numerous errors
in the jury selection and in the guilt and penalty stages of his trial.
III. JUROR ExCLUSION
The defendant first objected to the exclusion of a prospective juror
who claimed that under no circumstances could he vote for the death
penalty. The court quickly dismissed this argument under the prece-
dent of Witherspoon v. llinois,6 Wainwright v. Witt,7 and People v.
5. Id. at 1026-32, 750 P.2d at 1353-58, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 196-201.
6. 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). The United States Supreme Court has held that a
juror may be excluded for cause if it is "unmistakenly clear... that they would auto-
Ghent.8 The juror was thus found to be properly excluded.9
IV. GUILT STAGE
A. Warrantless Entries
The defendant's argument of illegal entry of his home was simi-
larly dismissed. The defendant claimed that all evidence found in his
house, car, and clothing should have been excluded as the fruits of an
improper search. The court determined that the situation was exi-
gent because of the fire and missing children in the immediate area.
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was
thus held to clearly apply as to the initial entries.1 0
The later warrantless entry by the homicide investigator was also
examined. The court held that this detective's observations were of
no significance since he did not testify. The court also noted that
within thirty minutes of the investigation's warrantless entry, the de-
fendant consented to a full-scale search." Thus, "[t]he consensual
searches provided an independent basis to seize the challenged
evidence." 1
2
B. Evidence and Instructions of Premeditation and Deliberation
The defendant first contended that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding of premeditation and deliberation as a matter of
law. The court used the three categories of People v. Anderson1
3 to
sustain the jury's finding. The court conceded that no one factor was
especially strong. However, when viewed in totality and in circum-
matically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evi-
dence .. " Id. (emphasis in original).
7. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). The test for bias under Witt is "whether the juror's views
would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in ac-
cordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
8. 43 Cal. 3d 739, 767-68, 739 P.2d 1250, 1268, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 100-01 (1987) (trial
court's determination of bias where conflicting responses elicited not to be disturbed
on appeal).
9. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1016, 750 P.2d at 1346, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
10. Id. at 1017, 750 P.2d at 1347, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 190; see People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.
3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929
(1976). For a discussion of the exigent circumstances exception in the child protection
context, see Hardin, Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and
Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REV. 493, 507-17 (1988).
11. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1018, 750 P.2d at 1347-48, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
12. Id. at 1018, 750 P.2d at 1348, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 191. See Special Project, Seven-
teenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals 1986-1987, 76 GEO. L.J. 521, 704-05 (1988) (discussion of inevitable
discovery doctrine).
13. 70 Cal. 2d 15, 26-27, 447 P.2d 942, 949, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (1968). The three
categories of evidence are: 1) facts showing planning activity; 2) facts suggesting mo-
tive; and 3) facts about the manner of killing which suggests a preconceived design. Id.
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stances favorable to the prosecution, the determination was sus-
tained. Specifically, the court found considerable evidence of active
planning which is recognized as "'the most important prong of the
Anderson test.' "14 This, coupled with the less extensive evidence of
motive and preconceived design, provided sufficient evidence. The
court noted that a finding beyond a reasonable doubt was not re-
quired on appeal since the appropriate standard is whether "'any ra-
tional trier of fact' could have been so persuaded by the evidence
presented."15
Secondly, Lucero claimed that the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury as to the defendant's requested Sears instruction on the
amount of evidence required for a first degree murder verdictl6 was
reversible error. In People v. Sears,17 this court"determined that a
defendant has a right to issue jury instructions relating to evidence
affecting reasonable doubt or relating certain facts to a particular is-
sue.18 The defendant's requested instruction, however, did not focus
on facts producing a reasonable doubt as to premeditation and delib-
eration, nor did it apply the reasonable doubt standard to the defend-
ant's argument19 or to the elements of the crime.20 Thus, the court
found that the instruction was requested simply to incorrectly sug-
gest to the jury that each of the Anderson factors must be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt to support a first degree murder conviction.
The court explained that the Anderson factors are correctly used at
the appellate level to determine whether a finding of premeditation
14. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1018-19, 750 P.2d at 1348, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (quoting
People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 627, 685 P.2d 1126, 1138, 205 Cal. Rptr. 77, 87 (1984)).
15. Id. at 1020, 750 P.2d at 1349, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 192. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
16. The requested instruction was as follows:
Evidence of premeditation and deliberation falls into three (3) basic
categories:
(1) Facts showing prior planning activity
(2) Facts of prior activity suggesting motive
(3) Facts about the manner of the -killing which suggest a preconceived
design.
In order to sustain a first degree murder verdict there must be evidence of all
three (3) types of facts or otherwise extremely strong evidence of prior plan-
ning (type 1) or evidence or motive (type 2) in conjunction with either prior
planning (type 1) or manner of killing (type 3).
Id. at 1020, 750 P.2d at 1349, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (citing People v. Sears, 2 Cal. 3d 180,
465 P.2d 847, 84 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1970)).
17. 2 Cal. 3d 180, 465 P.2d 847, 84 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1970).
18. Id. at 190, 465 P.2d at 853-54, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18.
19. See People v. Adrian, 135 Cal. App. 3d 335, 338, 185 Cal. Rptr. 506, 508 (1982).
20. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 885, 538 P.2d 247, 262, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 134 (1975).
and deliberation is justified and not a required instruction.2'
C. Spectator Misconduct
The last objection during the guilt stage referred to an outburst by
one of the victim's mother immediately prior to the jury's leaving for
deliberation. Lucero contended that the timing of this outburst made
it extremely prejudicial and that it may have informed the jury of
facts outside the record. The defendant maintained that this, coupled
with the need for sensitivity in a capital trial, warranted a mistrial.
The court, however, recognized the trial court's broad discretion in
determining the prejudicial effect of an in-court outburst.2 2 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that no California case had declared a mis-
trial based on spectator misconduct. 23 Of the out-of-state cases which
were reversed due to spectator misconduct, none involved a single
outburst.24 Thus, the court declared that the prompt admonition by
the trial court, coupled with the trial court's broad discretion af-
forded in spectator misconduct cases, mandated a denial of the de-
fendant's motion for mistrial.25
V. PENALTY STAGE
A. Exclusion of Future Behavior Evidence
The defendant attempted to bring in evidence relating to his likeli-
hood of adjustment to a prison setting and his unlikelihood of recidi-
vism. The trial court disallowed this testimony under People v.
Murtishaw.26 However, the supreme court held that Murtishaw was
incorrectly applied to this case. The unreliability of dangerousness
predictions was acceptable when the prediction forecast an absence of
21. The court held that the trial court correctly provided the jury with CALJIC
No. 8.20's definition of deliberation and premeditated murder and that defendant's ad-
ditional instruction was therefore not proper. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d 1006, 1021, 750 P.2d
1342, 1350, 245 Cal. Rptr. 185, 193 (1988).
22. Id. at 1022, 750 P.2d at 1351, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (citing People v. Slocum, 52
Cal. App. 3d 867, 884, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442, 451 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976)).
23. Id. at 1023 n.10, 750 P.2d at 1351 n.10, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 194 n.10.
24. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 433 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(continuous impassioned statements of victim's widow evidencing extreme hostility to-
ward defendant); Price v. State, 149 Ga. App. 397, 399, 254 S.E.2d 512, 513-14 (1979) (ex-
cessive interruptions and outbursts by victim's mother); Walker v. State, 132 Ga. App.
476, 208 S.E.2d 350 (1974) (victim's mother seated at prosecution table throughout
trial); State v. Stewart, 278 S.C. 296, 301, 295 S.E.2d 627, 630, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828
(1982) (glaring at jury coupled with opinionated remarks about defendant's guilt).
25. The court did note that the trial court's "cursory admonition" was probably de-
ficient and that greater effort should have been expended. However, this was an insuf-
ficient reason to declare a mistrial. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1024 n.11, 750 P.2d at 1352
n.11, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 195 n.ll.
26. 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922
(1982) (evidence of high likelihood of future violence inadmissible in capital cases as
predictions of dangerousness are subject to overprediction).
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future violence, whereas the unreliability in Murtishaw related to
overprediction of dangerousness. 27
More importantly, the trial court's error was also held to be a vio-
lation of the eighth amendment.28 The United States Supreme Court
held that "any aspect of a defendant's character... that the defend-
ant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death" must be admit-
ted.29 Furthermore, in a closely analogous case, the United States
Supreme Court determined that such evidence directly relates to mit-
igation of punishment and, as such, may serve as a basis for a lesser
sentence.3 0 The Court held that the exclusion of petitioner's future
behavior evidence was reversible error.31
The court noted that creating a distinction between evidence of fu-
ture behavior as in the Skipper case, and evidence of past behavior
used to infer future behavior as occurred in this case, was "elusive"32
and thus improper. Additionally, the court noted that the allowance
of Dr. Conolley's testimony regarding Lucero's past behavior in
prison and current mental condition did not render the exclusion
harmless as cumulative testimony. As determined in Valle v. nor-
ida,33 there is a considerable distinction between evidence allowing
the jury to infer future good behavior and expert opinion testimony.
As the doctor's testimony did not discuss future behavior, the exclu-
sion of the testimony regarding likelihood of adjustment was prejudi-
cial error.34
27. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1026, 750 P.2d at 1353, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 196; see Mur-
tishaw, 29 Cal. 3d at 771, 631 P.2d at 469, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 760-61. See generally Good-
man, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499, 523-27
(1987).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
29. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978)); see also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107 S. Ct. 1821 (1987) (jury improp-
erly instructed to consider only those mitigating factors which were specifically enu-
merated in the Florida death penalty statute); People v. Zimmerman, 36 Cal. 3d 154,
158, 680 P.2d 776, 777-78, 202 Cal. Rptr. 826, 827-28 (1984) (mitigating circumstances
must be considered before death penalty can be imposed). See generally Goodman,
Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1987).
30. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (defendant's introduction of tes-
timony by two jailers and one "regular visitor" to show his positive adjustment to life
in jail held related to mitigation of punishment).
31. Id. at 8.
32. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1027, 750 P.2d at 1354, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 197 (quoting Skip-
per, 476 U.S. at 7).
33. 502 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 1987).
34. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1029, 750 P.2d at 1355, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
B. Exclusion of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome Evidence
A similar analysis was undertaken with regard to the defendant's
attempt to proffer the testimony of Thomas Wulbrecht, a counselor
at Pettis Veterans Hospital with specialized training in post-trau-
matic stress syndrome. Wulbrecht opined that the syndrome proba-
bly caused the explosive behavior the day of the murders. The trial
court disallowed the counselor's opinion and testimony as to the
existence of the syndrome. Because Wulbrecht was unable to relate
the defendant's mental condition to the offense in question, the testi-
mony was held to be "sheer speculation." 35
The court found the exclusion inconsistent with Lockett, Eddings,
and Skipper and held that the defendant was entitled to put forth
Wulbrecht's testimony as a factor to be considered in mitigation.3 6
The court noted that Wulbrecht's description of the defendant's con-
dition was particularly relevant and improperly excluded.
Next, the court discussed whether the testimony was cumulative
since Dr. Conelley had already testified to similar issues. This ques-
tion was answered in the negative due to the existing debate on
whether the syndrome in fact exists, the questioned reliability of a
diagnosis, and the fact that Wulbrecht did not have the "professional
interest"37 that Dr. Conelley had. The court concluded that under
Chapman v. California,38 the exclusion of mitigating evidence was
not harmless error 39 and thus mandated a reversal and remand of
the penalty stage. However, the judgment as to guilt and the finding
of special circumstances were affirmed.
VI. JUSTICE MOSK'S SEPARATE OPINION
In an emotional opinion, Justice Mosk opined that Lucero did "not
deserve death at the hands of the society he faithfully served." 40 The
Justice perceived a "macabre irony in the fact that the society on
35. Id. at 1030, 750 P.2d at 1356, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
36. Id. at 1030-31, 750 P.2d at 1356, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200.
37. The prosecution had emphasized Conelley's status as a "hired gun" who would
testify according to defendant's wishes. This "professional interest" did not exist with
Wulbrecht who worked every day with veterans suffering from the stress syndrome.
Id. at 1031, 750 P.2d at 1356, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200.
38. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
39. Although Skipper, Eddings, and Lockett were reversed without a determina-
tion of harmless error, the United States Supreme Court in the analogous case of
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 1824 (1987) (jury instructions held improper
where jury instructed to disregard consideration of relevant mitigating evidence) sug-
gested that such a determination might be warranted. Thus, the court used the Chap-
man test without deciding whether the determination was necessary. Lucero, 44 Cal.
3d at 1032, 750 P.2d at 1357, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 200-01. For a discussion of the applicabil-
ity of harmless error in death penalty cases, see Comment, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless
Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 740 (1987).
40. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1034, 750 P.2d at 1358, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
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whose behalf Lucero took an undetermined number of lives is now
seeking to take his life."41 His solution was to employ the statutory
powers of sections 1181(7)42 and 126043 of the Penal Code to modify
or reduce the imposed penalty. Justice Mosk stated that the defend-
ant deserved compassion and this, coupled with the difficulty of re-
trying a case for which the crime occurred eight years ago, warranted
employment of the reduction in sentence powers. The end result
would be a modification of the judgment to eliminate the special cir-
cumstance finding and the death penalty. These modifications would
then accompany the remand for resentencing.
Justice Mosk's solution, however, entails the overruling of a
number of past decisions. In fact, the Justice himself listed eight
supreme court cases44 that would have to be overruled in order to im-
plement his solution.45
VI. CONCLUSION
Sections 1181(7) and 1260, as interpreted by the supreme court, al-
low penalties to be modified or reduced where the sentence is in ex-
41. Id. at 1033, 750 P.2d at 1358, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1187(7) (West 1985). Section 1181(7) provides as follows:
When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but in any case
wherein authority is vested by statute in the trial court or jury to recommend
or determine as a part of its verdict or finding the punishment to be imposed,
the court may modify such verdict or finding by imposing the lesser punish-
ment without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend to
any court to which the case may be appealed.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181(7) (West 1985).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West 1982). Section 1260 provides as follows:
The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from,
or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the punishment
imposed, and may set aside, affirm or modify any or all of the proceedings
subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if
proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial
court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West 1982).
44. People v. Lookadoo, 66 Cal. 2d 307, 327, 425 P.2d 208, 221, 57 Cal. Rptr. 608, 621
(1967); People v. Mitchell, 63 Cal. 2d 805, 821, 409 P.2d 211, 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 371, 382
(1966); People v. Howk, 56 Cal. 2d 687, 700, 365 P.2d 426, 433, 16 Cal. Rptr. 370, 377
(1961); People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 26, 338 P.2d 397, 410 (1959); People v. Green, 47
Cal. 2d 209, 235, 302 P.2d 307, 324-25 (1956); People v. Carmen, 43 Cal. 2d 342, 351, 273
P.2d 521, 526 (1954); People v. Dessauer, 38 Cal. 2d 547, 555, 241 P.2d 238, 243 (1952);
People v. Thomas, 37 Cal. 2d 74, 77-78, 230 P.2d 351, 353 (1951). Additionally in need of
overruling and unmentioned by Justice Mosk include the following: People v. Rittger,
54 Cal. 2d 720, 734-35, 355 P.2d 645, 653-54, 7 Cal. Rptr. 901, 909-10 (1960); People v.
Brust, 47 Cal. 2d 776, 791-92, 306 P.2d 480, 488 (1957); People v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d 200,
213, 266 P.2d 505, 512 (1954).
45. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1035-36, 750 P.2d at 1359, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
cess of the fixed maximum, where consecutive sentences are
improperly imposed, and where other similar errors have occurred.46
Additionally, these sections allow the appellate court to "reduce the
conviction to a lesser degree and affirm the judgment as modi-
fied.... ."47 However, when the error relates solely to punishment for
first degree murder, appellate courts cannot reduce the punishment
as the trial court has exclusive jurisdiction in determining
punishment.48
Mosk's opinion emphasized that none of the cases which have
avoided using the statutory powers of modification provided a suffi-
cient rationale for their refusal.49 This is correct. However, the mere
fact that the cases did not discuss their reasons does not mandate the
conclusion that none existed. In fact, a compelling justification is the
trial court's ability to observe the conduct of the defendant and to
hear any presentence information.50 Taking into account the severity
of the punishment in question, good reason exists to leave the discre-
tion to the trial court. The Justice's plea for discretion is thus inap-
propriate in the death penalty context. The passage of time alone is
not compelling enough to violate the trial court's exclusive jurisdic-
tion in determining punishment.
LESLIE GLADSTONE
V. EVIDENCE
A. Proposition 8's "Truth-in-Evidence" provision dictates
the use of federal standards in determining admissibility
of statements in violation of Miranda: People v. May.
In People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1988), the supreme court denied the defendant's contention that Peo-
ple "v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976),
requires all statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), to be inadmissible at trial for all purposes. The court held
that statements obtained in violation of Miranda will be admissible
at trial for impeachment purposes, thus adopting the federal holding
of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 22 (1971). The court stated that
46. See 22 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV) Criminal Law §§ 3792-3793 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
47. People v. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d 107, 118, 702 P.2d 555, 562, 216 Cal. Rptr. 397, 404
(1985).
48. People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 235, 302 P.2d 307, 324-25 (1956), disapproved on
other grounds, People v. Marse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963).
See also B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Appeal § 731 (1963 & Supp.
1985); Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A Method of Swift Appellate Action,
23 UCLA L. REV. 491 (1976).
49. Lucero, 44 Cal. 3d at 1035, 750 P.2d at 1359, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
50. See Hopkins, supra note 48 at 492-93.
[Vol. 16: 117, 1988] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Proposition 8, with its "Truth-in-Evidence" provision, nullified the
California independent state basis for excluding evidence.
May was arrested after a police investigation of rape related of-
fenses. After being read his Miranda rights, May demanded an attor-
ney. See 19 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law §§ 2205-2208.
However, the police continued to interrogate him and obtained in-
criminating testimony suggesting his involvement in the crimes. May
pled not guilty to charges of rape and other related crimes. He later
moved to have the illegally obtained statements suppressed under
Disbrow. The evidence was excluded as to the substantive use of the
statements; however, the court allowed its use for impeachment pur-
poses. The court held that the federal standard should be applied,
notwithstanding California precedent which provided for a greater
degree of protection for the accused. The court asserted that Proposi-
tion 8 dictated the use of federal law on Miranda violations. Thus,
Harris governed and the pre-trial statements were admissible for
impeachment.
Proposition 8, or article I, section 28 of the California Constitution,
was enacted in response to voters' concern over California's supposed
leniency toward offenders' rights. Coined the Victim Bill of Rights,
this provision professed to safeguard victims by ensuring adequate
custody, trial, and punishment of felonious offenders. CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 28; see 17 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law § 51 (1984). The
"Truth-in-Evidence" section was enacted to implement these goals.
This provision provides that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded
in any criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d); see 21 CAL.
JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law § 3131 (1985). However, section 28(d)
also states in pertinent part that "[n]othing in this section shall affect
any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hear-
say.... ." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). The defense alleged that section
940 of the Evidence Code, the statute protecting the privilege of self-
incrimination, was such an "existing statutory rule of evidence relat-
ing to privilege." See Kopeny, The Impact of Proposition 8 on State-
ments, 13 W. ST. U.L. REV. 55 (1985). The defense counsel also
contended that under section 940 of the Evidence Code and section
28(d) of the California Constitution, the statements were inadmissi-
ble as a violation of this privilege. See Comment, Disbrow Confronts
Proposition 8: Will Miranda Violative Statements Be Admitted to
Trial for Impeachment?, 17 PAC. L.J. 1337-1360 (1986).
The supreme court, however, disagreed. It maintained that the Ev-
idence Code did not specifically codify remedial measures to cure Mi-
randa violations, but dealt only with the right to refuse disclosure.
Thus, the law on remedial measures to cure violations was merely ju-
dicially created through interpretation of the Evidence Code. The
court further held that the "Truth-in-Evidence" provision was
adopted to override judicial decisions grounded on deterrence of im-
proper police conduct. The court decided that the language of section
28(d) referred only to "legislatively created rules of privilege," such
as the attorney-client and physician-patient privileges. Thus, Dis-
brow's judicial interpretation of the Evidence Code was held non-
binding on the court.
The court thus relied on Harris, which stated that the privilege to
testify did not encompass a privilege of perjury. See 401 U.S. at 225.
Thus, the court concluded that no privilege prevented the state from
impeaching the defendant.
The court then held that the exception for statutory rules of evi-
dence relating to privilege or hearsay did not encompass the privilege
against self-incrimination. However, the only purpose of section 940
of the Evidence Code is to codify judicially created laws on the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. See People v. Barrios, 166 Cal. App.
3d 732, 212 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1985); see also 19 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.)
Criminal Law § 2183 (Supp. 1987). Disbrow, by interpreting article I,
section 15 of the California Constitution, was such a judicially created
law. Section 940 of the Evidence Code incorporated that law into its
statutory rule on self-incrimination protection.
The majority's reasoning gives no force of law to Evidence Code
section 940. If the drafters of the constitution had intended to com-
pletely overrule the exclusionary rules, then their language would
have reflected that intent. No such language appears in section 28(d).
Rather, the provision clearly states that rules of evidence relating to
privilege shall not be affected. The Harris rule entices police officers
to use illegal means for obtaining statements so that prosecutors may
use such evidence to impeach the accused on cross-examination.
May, 44 Cal. 3d at 333, 748 P.2d at 322, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). A remaining option for a defendant in this situation, of
course, is to not take the stand-an action likely to have a negative
effect on the jury.
LESLIE GLADSTONE
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B. When substantial evidence indicates that a defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, section 1368 of the Penal Code
requires a full competency hearing and failure to hold
the hearing renders all subsequent criminal proceedings
void: People v. Hale.
In People v. Hale, 44 Cal. 3d 531, 749 P.2d 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. 114
(1988), the supreme court held that when substantial evidence indi-
cates that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, failure by the
trial court to hold a full competency hearing in accordance with sec-
tion 1368 of the Penal Code renders all subsequent criminal proceed-
ings void. Moreover, the court held that once the defendant's mental
competency has been doubted, the matter becomes jurisdictional and
cannot be waived by the defendant or defense counsel. Finally, the
court held that if a trial court has properly ordered a competency
hearing, it cannot vacate the order, sub silentio.
Hale was accused of murdering two elderly men. At both the pre-
liminary hearing and arraignment, the defendant exhibited abnormal
and bizarre behavior which led the court to express serious doubt as
to his mental competence. The court suspended the arraignment pro-
ceedings pending a competency hearing. The defendant was first ex-
amined by two psychiatrists; each offered different opinions as to the
defendant's competency. A third psychiatrist was appointed and
opined that although the defendant did suffer from paranoid schizo-
phrenia, he was currently in remission and was therefore competent
to stand trial. The court then appointed two additional psychiatrists
to examine the defendant. These psychiatrists also disagreed regard-
ing the defendant's competence. The second psychiatrist found the
defendant competent and concluded that prior examination had oc-
curred before the defendant's treatment had taken effect. After re-
ceiving these conflicting reports, the court failed to hold the
competency hearing and the case proceeded to trial without objection
from defense counsel. The defendant was subsequently convicted of
both murders and was sentenced to death. Under section 1239(b) of
the Penal Code, the defendant was automatically entitled to an ap-
peal and the court reversed the conviction.
In the seminal case of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), the
United States Supreme Court held that the conviction of an individ-
ual who is legally incompetent to stand trial is a violation of the due
process right to a fair trial. Id. at 378, 385. See generally 21 AM. JUR.
2D Criminal Law § 95 (1981). Strong policy reasons exist for not per-
mitting mentally incompetent individuals to stand trial. First, the ad-
versary system requires that a defendant be capable of assisting
counsel in the preparation of his defense. Additionally, a defendant
must be capable of understanding the nature and object of the pro-
ceedings against him. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1974).
In general, federal and state decisions involving defendants suffering
from mental disorders have followed the Pate holding, although disa-
greement exists as to its application. See generally Annotation, Com-
petency to Stand Trial of Criminal Defendant Diagnosed as
"Schizophrenic"-Modern State Cases, 33 A.L.R. 4TH 1062 (1984); An-
notation, Competency to Stand Trial of Criminal Defendant Diag-
nosed as "Schizophrenic"-Modern Federal Cases, 63 A.L.R. FED. 696
(1983). California statutory and case law have recognized the policy
arguments behind not permitting mentally incompetent individuals
to stand trial and judicial decisions are in accord with Pate. See gen-
erally 21 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law §§ 2886-2890 (1985 &
Supp. 1988).
Section 1367 of the Penal Code provides that: "A person cannot be
tried or adjudged to punishment while such person is mentally in-
competent." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1982). Section 1368 of
the Penal Code sets forth the procedure a trial court must follow
when a question arises concerning the defendant's competency to
stand trial. If both the court and the defense counsel express doubt
as to the mental competence of the defendant, the court is required
to suspend all proceedings and order a full competency hearing. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368 (West 1982). The court is also vested with
the power to order a competency hearing sua sponte, even if defense
counsel believes his client is competent. Finally, once a hearing has
been ordered, all further criminal prosecution proceedings must be
suspended until the present mental competence of the defendant has
been determined. Id. at § 1368(c).
After Pate, the California Supreme Court has uniformly held that
a competency hearing is required when substantial evidence indicates
that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. See People v.
Stankewitz, 32 Cal. 3d 80, 92, 648 P.2d 578, 584, 184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 617
(1982); People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 518, 426 P.2d 942, 949, 58
Cal. Rptr. 374, 381 (1967). In the present case, the trial court ex-
pressed specific doubts as to the defendant's competency based on his
bizarre courtroom behavior. Further, all five psychiatrists agreed
that the defendant suffered from a mental disorder but disagreed
whether that disorder impaired the defendant's competency to un-
derstand the proceedings and take an effective role in his own de-
fense. The court therefore concluded that substantial evidence
existed to prove that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial
and thus a section 1368 hearing was required.
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The court next addressed the trial court's authority to vacate the
order providing for a hearing, sub silentio. Section 1368 mandates
that all criminal proceedings must be suspended until a determina-
tion has been made regarding the defendant's competency to stand
trial. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368(c) (West 1982). The state argued that
the verdict should stand because when the trial resumed, the defend-
ant was no longer mentally incompetent. The court was unper-
suaded. Precedent has established that the trial court is not vested
with discretion to unilaterally reject one set of psychiatric opinions in
favor of a conflicting set to deny a hearing on competency.
Stankewitz, 32 Cal. 3d at 93, 648 P.2d at 585, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 618. In
this case, five separate psychiatric reports were entered; two clearly
stated that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Therefore,
the trial court improperly vacated the competency hearing order, sub
silentio.
Next, the state argued that the defense counsel's failure to raise
the competency issue at trial should be construed as a waiver of the
defendant's right to a competency hearing. This argument is not per-
suasive in light of previous court decisions. Once sufficient doubt
arises as to a defendant's mental competency, the matter is jurisdic-
tional and cannot be waived. See In re Davis, 8 Cal. 3d 798, 808, 505
P.2d 1018, 1026, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178, 168, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870
(1973); People v. Westbrook, 62 Cal. 2d 197, 203, 397 P.2d 545, 549, 41
Cal. Rptr. 809, 818 (1964). Therefore, not raising the competency is-
sue at trial was inconsequential because the court had been divested
of jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal prosecution.
The court's holding illustrates a strong desire to guarantee the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. Since the landmark Pate decision, the
California court has held that defendants should not be permitted to
stand trial unless they are fully capable of understanding the nature
of the proceedings brought against them and are capable of assisting
in their defense. Moreover, the court's interpretation of section 1368,
that once a competency hearing is ordered the trial court cannot va-
cate the order, sub silentio, is sound. The existence of sufficient evi-
dence questioning the defendant's ability to stand trial should place a
duty on the court to conclusively determine whether the defendant is
mentally competent before continuing criminal proceedings. The
goal of our system of justice should be to ensure that all criminal de-
fendants are provided the opportunity of a fair trial. The court's de-
cision is consistent with this goal.
RONALD P. SCHRAMM
VI. FAMILY LAW
In adoption cases, habeas corpus may not be used to
collaterally attack final, non-modifiable judgments:
Adoption of Alexander S.
In Adoption of Alexander S., 44 Cal. 3d 857, 750 P.2d 778, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1988), the California Supreme Court held that it was im-
proper procedure for an appellate court to treat belated claims as if
they constituted a writ of habeas corpus in adoption proceedings.
The unanimous court, led by Justice Panelli, also emphasized the im-
portant policy of protecting the child's best interests in holding that
the habeas corpus procedure may not be used as a collateral attack on
final, non-modifiable judgments in adoption-related matters.
The natural mother, Nicoleta S., was four months pregnant when
she immigrated to the United States from Romania in 1983. She was
not married, and the child's natural father, Tudor G., remained
abroad. Nicoleta, who is college-educated and has a good command of
the English language, contacted the Catholic Foundation for Immi-
gration and Resettlement regarding her decision to place her baby up
for adoption. She was referred to an attorney and introduced to the
prospective parents, Mark and Lorraine H. Both Nicoleta S. and Mr.
& Mrs. H. consented to joint representation in writing pursuant to
section 225m of the Civil Code. CAL. CIV. CODE § 255m (West 1982)
[hereinafter section 225m]. Nicoleta agreed to allow them to adopt
her child in exchange for medical and living expenses. Section 225m
reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be unethical for an attor-
ney to undertake the representation of both the prospective adopting parents
and the natural parents of a child in any negotiations or proceedings in con-
nection with adoption unless a written consent is obtained from both parties.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 225m (West 1982).
Mr. & Mrs. H. filed a petition for independent adoption in April
1984, just two days after Alexander was born. A social worker from
the Department of Social Services met with Nicoleta several times to
explain the adoption procedures, alternatives to adoption and the dif-
ficulty in withdrawing consent to adoption once it is given. Two
months later, Nicoleta S. consented, but one month after that she no-
tified the social worker of her decision to withdraw consent since she
had obtained permanent employment. Upon notifying her attorney,
he withdrew due to conflict of interest.
Nicoleta moved the trial court for visitation rights and filed peti-
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tions to withdraw her consent to the adoption pursuant to section
226a of the Civil Code and to declare the existence of a father-child
relationship. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 266a (West 1982) [hereinafter sec-
tion 266a]. The five-day trial addressed the visitation and consent is-
sues, postponing the father-child relationship issue to allow the
father, Tudor G., an opportunity to come to this country and be
heard.
The trial judge ruled that the consent withdrawal could be granted
if the two requirements of section 226a were met: 1) withdrawal of
consent must be reasonable in light of all circumstances, and 2) with-
drawal of consent must be in the child's best interests. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 226a (West 1982). The trial court found the first requirement
was met. Although Nicoleta's consent was knowingly and voluntarily
obtained, without the elements of coercion, duress or undue influ-
ence, she may have originally consented because of the stress of im-
migration and her inability to consult with the natural father.
However, the court determined that withdrawal of consent was not
in Alexander's best interest since Mr. and Mrs. H. could provide a
more stable environment; the child had already "bonded" with his
new parents and would suffer emotionally if separated from them.
Therefore, the trial court denied the withdrawal of consent petition
and the motion for visitation rights. The trial court's order was en-
tered on January 3, 1985, with notice mailed to both parties on Janu-
ary 30, 1985. Although the judgment was appealable, no appeal was
filed within the 60-day limitation period required by Rule 2(a) of the
California Rules of Court.
Tudor G. could not leave Romania for the hearing and the court
thereafter found he was not the "presumed" father and terminated
his custody rights. Nicoleta S. filed a timely appeal from this judg-
ment which did not mention the denial of her withdrawal of consent.
Her brief, however, added a request for relief from this judgment to
the judgment denying the Tudor G. paternal relationship.
Although the court of appeal "correctly recognized and frankly ad-
mitted" it had no jurisdiction to hear Nicoleta's claim on the consent
issue, it sua sponte decided, without notice to the parties, to treat the
belated appeal as a petition for habeas corpus. The only authority
cited for what Justice Panelli termed the appellate court's "unortho-
dox decision" was 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions,
§,21c (3d ed. 1985) which states that "[h]abeas corpus is an appropri-
ate remedy for obtaining custody of a child."
The appellate court found Nicoleta was denied effective assistance
of counsel (though she did not raise the issue) since her former attor-
ney failed to provide her with the information that the social worker
later did. The court of appeal then issued a writ of habeas corpus, or-
dering the trial court to vacate its judgment and initiate new
proceedings.
The California Supreme Court noted several procedural errors
made by the appellate court beginning with its lack of jurisdiction to
even hear the claim regarding withdrawal of consent. Jurisdiction is
vested in an appellate court upon timely notice of appeal. See Estate
of Hanley, 23 Cal. 2d 120, 142 P.2d 423 (1943); 4 CAL. JUR. 3D Appel-
late Review § 155 (1973). Nicoleta never filed a notice appealing the
judgment denying her petition to withdraw consent for adoption.
She merely tacked the issue onto her brief for the father-child rela-
tionship issue. The supreme court also found error in that the court
of appeal failed to afford the parties the chance to present views via
supplemental briefing when it decided to render a decision based on
issues not originally briefed pursuant to section 68081 of the Govern-
ment Code. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68081 (West Supp. 1988). In fact,
Mr. & Mrs. H. requested the opportunity to submit supplemental
briefing once the appellate court suggested habeas corpus was appli-
cable. Their request was denied.
Error also resulted from the substitution of habeas corpus for the
available remedy of appeal. Absent special circumstances excusing
the failure to appeal, a habeas corpus writ will not lie where errors
could have been timely raised. Alexander S., 44 Cal. 3d at 865, 750
P.2d at 783, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 5 (citing In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759,
264 P.2d 513, 514 (1953)). The court of appeal also erred by failing to
abide by proper habeas corpus procedures. For example, the court
granted the writ without a verified petition and failed to afford op-
posing parties the opportunity to file a return to the petition.
Finally, the court distinguished habeas corpus in adoption cases
where it could only result in "delay, uncertainty and potential harm
to the prospective adoptee" from criminal cases where the defendant
may have been unlawfully denied personal liberty. Id. at 866, 750
P.2d at 784, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
The court then considered whether habeas corpus is ever appropri-
ate to collaterally attack a final non-modifiable judgment in adoption
cases and found it is not. The court listed six situations where habeas
corpus is allowed in custody cases:
"to enforce an existing right to physical custody established by prior order...
to determine physical custody [... ] where no previous custody order has is-
sued ... to modify a modifiable order . .. to protect a child from imminent
danger... to allow a natural parent lacking physical custody to bring an origi-
nal action.., where consent to adoption was required but not obtained... to
collaterally attack a prior order where the court lacked jurisdiction.
Id. at 866-67, 750 P.2d at 784, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 6 (citations omitted).
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The court found that habeas corpus was not applicable to Alexan-
der's case under any of the above situations, but clarified that its de-
cision was not made solely on lack of precedent. The court did,
however, express concern for the welfare of the child involved, find-
ing that "protracted litigation" over child custody may produce harm.
Id. at 868, 750 P.2d at 785, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 7. The court quoted a re-
cent United States Supreme Court decision wherein federal habeas
corpus could not be used to litigate child-custody related constitu-
tional claims stating that "[t]he State's interest in finality is unusu-
ally strong in child-custody disputes. The grant of federal habeas
corpus would prolong uncertainty for children.... It is undisputed
that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relation-
ships with their parents or foster parents." Id. (citing Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Services, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1982)).
The court found the potential delay in Alexander's case addition-
ally intolerable not only in light of the additional hearings necessary
to finalize adoption, but also since Nicoleta S. failed to "avail herself
of her right to appeal." Id. Hence, the unanimous opinion was clear;
the best interest of the child should be foremost in these cases. Pro-
cedural error by either the parties or the appellate courts cannot and
will not be excused.
LISA ELANE SLATER
VII. INSURANCE LAW
The California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA)
is not subject to section 790.03 of the Insurance Code.
CIGA is not liable under common law tort or bad faith,
but is subject to the duty to defend and to accept a
reasonable settlement offer: Issaacson v. California
Insurance Guarantee Association.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Issaacson v. California Insurance Guarantee Association, 44
Cal. 3d 775, 750 P.2d 297, 244 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1988), the California
Supreme Court held that the California Insurance Guarantee Associ-
ation (CIGA) could not be held liable for violations of the Unfair
Practices Act. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp.
1988). Furthermore, the court held that CIGA was not subject to
common law tort liability, nor liable for common law bad faith. How-
ever, the court did conclude that CIGA was under a duty to defend
insureds whose insurers had become insolvent and was also under a
duty to accept a reasonable settlement offer within statutory limits
under the Guarantee Act. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1063-1063.14 (West
1972 & Supp. 1988).
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
A medical malpractice action was brought against the two physi-
cian-plaintiffs who were insured by Imperial Insurance Company.
Imperial subsequently became insolvent and, pursuant to statute,
CIGA assumed Imperial's duty to defend the insureds. The litigants
settled the case for $500,000, but CIGA was unwilling to pay more
than $400,000. At the mandatory settlement conference, the insureds
agreed to pay the remaining $100,000. Subsequently, the insureds
brought the present suit against CIGA for reimbursement of their
$100,000 payment.
III. LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 790.03, TORT, AND COMMON LAW
BAD FAITH
A. Section 790.03 Liability
The court first indicated that CIGA was not to be treated as an or-
dinary insurance company since it was not formed as such. Rather,
CIGA was created to assure that insureds would have their claims
paid up to the statutorily delineated amount in the event their in-
surer became insolvent. The legislature expressly limited payment
by CIGA to those claims covered by the insureds' insolvent carrier up
to a maximum of $500,000 per covered claim. CIGA was not author-
ized to make payment outside the scope of covered claims.
The court noted that CIGA was not to be considered a profit mak-
ing enterprise by the court. Thus, watchdog-type procedures such as
section 790.03 of the Insurance Code and common law tort liability
were inappropriate. CIGA does not receive a financial benefit from
refusing not to defend or settle claims since it only collects funds
from California insurance companies based on its financial
obligations.
Since CIGA was not an insurance company, the court concluded
that the Unfair Practices Act, particularly section 790.03, was inappli-
cable. The legislature had specifically authorized CIGA to pay only
for covered claims, thus it was unnecessary to apply the Act to
CIGA's unique position. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972
& Supp 1988). See generally 2 P. EISLER, CALIFORNIA UNINSURED
MOTORIST LAW §§ 27.10-27.11 (4th ed. 1987) (application of Unfair
Practices Act to uninsured motorists); 1 CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW
& PRACTICE ch. 7 (1986) (overview of duty of good faith and fair deal-
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ing); 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts and Coverage §§ 410-412
(1977 & Supp 1988).
B. Tort Liability
The court held that because of the statutory mandate to pay out
only "covered claims" and the legislative intent to restrict CIGA to
"covered claims," CIGA was not liable for any tort damage in excess
of the covered claims.
C Common Law Bad Faith
The court also held that under a common law bad faith action,
CIGA was not liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing because there was no contractual relationship be-
tween CIGA and the plaintiffs.
IV. LIABILITY FOR REIMBURSEMENT WITHIN STATUTORILY
AUTHORIZED LIMITS
A. Duty to Defend
Section 1063.1 of the Insurance Code provides that CIGA has a
duty to defend if it falls within "covered claims." See CAL. INS. CODE
§ 1063.2(a) (West Supp. 1988). If the underlying insolvent insurer has
a duty to defend, CIGA assumes that duty since the scope of "covered
claims" is defined by the duty of the underlying insurance carrier.
See 1 CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 12 (1986).
B. Duty to Accept a Reasonable Settlement Offer
In order to recover an excess amount, the insured must first prove
that CIGA refused to settle the claim for a reasonable amount. If, af-
ter proof, it becomes clear that CIGA failed to accept a reasonable
settlement offer within its statutory limits, it becomes liable for the
excess amount paid by the insureds up to the policy limits. See 1 P.
EISLER, CALIFORNIA UNINSURED MOTORIST LAW § 8.70 (4th ed. 1986)
(application of Guarantee Act to uninsured motorists); 1 CALIFORNIA
INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE ch. 12 (1986); 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insur-
ance Companies §§ 166, 169 (1977 & Supp. 1988). The court qualified
its holding by stating that no presumption exists providing that the
total amount paid to a plaintiff in a tort action constitutes a reason-
able settlement in a situation where CIGA paid less than the statu-
tory maximum and the alleged tortfeasors paid the rest.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislature has expressly authorized that CIGA pay only "cov-
ered claims," and thus a good reason exists for eliminating any liab-
lity for excess payments. It takes only a small inferential leap to
conclude that any allegations of unfair practices under sections 790-
790.10 will not apply to CIGA because of the statutory limit. How-
ever, CIGA is still liable under a statutory duty for payment of "cov-
ered claims," and CIGA still has an affirmative duty to defend and to
accept reasonable settlement offers within the statutory limits. Thus,
CIGA is not completely immune from litigation.
ERNEST F. BATENGA
VIII. LABOR LAW
A. Parity agreements in employment contracts between
employees and school districts are not per se illegal, but
will be analyzed on a case-by-case basis: Banning Teachers
Association v. Public Employment Relations Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court, in Banning Teachers Association v.
Public Employment Relations Board, 44 Cal. 3d 799, 750 P.2d 313, 244
Cal. Rptr. 671 (1988), refused to hold that parity agreements between
a school district and its employees are per se violations of sections
3543.5 and 3545 of the Government Code. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 3543.5, 3545 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter sections 3543.5
and 3545]. The court did state, however, that a parity agreement
could be found to violate those provisions, but the decision of the
Public Employment Relations Board as to the existence of a violation
would be given due deference.
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Banning Unified School District [hereinafter the District] en-
tered into negotiations with its classified employees unit and con-
sented to a parity agreement. The parity agreement would match
any subsequent increase in salaries of other units. A few months
later the District entered into negotiations with District's certificated
employees unit through the unit's representative California Teachers
Association/National Education Association [hereinafter CTANEA].
The certified employees and salaries were raised above the classified
employees' salaries pursuant to the parity agreement. CTANEA
filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Rela-
tions Board [hereinafter PERB]. PERB has statutory power to inves-
tigate charges alleging violations of sections 3543.5 and 3545. See
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generally 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools § 366 (1980 & Supp. 1988) (over-
view of PERB). The administrative law judge found no violation
under the cited statutes and concluded that the District had not vio-
lated its duty to bargain in good faith. PERB filed an opinion agree-
ing with the administrative law judge and reasoned that the legality
of parity agreements should be litigated on a case by case basis. The
appellate court reversed, holding that parity agreements were per se
illegal.
A. Separation of Agencies Pursuant to Section 3545 of the
Government Code
Justice Panelli stated that PERB was statutorily granted the power
to investigate and resolve unfair practice charges. Banning, 44 Cal.
3d at 804, 750 P.2d at 315, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 673. The court indicated
that the appellate court failed to give due deference to the decision
by PERB and had substituted its own decision.
The court further stated that each unit negotiates on its own behalf
for its own benefits pursuant to Government Code section 3545, sub-
section b(3). See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3545(b)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
See generally Blumberg, Brannigan & Nason, Administrative Power
and Collective Bargaining in the Schools, 10 J. OF COLLECTIVE NEGO-
TIATION IN PUB. SECTOR 327 (1981) (general discussion on collective
bargaining in the school setting). Since the requirement was fol-
lowed, any benefit to the classified employees pursuant to the parity
agreement was not the mixing of units against which section 3545
was mandated.
B. Bargaining in Good Faith by the District Pursuant to Section
3543.5
The court held that in this instance the parity agreement did not
violate the District's duty to bargain in good faith pursuant to section
3543.5. The court reasoned that the District was operating under a
finite budget constraint and would take into consideration its bar-
gaining results with other units regardless of the existence of the
parity agreement. The court gave deference to PERB's finding that
the existence of the parity agreement, in this case, did not have a sig-
nificant impact on the bargaining power of teachers. See generally
Note, The Negotiability of Parity Agreements in Public Sector Collec-
tive Bargaining, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 139 (1982) (impact of parity
agreements in New York).
III. CONCLUSION
The court held that parity agreements are not per se illegal, but
the legality of such agreements must be determined on a case by case
basis. Thus, negotiations would still be subject to scrutiny, although
substantial deference would be given to the findings of PERB. The
court, in this case, examined a split in case law among the various
state and federal jurisdictions and resolved to follow a course which
would give the deference to PERB that earlier California case law
had mandated. The court dismissed the argument that parity agree-
ments would inhibit a non-parity unit since school districts must now
consider that individual pay increases may automatically increase pay
for the parity unit. When combined with finite budgetary restric-
tions, this may cause an enormous disincentive to raise pay, which
will ultimately decrease the non-parity unit's bargaining power. Due
to the statutory mandate, the court allowed the three-member Public
Employment Relations Board to become the major factor in deter-
mining whether or not the disincentive affected the duty to bargain
in good faith.
ERNEST F. BATENGA
Ix. REAL PROPERTY LAW
A. The United States is similar to a private landowner and
is not precluded by the federal Constitution from
acquiring riparian rights. Prior to exercising its
riparian rights, the United States must apply to the
Water Resources Control Board to determine the
propriety of the intended use: In re Water of Hallett
Creek Stream System.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System,1 the issue before
the supreme court was whether, pursuant to California law, the
United States had riparian water rights on land reserved by the fed-
eral government as a national forest. The court found that the
United States was in a position equivalent to that of a private Califor-
nia landowner and that the federal government was not forbidden by
the United States Constitution from acquiring riparian rights under
the laws of California. The court based this finding on the principle
that the federal government may act in a proprietary capacity with
1. 44 Cal. 3d 448, 749 P.2d 324, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1988). Justice Kaufman wrote
the unanimous opinion of the court. For a discussion of the law prior to this decision,
see Comment, The Application of California Riparian Water Rights Doctrine to Fed-
eral Lands in the Mono Lake Basin, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1983).
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respect to reserved lands, but that Congress will defer to state law in
ascertaining the riparian rights attached to those lands. In addition,
the court found that these riparian rights were not per se defeasible2
and that the United States must apply to the Water Resources Con-
trol Board (the Board), prior to the exercise of these rights, for a de-
termination as to the propriety of the intended use. The court
believed that such a finding was consistent both with the powers
given to the Board by the state and with the treatment given to a pri-
vate party asserting a riparian right.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August 1976, the Board3 was petitioned by a private party to de-
termine the rights of several claimants as to the waters of Lassen
County's Hallett Creek Stream System. With a need for water in the
Plumas National Forest, the United States asserted rights of two
types: "(1) a 'reserved' water right under federal law for 'primary' na-
tional forest purposes 4 ... and (2) riparian 5 water rights under Cali-
fornia law for 'secondary' national forest purposes."6 The Board
granted the claim of reserved rights, but denied the United States ri-
2. For an explanation of defeasibility, see ivtfra notes 33-39 and accompanying
text.
3. The State Water Resources Control Board [hereinafter the Board] is the ad-
ministrative body charged with the primary determination of water rights in Califor-
nia. See CAL. WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1971). For further explanation of the Board's
procedure, see Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 454 n.1, 749 P.2d at 325 n.1, 243 Cal. Rptr. at
888-89 n.1. See generally 62 CAL. JUR. 3D Water §§ 496-500 (1981) (function and proce-
dure of the Board).
4. Under the reserved rights doctrine, land reserved for a federal purpose im-
pliedly reserved sufficient water to carry out the primary purpose of the reservation.
Therefore, where the federal government seeks water rights for a "secondary pur-
pose," it may not use the federal reserved rights doctrine; rather, it must look to the
appropriate state law. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 457-58, 749 P.2d at 327-28, 243 Cal.
Rptr. at 891 (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698, 711-15 (1978); Cap-
paert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1976)); see also infra note 8 and accompa-
nying text.
5. Two types of water rights are recognized under California law. Riparian rights
give the proprietor the right to make "reasonable and beneficial uses of the water on
that land." Appropriative rights give a person "who diverts or appropriates water
from a watercourse and puts it to a reasonable and beneficial use.., a right to that use
which is superior to the rights of later appropriators." Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 454-
55 n.2, 749 P.2d at 325 n.2, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.2; see also 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 768-777 (1987); 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters §§ 260, 316
(1975); 62 CAL. JUR. 3D Water §§ 65-183, 255-385 (1981).
6. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 454-55, 749 P.2d at 325, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889. The
United States described their primary use as "firefighting and roadwatering." The sec-
ondary use was described as "wildlife enhancement." Id.
parian rights for its secondary purpose on the grounds that California
law did not authorize the granting of riparian rights to the federal
government and that Congress had dissolved the government's ability
to assert such a claim.7
Pursuant to section 2757 of the California Water Code, the United
States sought a new determination of its riparian rights in the supe-
rior court.8 Upholding the United States' exception to the Board's
determination, the superior court stressed that under California law,
the federal government is no less able to assert its riparian rights
than other California landowners. 9 The trial court also found that
although Congress had indeed made federal riparian rights defeasible
to appropriative rights on public lands, Congress had not made such a
rule applicable to lands reserved for national forest purposes.0 The
court of appeal subsequently affirmed the superior court's holding as
to the existence of riparian rights, but reversed the trial court's find-
ing on defeasibility, holding that federal legislation requires that fed-
eral riparian rights are "automatically subordinate to the rights of
subsequent appropriators."" Both parties petitioned the supreme
court for review.
III. THE COURT'S OPINION
A. It is Constitutionally Permissible for the United States to Assert
Riparian Rights under California Law.
The Board first argued that the federal government was incapable
of exercising rights in a proprietary capacity under state law since
the exercise of such rights was beyond the scope of the sovereign
powers delegated in the federal Constitution.12 In rejecting this argu-
ment, the court first noted the differences between a private and gov-
ernmental landowner.i3 Looking to United States Supreme Court
cases which discussed federal water rights, the court found that
although these rights had been discussed in terms of the sovereign
rights delegated by the commerce i 4 and supremacy' 5 clauses of the
7. Id. at 455, 749 P.2d at 326, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889. The pertinent federal legisla-
tion includes the Mining Act of 1866, 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976), the Patents Act of 1870, 43
U.S.C. § 661 (1976), and the Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-23 (1976).
8. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 445, 749 P.2d at 326, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889. The ripa-
rian rights issue was the only ground for appeal. The reserved rights issue was consid-
ered settled at the Board level and is not germane to the remainder of the discussion.
9. Id. at 455, 749 P.2d at 326, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
10. Id. at 456, 749 P.2d at 326, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 459, 749 P.2d at 328, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
13. Id. See generally Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water,
45 CALIF. L. REv. 638, 649-53 (1957) (discussion of government ownership of land).
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
15. Id.
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Constitution, no decision has precluded the United States from exer-
cising its state-provided proprietary rights along with its sovereign
powers. 16 Based on the holdings in Camfield v. United States17 and
Kleppe v. New Mexico,18 the court held that the federal government
was free to act in a proprietary capacity with respect to its own
land.19
Having established the ability of the United States to act in a pro-
prietary capacity, the court next considered whether the exercise of
such rights was proper under California law. Based on the landmark
water rights case of United States v. New Mexico,20 the court found
that "[w]here Congress has expressly addressed the question of
whether federal entities must abide by state water law, it has almost
invariably deferred to the state law."2 1 Applying the United States v.
New Mexico holding in a manner it believed to be consistent with
congressional intent, the court extended the requirement of deferring
to state law to include decisions determining water rights for secon-
dary uses on federally reserved lands. Thus, as California law pro-
vides for the acquisition of riparian rights by any proprietor,2 2 the
court established that the United States was not constitutionally pro-
hibited from asserting its riparian rights under the laws of the state.
B. Congress did not Sever Federal Proprietary Claims to Riparian
Rights in California.
The Board next alleged that Congress's passing of the Mining Acts
of 1866,23 the Patents Act of 1870,24 and the Desert Land Act of
187725 served to sever federal proprietary claims to riparian rights in
California. Disagreeing with the Board, the court discussed the his-
tory of water rights in California26 and concluded that these Acts
16. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 460, 749 P.2d at 329, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
17. 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897).
18. 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976).
19. Hallet Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 460, 749 P.2d at 329, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93.
20. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
21. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 460, 749 P.2d at 329, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 893 (quoting
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702).
22. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
23. 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1975).
24. 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976); see 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real
Property § 772 (1987).
25. 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-23 (1976); see Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 462-66, 749 P.2d at
330-33, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 894-97.
26. Id. at 463-64, 749 P.2d at 332, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 895. See generally Note, In-
stream Appropriations and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Conserving Water for the
Future, 75 GEO. L.J. 1701 (1987) (water rights in western states); Note, Federal-State
both established the "appropriation doctrine" and applied it to "the
waters of the West."27 The court noted that the present dispute was
sparked by the development of competing theories as to federal ripa-
rian rights under state law. Under the California doctrine, as pro-
pounded by the United States, state law governed the rights
applicable to the United States in association with its property in the
state; therefore, the riparian rights adopted by California in Lux v.
Haggin28 were to apply.29 Under the Oregon rule, the theory pro-
pounded by the Board, the Desert Land Act was viewed as establish-
ing appropriative rights as the "'uniform rule'" in the western
states, thus resulting in a severance of the federal government's
water rights from the land upon conveyance.30
This dispute was settled by the United States Supreme Court in
California-Oregon Power v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.31 Attempt-
ing to find a middle ground, the Court approved the Oregon doc-
trine32 but failed to find that appropriation was the "uniform rule."
Rather, the Court deferred to the various western states on the ques-
tion of whether common law riparian rights or appropriative rights
should apply.33 Based on this history, the Hallett Creek court was
left with no precedent pertaining to the water rights which attached
to land retained by the United States. With no case law impairing
the Lux decision that riparian rights are applicable to California
landowners regardless of the owners identity, the court concluded
that no severance had occurred and that riparian rights attached to
federal property within the state.3 4
C. Riparian Rights on Federally Reserved Lands are not
Defeasible.
The Board next contended, as the court of appeal so held, that the
Desert Land Act automatically subordinates riparian rights on fed-
Corflicts over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 971 (1960) [here-
inafter Federal-State Conkflicts] (discussion of the conflict between riparian and appro-
priative rights and state and federal assertions of those rights).
27. 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
28. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 464, 749 P.2d at 332, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96; see also
Federal-State Conflicts, supra note 26, at 972-73. See generally 62 CAL. JUR. 3D Water
§§ 66-67 (1981) (federal and state owners of riparian rights and Lux discussion).
29. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 465, 749 P.2d at 332-33, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 897; see also
Hough v. Porter, 51 Or. 382, 98 P. 1083 (1909). See generally 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters
§ 278 (1975) (severance of rights from land); 62 CAL. JUR. 3D Water §§ 114-116 (1981)
(severance of rights from land).
30. 295 U.S. 142 (1935) (patent issued for lands in a desert territory does not in-
clude the right to water flowing across or bordering upon the land).
31. Id. at 164.
32. Id.
33. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 467, 749 P.2d at 334, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
34. Id. at 467-68, 749 P.2d at 334, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 898. See generally 62 CAL. JUR.
3D Water §§ 66-67 (1981) (rights of prior riparian or appropriative owners).
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eral lands to "subsequent appropriators recognized under state and
local law."35 Based on Federal Power Commission v. Oregon,36 the
court rejected this contention, emphasizing that the Desert Land Act
subordinates riparian rights only on federal lands which are within
the "public domain" 37 and not on lands "reserved" for a federal pur-
pose.3 8 Dismissing the appellate court's contention that United States
v. New Mexico3 9 overruled Federal Power Commission, the court
found that "nothing in that decision limits the United States to the
acquisition of appropriative rights where riparian rights are other-
wise recognized under state law." 40 The court concluded that Cali-
fornia does not provide for the principle of a "federally held
'defeasible riparian right.' "41
D. Federal Riparian Rights may be Limited.
Finally, the court answered the Board's contention that the rights
of appropriators would be violated upon implementation of an "unex-
ercised" federal riparian right.42 Based on In re Waters of Long Val-
ley Creek Stream System, 43 the court held that no such violation of
rights would occur because the Board is empowered to subordinate
the federal riparian rights to "appropriative 'rights currently being
exercised,' and may further 'determine that the future riparian right
[of the federal government] shall have a lower priority than any uses
of water it authorizes before the riparian in fact attempts to exercise
his right.' "44 As a result of this power, the court concluded that
prior to the exercise of its riparian rights, the United States must ap-
35. 349 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1955).
36. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 469, 749 P.2d at 335-36, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 899. Lands
of "public domain" are "lands open to settlement, sale or disposition under the federal
public land laws .... 'Reserved' lands are lands which have been removed from the
public domain for some predetermined purpose, such as a national park [or] national
forest." Id at 456 n.5, 749 P.2d at 326-27 n.5, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 890 n.5.
37. Id. at 469, 749 P.2d at 335-36, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 899 (citing Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976)).
38. 348 U.S. 696 (1978); see also text accompanying notes 19-21.
39. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 470, 749 P.2d at 336, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
40. Id. at 470, 749 P.2d at 336, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
41. Id.
42. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979) [hereinafter Long Valley].
43. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 471, 749 P.2d at 337, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (quoting
Long Valley, 25 Cal. 3d at 359, 599 P.2d at 668-69, 678, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 362. See gener-
ally Note, Unused Riparian Water Rights In Washington-Department of Ecology v.
Abbot, 103 Wash. 2d 686, 694 P.2d 1071 (1985), 60 WASH. L. REV. 787 (1985) (loss of
unexercised water rights).
44. Hallett Creek, 44 Cal. 3d at 472, 749 P.2d at 337, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
ply to the Water Resources Control Board for a determination as to
the propriety of the intended use.45 This determination will be made
"in light of the state's interest in promoting the most efficient and
beneficial use of the state's waters."46
IV. CONCLUSION
Hallett Creek presents a question of first impression in California
and raises vital issues in a time when western states are suffering a
severe water shortage. The United States has not previously at-
tempted to claim riparian rights on its reserved lands in California.
In light of the percentage of California land owned by the federal
government, the significance of the decision only increases. The
court has succeeded in finding a middle ground where both the fed-
eral and state interests are efficiently and equitably served. By re-
quiring the United States to apply to the Water Resources Control
Board prior to exercising its riparian rights, the court has assured
that the rights of prior appropriators will be protected. Similarly, by
allowing the federal government to be treated in a fashion equivalent
to other California proprietors, the court has assured the United
States of an equal opportunity to protect its national forests.
STEVEN L. MILLER
B. San Francisco's Transit Impact Development Fee does not
violate developers' vested rights despite retroactive
application: Russ Building Partnership v. City and County of
San Franscisco.
In Russ Building Partnership v. City and County of San Frans-
cisco, 44 Cal. 3d 839, 750 P.2d 324, 244 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988), the court
upheld the retroactive application of a San Franscisco Transit Impact
Development Fee (TIDF) ordinance. The plaintiffs' building permits
were conditioned upon participation in a "downtown assessment dis-
trict or similar fair and appropriate mechanism." Thus, the TIDF
embraced the condition's scope. The court found that the TIDF as-
sessment did not violate the plaintiffs' vested rights because the
building permits were subject to the conditions expressed in the
permits.
In 1979, both Crocker National Bank (Crocker) and Pacific Gate-
way Associates Joint Venture (Pacific) applied for building permits
to erect office towers in downtown San Francisco. Alarmed by the
probable increase in both noise and congestion, and also cognizant of
an environmental impact report indicating a negative impact on the
45. I&
46. 1&
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San Francisco Municipal Railway, the permits were approved subject
to both Crocker's and Pacific's participation in a downtown assess-
ment district. This downtown assessment district or "similiar fair
and appropriate mechanism," would raise capital to maintain and im-
prove San Francisco's transportation services. Crocker and Pacific
accepted the conditional permits. All other permits approved for of-
fice development in downtown San Francisco also imposed the same
condition.
In 1981, while Pacific and Crocker were constructing their build-
ings, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors instituted the TIDF or-
dinance. The restriction required all developers of new downtown
San Francisco office space to pay the TIDF as a prerequisite to re-
ceiving a certificate of completion and occupancy. The defendant
contended that the purpose of the TIDF was to offset the increasing
costs that the new office developments would have on San Fran-
cisco's public transportation system.
Property developers acquire a vested right to finish construction of
a project once they accomplish substantial work, incur considerable
liabilities, and rely in good faith on a building permit issued by a gov-
ernment agency. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South
Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 791, 553 P.2d 546, 550, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 386, 389-90 (1976) (citing Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. Santa Bar-
bara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 784, 194 P.2d 148, 152 (1948) (quoting 9 AM.
JUR. Buildings § 8 (1937)). Once a vested right is acquired, a subse-
quent change in zoning rules will not upset such a right to build as
authorized by the building permit. Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 791, 553 P.2d at
550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (1976). Vested rights not only encompass
protection of construction rights, but also the right to use the subject
property as contemplated by the building permit. San Diego v. Mc-
Clurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 234 P.2d 972, 977 (1951) (citing Coldwater
v. Williams Oil Co., 288 Mich. 140, 142-43, 284 N.W. 675, 676 (1939));
Best & Co. v. Incorporated Village of Gorden City, 286 N.Y.S. 980, 981,
247 A.D. 893 (1936)); see 13 AM. JUR. 2D Buildings § 10 (1964 & Supp.
1988); 11 CAL. JUR. 3D Building Regulations § 1 (1974 & Supp. 1988).
A special assessment district is a fee mechanism that is imposed
upon property which will benefit from a public improvement. Daw-
son v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 16 Cal. 3d 676, 683, 547 P.2d 1377, 1381,
129 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1976) (quoting CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 10008
(West 1969)); Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 552, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391, 395 (1980). The spe-
cial assessment district, created by a local government resolution, is
subject to public scrutiny and rejection unless overridden by an
eighty percent majority of the local legislative body. Dawson, 16 Cal.
3d at 683 n.4, 547 P.2d at 1381 n.4, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 101 n.4.
Plaintiffs Crocker and Pacific attacked the TIDF ordinance on
three grounds. First, it was argued that the intention of the TIDF
was to apply to both prior and present downtown office buildings.
Second, the TIDF was not a downtown assessment district because it
only subjected new office developments to the fee mechanism. And
third, the TIDF violated the plaintiffs' vested rights to develop office
towers because their building permits did not effectively notify them
of the TIDF. Thus, such a retroactive application, it was argued, vio-
lated their constitutional due process rights. The court summarily
rejected all three arguments.
First, the court reasoned that the express language of the building
permits called for the TIDFs to be applied to new office develop-
ments. The wording "cumulative office development," according to
the court, signified that the TIDFs were to furnish additional capital
to San Francisco. This additional capital would be used to pay for the
additional cost in maintenance and improvements required since new
office developments would cause additional burdens on San Fran-
cisco's public transportation system.
Second, the TIDF, according to the court, was comparable to a spe-
cial assessment district since it applied to a specific geographic area
which would benefit from better transportation services. Addition-
ally, the TIDF raised funds that would pay for the increased de-
mands created by the plaintiffs' projects. Therefore, the TIDF was
analogous to a downtown assessment district or "similar fair and ap-
propriate mechanism."
Third, the TIDF did not violate the plaintiffs' vested rights because
the plaintiffs' building permits expressly conditioned their construc-
tion rights. The court opined that even if the condition was ambigu-
ous in its application, the plaintiffs were not exempt from the
operation of the conditional building permits. Thus, the plaintiffs
were adequately notified because the TIDF was a reasonable adapta-
tion of the expressed condition of the plaintiffs' building permits.
This case sanctions the use of ambiguous conditional building per-
mits. Consequently, developers will be heavily impacted as munici-
palities will retroactively control land use without violating a
developer's vested rights-so long as the retroactively imposed condi-
tion is an appropriate application of the pre-existing building permit.
PETER BENNETT LANGBORD
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x. TORTS
Strict liability will not be imposed on manufacturers of
prescription drugs if the drug is properly prepared and
contains appropriate warnings at the time of
distribution. The market share doctrine does not support
causes of action for fraud, breach of warranty, or joint
liability of defendant manufacturers: Brown v. Superior
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court re-
solved several issues involving the scope of liability for prescription
drug manufacturers. The court held that the manufacturers were
not strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by prescription drugs, ab-
sent proof that the drug was improperly prepared or that the manu-
facturer failed to warn of dangerous side effects which were known
or reasonably should have been known when the drug was distrib-
uted.2 The court also clarified the market share doctrine enunciated
in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories3 by stating that defendant manufac-
turers were not jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of
damages. Rather, they are liable only for the proportion of the dam-
ages which equaled their respective percentage or share of the mar-
ket.4 Furthermore, causes of action for fraud and breach of warranty
could not be maintained based on the "market share" theory of
liability.5
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs, in sixty-nine different cases, 6 brought suit against
170 or more manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) for
injuries sustained in utero after their mothers had used the drug dur-
1. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988). Justice Mosk wrote the
unanimous opinion for the court.
2. Id. at 1069, 751 P.2d at 482-83, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 425. See infra notes 13-40 and
accompanying text.
3. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
4. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1072-75, 751 P.2d at 485-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426-28. See
inkfra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
5. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1072, 751 P.2d at 484, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
6. Id. at 1055, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414. Although each case is in-
dependent of the others, the court's ruling is binding on all of the actions as well as
subsequently filed cases presenting the same issues. Id.
ing pregnancy to prevent miscarriage. 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant manufacturers knew DES contained a cancer-causing sub-
stance, but failed to warn the prospective users or their physicians of
these inherent dangers.8 The plaintiffs sought to hold the defendant
manufacturers liable based upon strict liability, negligence, fraud,
and breach of both express and implied warranties. 9
The trial court, in pre-trial rulings, held that the defendants were
liable for injuries caused by DES only if they failed to warn of known
defects or side effects.O Further, the lower court dismissed the
breach of warranty and fraud causes of action maintained under the
market share theory of liability, stating that each defendant manu-
facturer was liable only for the damages which are equal to its pro-
portion of the market." These rulings were upheld by the appellate
court.
12
III. SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR MANUFACTURERS
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
The court first examined the issue of whether strict liability should
be imposed on manufacturers of prescription drugs.' 3 Strict liability,
unlike negligence where liability is predicated on the failure of the
manufacturer to exercise due care, imposes liability on the manufac-
turer merely upon proof that a defect in the product caused the al-
leged injury.14 The focus is "not on the conduct of the manufacturer
but on the product itself, and [strict liability] holds the manufacturer
liable if the product was defective."'15
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 16 identified three different types of
situations where a manufacturer could be held strictly liable. First,
strict liability may be imposed when a product is improperly manu-
factured and causes injury which would not have occurred had the
product been properly manufactured. 17 Second, strict liability may
7. Id. at 1054-55, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414. A more detailed discussion
of the problems associated with DES and the injuries which resulted from its use is
presented in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 593-95, 607 P.2d 924, 925-26,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133-34, cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
8. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1055, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1055, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
11. Id. at 1055, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
12. See Brown v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 150, 227 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1986).
13. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059, 751 P.2d at 473-74, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 415. Only one
case had held that strict liability should be imposed on a manufacturer of prescription
drugs. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-57 (1st Cir. 1981).
14. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1056, 751 P.2d at 474, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 415. Strict liability
was adopted by the California Supreme Court in 1963. See Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
15. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1056, 751 P.2d at 474, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
16. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
17. Id. at 428-29, 573 P.2d at 453-54, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36; see Escola v. Coca-Cola
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arise when the product is defectively designed.' 8 Finally, strict liabil-
ity can be applied against manufacturers for failure to warn of a
product's dangerous propensities.19 The Brown court examined only
the second and third types of strict liability since the plaintiff did not
allege the existence of a manufacturing defect.
Two tests were enunciated in Barker to prove that a product was
designed defectively.20 The first test involves an examination into
whether "the product failed to perform as safely as the ordinary con-
sumer would expect when used in an intended and reasonably fore-
seeable manner."21 The Brown court stated that the "consumer
expectation standard" is inapplicable when the product is a prescrip-
tion drug.22 A patient's expectation as to the effectiveness and risks
associated with the use of prescription drugs are based on the infor-
mation which the physician has conveyed to him.23 The warnings re-
garding a particular drug are directed to the physician who has the
duty to inform the patient as to the side effects of the particular
drug.2 4 Thus, the court reasoned that since a physician understands
that the use of prescription drugs often involves uncertain results
and risks, a manufacturer is not liable under the "consumer expecta-
tion" test as long as adequate warnings are provided to the
physician.25
The second test stated in Barker involves balancing the gravity and
likelihood of the risks inherent in the product as designed against the
benefits the product could produce to the public. 26 The Brown court
argued that strict liability should not be imposed on manufacturers of
prescription drugs, such as DES, which contain unknown inherent
dangers because the benefits of having such drugs available to the
public outweigh the risks involved in their use.27 "Public policy fa-
vors the development and marketing of beneficial new drugs, even
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Coca-Cola bottle exploded in plain-
tiff's hand).
18. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235. See infra notes 31-32 and ac-
companying text.
19. Barker, 20 Cal. 2d at 428, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235. See infra notes
31-32 and accompanying text.
20. Barker, 20 Cal. 2d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
21. Id.
22. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1061-62, 751 P.2d at 477-78, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
26. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
27. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1062-65, 751 P.2d at 478-80, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419-21.
though some risks, perhaps serious ones, might accompany their in-
troduction because drugs save lives and reduce pain and suffering."28
If strict liability is imposed on prescription drug manufacturers, then
such manufacturers might be discouraged from undertaking research
and development of new drugs because of the likelihood of imposing
liability for unknown dangers and the high cost of obtaining insur-
ance.2 9 Thus, although the manufacturer is in a superior position to
obtain insurance and spread the costs to consumers, this is out-
weighed by the detrimental effect the imposition of strict liability
would have on the development and distribution of new drugs.30
Furthermore, the court stated that because society is benefited by
the development of new drugs, a manufacturer should not be strictly
liable for failing to warn of dangers which were not known and could
not have been scientifically known at the time the drug was distrib-
uted.3 1 As long as the manufacturer discloses all known or knowable
potential side effects of a particular drug, such as DES, to the physi-
cian, strict liability cannot be imposed on the manufacturer for fail-
ure to warn the patient of a potential danger.32
In rejecting the application of the strict liability doctrine to pre-
scription drugs, the court adopted the less strict standard of liability
set forth by comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.33 Under comment k, a manufacturer of prescription drugs
28. Id. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. Drugs, as distinguished from
other products where strict liability is imposed, are often "necessary to alleviate pain
and suffering or to sustain life." Id. Thus, it is beneficial to have prescription drugs
made available at a low cost to the public. Id.
29. Id. at 1063-65, 751 P.2d at 479-80, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420-21.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1065, 751 P.2d at 480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421. Only a few courts subject a
manufacturer to strict liability for failing to warn of a defect regardless of whether the
manufacturer could have known about the defect. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville
Sales Co., 484 So. 2d 110, 114-15 (La. 1986); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d
434, 438 (Mo. 1984); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 346 Pa. Super. 95, 499 A.2d 326
(1985); Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 821-22, 579 P.2d 940, 947 (1978).
32. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1066, 751 P.2d at 480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). Comment k
states:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the pres-
ent state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of ra-
bies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences
when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful
death, both the marketing and use of vaccine are fully justified, notwithstand-
ing the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot le-
gally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It
is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, be-
cause of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there
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is liable only for failing to warn of known or knowable dangerous
side effects of the drug.34 Thus, comment k resembles a negligence
standard in that liability is not premised on the mere existence of a
defective product, but on the failure of the manufacturer to properly
prepare the drug or to provide an adequate warning as to all dangers
which could have been known at the time of distribution.35
Although the court adopted the comment k standard, it rejected
the additional requirement set forth in Kearl v. Lederle Laborato-
ries3 6 that comment k is applicable only to drugs which are "unavoid-
ably dangerous." Kearl imposed an obligation on the trial judge to
determine, out of the presence of the jury, whether or not the drug
was "unavoidably dangerous."37 If the judge determines the drug is
unavoidably dangerous, the comment k standard would be invoked.
Otherwise, strict liability would be imposed on all those drugs which
did not satisfy this definition.38 The Brown court, in disapproving the
Kearl test, stated that adoption of such a test would create a likeli-
hood of inconsistency between judges in different cases and between
can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products,
again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed,
and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held
to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely be-
cause he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
34. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417. Most courts
have adopted the comment k standard. See DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697
F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir.
1969); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (D. Md. 1975); Stone v.
Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301, 1303-04 (Ala. 1984); Johnson v.
American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 285-86, 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (1986); see also Car-
michael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d958, 988, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 400 (1971); Christofferson
v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 79, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1971); Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 708-11, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 412-14 (1967).
35. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
36. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 828-30, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463-64 (1985).
37. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 829-30, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64. Kearl states that the
judge must answer:
(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer an excep-
tionally important benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2)
whether the then-existing risk posed by the product Was both 'substantial' and
'unavoidable'; and (3) whether the interest in availability (again measured as
of the time of distribution) outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced ac-
countability through strict liability design defect review.
Id. at 829-30, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
38. Id. at 829-30, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64.
a judge and jury in the same case.3 9 The Kearl test might also be a
significant deterrent for a manufacturer to develop new drugs be-
cause of the possibility that a judge might subjectively determine that
the drug was not unavoidably dangerous and apply the strict liability
standard.40
IV. MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories4 1 the court adopted what became
known as the market share doctrine of liability. Under the market
share doctrine, the Sindell court acknowledged that it is often impos-
sible for a plaintiff to trace exactly which manufacturer produced the
product that caused the injury.42 In Sindell, the problem was ampli-
fied because the drug involved, DES, caused injuries to persons in
utero after their mothers had consumed the drug during pregnancy.43
To afford the plaintiffs relief for their injuries, the court stated that
as long as a substantial share of the DES manufacturers were joined
in the action, all defendants who were unable to prove that they
could not have supplied the DES ingested by the plaintiffs' mothers
would be liable for that proportion of the judgment which was repre-
sentative of their respective market share. 44
The plaintiffs, in Brown, sought to hold the defendants jointly and
severally liable for the entire judgment under the market share doc-
trine.45 The court noted that the market share theory of liability
enunciated in Sindell balanced the interest in affording the plaintiffs
relief for injuries caused by the drug against the interest in ascertain-
ing a reasonable approximation of a defendant's responsibility for the
injuries caused by the drug.46 The court concluded that joint liabil-
ity, which could lead to one defendant manufacturer being responsi-
39. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1067-68, 751 P.2d at 481-82, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
40. Id.
41. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
42. Id. at 600-01, 607 P.2d at 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. Although no other
jurisdiction has adopted the Sindell approach to market share liability, several jurisdic-
tions have adopted modified versions of the market share theory. See Shakil v. Led-
erie Laboratories, 219 N.J. Super. 601, 530 A.2d 1287 (1987); Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collin v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d
166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). Several jurisdictions, however, have rejected the market-
share theory of liability. See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa
1986); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982); Zafft v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984); Senn v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or.
256, 751 P.2d 215 (1988); Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super. 264, 505 A.2d
973 (1985).
45. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1072, 751 P.2d at 485, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426. This issue was
not addressed in Sindell.
46. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1074-75, 751 P.2d at 486-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28; see
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-12, 607 P.2d at 935-36, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
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ble for the entire amount of damages regardless of its market share,
was inconsistent with the balancing of interests involved in Sindel. 4 7
Thus, defendant manufacturers under the market share theory are li-
able only for the proportion of the damages which equals their re-
spective share of the market.48
The Brown court also rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that causes
of action for fraud and breach of warranty could be maintained under
the market share doctrine. 49 The plaintiff, in a cause of action for
fraud, would be unable to prove the requisite knowledge or intent of
the defendants making the alleged representation under the market
share theory.50 The breach of warranty causes of action were rebut-
ted by the court because such actions were inconsistent with the
court's prior determination of the scope of liability for manufacturers
of prescription drugs.5l Therefore, "a plaintiff who proceeds on a
market share theory may not prosecute a cause of action for fraud or
breach of warranty."52
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court has determined that, as a policy, the
development and distribution of new prescription drugs is desirable.
Strict liability should not be imposed on manufacturers of prescrip-
tion drugs for injuries caused by defects not known or scientifically
knowable at the time of distribution. By adopting the comment k
standard, which does not subject manufacturers to strict liability un-
less the drug was improperly prepared or the manufacturers failed to
provide appropriate warnings, the court is encouraging the develop-
ment of new drugs. Manufacturers may distribute prescription drugs
and will not be held liable for defects which they could not have de-
tected at the time of distribution.
Additionally, the court clarified the application of the market
share theory of liability enunciated in Sindell. By acknowledging
that the market share theory of liability balances the competing in-
47. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1075, 751 P.2d at 486-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
48. Id. at 1074-75, 751 P.2d at 486, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 428. But see Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 605-07, 689 P.2d 368, 382-83 (those defendants remain-
ing in the case where presumed to have produced the entire market upon which the
final percentages of liability were to be based unless they proved they had a smaller
portion of the market).
49. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1070-72, 751 P.2d at 483-84, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 425-26.
50. Id. at 1070-71, 751 P.2d at 483-84, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 425-26.
51. Id. at 1072, 751 P.2d at 484, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
52. Id.
terests of injured plaintiffs and defendant manufacturer, the court is
unwilling to allow plaintiffs to expose manufacturers to liability be-
yond their respective market share. Although the market share doc-
trine allows a plaintiff to recover for injuries which result from the
use of a drug such as DES, the court stated that recovery is limited to
a manufacturer's market share.
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